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1. Introduction 
                                                                                                                                              
“China is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. China 
is not in Africa for altruistic reasons. China is in Africa for China primarily.”  
Johnnies Carson, US assistant secretary for African affairs (The Guardian US embassy cables 2010a) 
 
What is behind statements like this? What is the motivation of a high ranking US official 
to make such serious accusations towards a new emerging global power? And how much 
truth lies in this statement?  
What is certainly true is that the Sino-African economic relationship has experienced 
enormous developments in the last decade. This intensification of intercontinental 
cooperation involves significantly increased trade relations, billions of new Chinese 
investments as well as public loans – developments that had received a remarkable 
degree of public attention. At the same time, China’s often much more intense activities 
in other parts of the world have received less public notice (Ye 2010, 2).Since this 
increase in intercontinental cooperation is of very recent nature and of high significance 
for the global economy, and moreover, the valuation of this process by journalistic and 
scientific publications ranges from high criticism to strong approval, an assessment of 
the actual impact of Chinese activities in African countries is deemed to be a promising 
and highly relevant research project. 
Two countries in sub-Saharan Africa that experienced a substantial increase in 
cooperation with China are Angola and Zambia. Both countries have a colonial history 
and a commodity-dominated economy. China is the largest consumer of Angolan oil and 
the second largest importer of Zambian copper (Trade Map). At the same time, China 
invests in various other sectors. Moreover, these two African countries have a long 
historical relationship with China and recently experienced a multiply in bilateral trade 
relations. However, the business and political environment could not be any different, as 
we will see in the following chapters: while Angola is still recovering from decades of 
civil war and is ruled by a president who is in power since 1979, Zambia can be referred 
to as a young and peaceful democracy. Angola has a mainly state-owned commodity 
industry and is dependent on loans with the purpose of rebuilding its infrastructure, 
while Zambia’s resources are in the hands of private foreign investors.  
 
The main objectives of this thesis are, on the one hand, to present an up-to-date 
overview of Chinese investment activities in sub-Saharan Africa, with a special focus on 
Zambia and Angola. On the other hand, I will analyse the impacts of China’s 
investments on African economies illustrating various aspects of the cooperation. Using 
the example of the country analyses on Zambia and Angola, this paper is guided by the 
following research questions that will be discussed in the concluding parts: 
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1. Are there investments apart from commodity-related sectors that are relevant in 
size, despite the economies’ commodity-oriented nature? 
2. Are there any differences between the approaches of Angolan and Zambian 
authorities in the management of foreign investments, Chinese in particular? 
3. What is the concrete measurable impact of recent Chinese activities on the 
economic development and local labour force of Zambia and Angola? 
4. Is China a better alternative to traditional actors with regard to aid and loans, or 
does its engagement lead to further unmanageable indebtedness of African 
economies?  
5. Are there any lessons that traditional donors and investors can learn from 
Chinese investors and vice-versa? 
This thesis is divided into four main sections: The first section, chapter 2, gives a 
general overview of Chinese economic activities in Africa and its observable impacts, 
with the focus set on sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter starts with a brief overview of 
Africa’s and China’s recent development and a history of Sino-African cooperation. 
After analysing China’s motivations for investing abroad, the focus is set on the Chinese 
approach to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Aid (ODA) as 
well as their channelling into Africa’s various economic sectors. After presenting the 
main impacts of their activities, I will also highlight the Chinese view on recent events 
and the common coverage in media reports. In Chapter 3, I will present a country study 
on Angola. After a brief country snapshot and an overview of the bilateral relationship, I 
will focus on China’s model of oil-backed loans. Following this, the Chinese 
investments in Angola’s both oil and non-oil related industries are discussed. Chapter 4 
provides the second country focus by illustrating China’s activities in copper mining and 
other sectors in Zambia. Concluding, chapter 5 will treat the questions listed above 
using the example of Zambia and Angola. 
Numerous publications and academic work on China’s activities in Africa have been 
published recently, most notably in the last five years. However, during my research I 
observed that many authors faced a similar problem as I did, namely to find current, 
accurate and objective data on both the African and the Chinese side. For example, the 
websites of an important institution such as the Angolan National Private Investment 
Agency (ANIP) were offline at the time of my research, or they were providing outdated 
data as it was the case with the website of the Zambian Development Agency (ZDA).It 
is not unusual that wrong or poorly researched figures taken from the media do appear in 
official reports and papers, like it was the case in official reports of the World Bank 
(Bräutigam 2011a, 215-218) or the International food policy research institute 
(Bräutigam 2012), resulting in conclusions based on speculations, old figures or 
estimations.  
 
Another observation I have made during my research is that media coverage with regard 
to this topic is usually negative or incomplete. Even in quality media, the general 
message was very similar: the Chinese are dangerous for the continent and mainly focus 
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on resource exploitation, therefore the west should wake up and counteract this 
development. A large number of the research papers on China’s activities in Africa are 
published by the African Development Bank. Also, the studies are regularly sponsored 
or published by US and European universities, often supported by OECD sponsorships. 
With regard to research of African origin, publications are mainly issued by South 
African Institutes and published mainly by the Centre for Chinese Studies or Southern 
Africa Institute For International Affairs, to name a few. Research in Angola or Zambia 
is currently on a comparatively low level. Numerous researchers from Africa, China, the 
USA and Europe have set their focus on China’s activities in Africa, among others the 
work of Corkin, Kiala, Lungu, Gu and Bräutigam has been essential for this thesis. 
Especially the final author published numerous working papers on various side issues of 
China’s presence in Africa and also runs an internet blog, where she regularly comments 
on current events in the Sino-African relationship. Further important sources are the 
field research-backed reports by Transparency International on corruption and 
governance and Human Rights Watch on the working conditions in Chinese companies. 
Data was mostly taken from recent OECD, World Bank, IMF, or ZDA reports. Trade 
data was mainly calculated by hand, using the data from the online database Trade Map.   
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2. China in sub-Saharan Africa  
 
2.1 Africa’s recent development and current economic situation  
 
In the last 10 years, African economies experienced very high growth rates of around 
6%, only interrupted by the 2008 and 2009 crisis halving the average growth. This trend 
has been continuing in 2011 and is predicted to do so in 2012. The sum of external 
financial flows to African countries – that is FDI, portfolio investment and ODA – 
increased from USD 28 billion in 2000 to USD 111 billion in 2011.  It is remarkable that 
since 2005, Africa has attracted higher FDI than ODA with a 3.6% share of global FDI 
flows in 2011 (AOE 2012, 40-41).  
 
At first glance, this is a rather low figure, but considering the starting point of 0.7% in 
2000 (AEO 2011 P 45), it’s clearly a positive sign for the direction of Africa’s 
development. The fact that the FDI share in total financial flows is higher than the ODA 
share implies a shift in the investment focus, away from unprofitable infrastructure 
measures towards the development and strengthening of the private sector (Ye 2010, 
14). Sub-Saharan African countries have nearly entirely recovered from the 2009 crisis 
with current growth rates close to their high level in mid-2000 (IMF 2011a, 1). In terms 
of absolute GDP, the leading SSA economies are South Africa, Nigeria and Angola. 
Ghana, Eritrea and Ethiopia show the highest GDP growth rates for 2011 (CIA World 
Factbook).  
 
Still, one has to keep in mind that most of Africa’s economies are still developing 
countries and in general have a very low level of market power and overall development. 
For example, the agricultural sector has a share of more than 40% of the GDP in some 
sub-Saharan African countries, which makes these economies very vulnerable to 
droughts and other natural catastrophes, as well as fluctuations in food prices has been 
the case in recent years. The service sector’s share of the GDP is gaining more and more 
significance since tourism, financial services, real-estate and new technologies are 
flourishing in Africa.  Africa’s manufacturing industry is considered to be 
underdeveloped and not competitive, especially in direct comparison with developing 
countries in Asia. This is mainly due to strong deficits in infrastructure, heavy 
competition from Asia and the impacts of Dutch disease in resource-rich countries, 
causing the weakening of non-commodity sectors due to an appreciation of the domestic 
currency as a consequence of high resource exports (AEO 2012, 20-21).  
When taking a closer look at Africa’s FDI, the fact that the majority of FDI are 
concentrated in few resource-rich countries is eye-catching. Some 75% of total FDI 
inflows to Africa (2010) went to15 oil-producing countries, led by Angola and followed 
by Egypt and Nigeria. However, there is an ongoing progress in FDI diversification as 
its growth rate in countries lacking resources has become higher than in oil-rich 
countries in recent years. The main origin of FDI flows to Africa are OECD countries 
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accounting for a share of 72% between 2000 and 2008, but only 40% in 2010 according 
to OECD data (AEO 2012, 43; Ye 2010, 14).  
Still, it is difficult to obtain reliable FDI data from other non-OECD countries due to the 
differing definitions, publication frequency and level of detail. According to data from 
ten African central banks (nine of them from SSA), 83% of FDI inflows between 2005 
and 2010 were coming from OECD countries while China and India had a share of only 
3% (AEO 2011, 47-48). Similarly to FDI, global ODA to Africa was increasing 
continuously in the last years, rising from USD 15 billion in 2000 to USD 48 billion in 
2010. This trend was also driven by the strong involvement of China, India, Saudi 
Arabia and South Africa (AOE 2011a, 51-52; AOE 2012, 52). 
If looking at Africa’s role in global trade, it can be observed that African countries had a 
rather insignificant share of about 3.1% in global imports and 3.3% in global exports in 
2010 (Trade Map). Moreover, they showed the lowest interregional trade rate compared 
to the rest of the world (Davies 2010b, 18-19). The composition of Africa’s exports to 
the world is clearly commodity-dominated: Crude oil accounted for 59% of all African 
exports in 2011, consequently 64% of total exports came from only five African 
countries, of which four are mainly exporting crude oil (Trade Map).   
The years 2010 and 2011 brought several political turnarounds, especially in Northern 
African countries, but there has also been an increase in public protests in several Sub-
Saharan countries like Mozambique, where the population protested against high costs 
of living, and demonstrations and conflicts in the course of the Zambian and Ivorian 
elections. It is remarkable, though, if keeping recent events in mind, that out of 13 
elections held in 2010 and around 30 held in 2011 only few countries such as Cote 
d’Ivoire or Nigeria suffered, from broader violence. Government protest suppression 
became significantly less frequent than in the recent past. Still the Freedom of the World 
Index indicates that, out of 54 African countries, only 9 are considered as free and 24 
partly free while 21 were seen as not free (AOE 2011a, 73-79; AOE 2012, 87-89).  
Political stability in African countries is thus still fragile. Although there have been 
several positive and peaceful election procedures in 2010 and 2011, the recent 
overthrows in Mali and Guinea Bissau show that the situation and stability in SSA 
countries is much more diverse than commonly held. 
 
2.2 China’s recent development and current economic situation  
 
Since the 1970s, China has been developing from a centrally planned and isolated 
communist state to a free market-oriented global power. Presently China is one of the 
world’s largest exporters and the second largest economy. Still, the country’s GDP per 
capita lies below that of many African states China is giving development aid and loans 
to. The Chinese economy, as we know it today, has its seeds in the integration of a 
modernization program for agriculture, industry, science and technology that has been 
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included in party policy in 1978 (Crabtree 2008, 4-6 ), followed by the development of a 
strategy for economic expansion known as the Going Out Strategy. This policy has been 
initiated in the 1990s with the goal to encourage and support domestic firms to do 
investments abroad including, among other measures, tax incentives, low cost loans and 
the supply of investment-relevant information to support their overseas expansion (Gu 
2009, 19-20). The long-term target of the policy is the development of high value added 
and competitive multinational companies (Bräutigam 2009, 87-88). 
 
Numerous economic reforms were undertaken in the last years to challenge the high 
inflation, trade deficit and difficulties with particular sectors of the Chinese economy – 
measures which led to China’s emergence as a new global player in a comparatively 
short time period (Crabtree 2008, 4-6). These reforms also caused a reduction of people 
living in poverty from 53% in 1981 to 8% in 2011. This development, however, was 
accompanied by a significantly rising inequality.  Moreover, the economic progress 
resulted in serious harms to the environment – yellow smog and acid rain are common in 
large cities and numerous lakes and streams are contaminated leading to polluted ground 
water (Bräutigam 2009,11-12).  
 
In the last two decades, China had an impressive GDP growth with an average of 9.32% 
between 1989 and 2011 (Tradingeconomics). Being the world’s most populous country 
with more than 1.3 billion inhabitants, China has the second largest absolute GDP after 
the USA, but only ranks 119
th
 with respect to the GDP per capita, while the USA ranks 
12
th
. China also made significant developments with regard to the GDP composition by 
sectors, from an agriculturally dominated state to a developed industrial economy. While 
in 2001, the contribution of agriculture, industry and services to the GDP was 18%, 49% 
and 33% respectively, the picture has changed over the recent years. In 2011, agriculture 
contributed 10%, industry 47% and services 43%, so that a significant shift to the 
tertiary sector can be observed (CIA World Factbook; Fact-index). The labor force is 
predominately occupied in the agricultural sector with a share of about 37% in 2008, but 
this is a substantial decrease compared to 50% in 2001. Still, China is far from the 
standard of developed countries like the USA with 0.7% of the workforce being 
occupied in the agriculture sector while the majority is employed in the service sector 
(CIA World Factbook; Nationmaster). 
 
Simultaneously to China’s status as the world’s largest exporter, its hunger for 
commodities has been increasing considerably. China’s global share of the oil imports, 
for example, grew from 3% in 2001 to 8% 2010, making China the third largest oil 
importer (Trade Map). The consumption of other raw materials, such as copper, tripled 
in the past thirty years and the country’s demand for steel made an exorbitant jump from 
about 16% of the world’s consumption in 2000 to ca. 47% in 2010 (Hanemann 2011, 6; 
Karithi 2010). 
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A similar picture can be seen in China’s outward FDI flows 1: while these flows were on 
a comparatively low level in the 1990s, amounting to USD 3.3 billion, they exploded to 
USD 143.8 billion in 2010. Even though Chinese FDI flows account for less than the 
half of the U.S figures, they were increasing much faster in the past 20 years 
(Unctadstat). One should keep in mind that high income countries claimed nearly 100% 
of the global FDI until recently. However, due to their flight from numerous investment 
destinations resulting from the financial crisis in 2008/09, China managed to extend its 
share in global FDI to around 5% (2009) as China’s investment behavior was 
characterized by an extension of investments to some countries during the crisis (Ye 
2010, 15). With regard to the regional distribution of China’s FDI, the largest share is 
directed to South and North America, accounting for 28.4% of all investments. Figures 
of Africa’s share are varying, depending on the source, and range from a 4% share in 
2009 to 13.8% between 2005 and 2010 only for SSA (Zhao 2011; Davies 2010a, 2). 
According to UNCTAD data, only one third of Chinese FDI is generating profit. 
Chinese investments may thus be more long-term oriented and therefore riskier than that 
of traditional investors (Crabtree 2008, 4-6).  
 
However, Chinese companies tend to have a rather bad reputation in the general 
perception, also underscored by official reports: the recent Bribes Payer Index Report 
published by Transparency International ranks Chinese companies 27
th
 of 28 countries 
(Transparency International 2011a, 5). Moreover, the World Bank announced in 2009 to 
sanction four major Chinese companies for corruption, including China’s single largest 
contractor for overseas operations or the state-owned China Road and Bridge 
Cooperation, however, also being among other major Western companies (Bräutigam 
2009, 295).  
 
China’s success story of rapid economic development is also partly the result of the 
political stability in the country. The regime is inviolable and firm and revolutionary 
movements or the recent political overthrows in the region have had no significant 
impact on the country’s stability, which is a clear advantage for economic prosperity at 
the cost of human rights and political freedom.  
 
2.3 Brief history the Sino-African relationship 
 
The Sino-African relations date back to the time of African independence movements in 
the 1960s, going along with a strong political focus of China’s activities in Africa.  
 
 
 
 
___________ 
1
 Not taking Taiwan, but Macao and Hong Kong into account. 
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Despite its underdeveloped economic state, China initiated several aid projects 
motivated by the historic chance to create new partnerships and establish political and 
ideological cooperations with a continent experiencing political changes in nearly every 
country.  The first fruits were reaped when China successfully became a member of the 
United Nations in 1971 as the single legitimate Chinese state, backed by many African 
states. In the following years however, the collaboration slowed down as China set a 
stronger focus on domestic politics and on the country’s future direction after Mao Tse 
Tung’s death in 1976. This setback in foreign engagement continued until the end of 
1980s (Davies 2010b, 5-6; Alden et al. 2008, 3).   
 
First Sino-African joint ventures were initiated in 1981 and already by 1985, 27 Chinese 
investments had been signed off by the government. Also during that time, Chinese 
entrepreneurs began to lease their former aid projects (Bräutigam 2009, 78). In the mid-
1980s, China already was the 8
th
 largest donor in SSA, not far behind Japan or UK, a 
remarkable figure as China’s economic situation at that time was not comparable with 
todays. China had a continuous presence in Africa, as Bräutigam puts it fittingly: “China 
never left, we just stopped looking” (Bräutigam 2009, 54). 
 
A significant increase in the intercontinental cooperation came in the late 1990s, after 
numerous market-opening measures had been performed in Africa. The continent 
became a priority destination for new Chinese investments and economic partnerships 
resulting in the launch of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as the main 
public representation for Sino-African partnerships (Davies 2010b, 5-6). 
 
Box 1: The Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
The FOCAC is as an organization initiated by the Chinese government in 2000. It is 
based on an arrangement between China and 49 African states (FOCAC 2012a) and has 
mostly a representative and public relation-oriented function since it doesn’t have any 
institutions granting the forum autonomy in its policy decision making. In the meeting 
held every three years, China and its African partners negotiate and communicate new 
steps and achievements in Sino-African relations, such as three-year-action plans for 
instance (CFCS 2010, 4-8). Most African countries have a positive attitude towards the 
forum and see it as an effective tool to improve and coordinate bilateral relations. 
However, there are groups demanding an increased contribution to the agenda from the 
African side and a stronger involvement of the African Union. One reason for 
complaints among African stakeholders is the limited availability and accuracy of data 
on the activities initiated by FOCAC, also leading to difficulties in monitoring the 
progress (CFCS 2010, 180-183). 
Today, almost every country in Africa has more or less close official trade relations with 
China and even African countries recognizing Taiwan appear as Chinese trade partners 
in the statistical data (Trade Map). 
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The increased importance of Sino-African relations is also underlined by the 
involvement of high officials on both sides: in 2006 for instance, the Chinese President, 
Premier Minister and Foreign Minister visited 15 African countries with one of the 
results of the visit being the publication of China’s first Africa policy statement (Alden 
et al. 2008, 1).  
 
Many different opinions and figures are circulating in working papers and media 
regarding Sino-African FDI, ODA, and trade development, mainly because of 
differences in the definitions and often unreliable data sources. However, general 
consensus exists that all these factors have significantly increased in the last years. One 
of the rather reliable figures is the Sino-African trade development, although it can still 
be incomplete – as it is common for trade figures. The 2011 figures indicate that China’s 
exports to Africa only account for a share of 3.8% of total Chinese exports. However, 
they increased nearly twelve-fold in the last 10 years. Imports from Africa to China grew 
even faster by rising nearly twenty-fold in the last decade, now accounting for 5.3% of 
total Chinese exports (Trade Map). 
 
We will now have a closer look on the development of Chinese activities in Africa over 
time. According to political economist and China researcher Dr. Jing Gu, Chinese 
operations in Africa can be divided into five different categories and stages: 
1. 1950s to 1980s: Chinese firms enter the markets through aid and development 
projects sponsored by the government.   
2. Mid-1980s to mid-1990s: Mostly national trading companies appear in Africa, 
pursuing primarily diplomatic targets. 
3. Mid-1990s to 2000: Numerous activities by state-owned enterprises, mainly 
focusing on resource localization, exploitation and export, but also on investments in 
African infrastructure projects. During this period, the number of private Chinese 
companies on the continent increased significantly, including with several 
manufacturers opening new factories, on the one hand with the purpose of extending 
their turnover but also to bypass the restrictions imposed on products produced in 
China.   
4. 2000 to 2005: The first trade zones and industry parks emerge, accompanied by an 
expansion of the activity of both private enterprises and state-owned companies. 
5. 2005 to present: There has been an ongoing expansion and development of an 
industry-clustering strategy, as well as a Chinese expansion into other sectors apart 
from construction, mining and manufacturing, such as the acquisition of a stake in a 
major South African bank in 2008. Moreover, an increased activity of small scale 
companies has been observed (Gu 2009, 4-6; Mediaclubsouthafrica). 
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2.4 China’s motivations to invest abroad 
 
Motivations for China’s various activities in Africa are numerous and often easy to 
understand. China uses its current financial strength to secure technologies and sales 
channels and thus expands its influence on the global economy and as a consequence 
may become an antipode to the strong Western influence (Davies 2010b, 7-9).  
 
Generally, Africa’s consumption market is still underdeveloped and doesn’t generate a 
turnover for investors as significant as it could be in high-income markets. However, 
Africa’s underdevelopment in particular leads to numerous major advantages for China: 
on the one hand, developing countries are deeply in need of basic goods ranging from 
clothes to food and electronics at competitive prices, a sector where China clearly is a 
big player and can live out its potential. Furthermore, a continuous presence in a 
developing country should not be underestimated. If the population of the host countries 
is confronted with Chinese people, language, media or business habits in their everyday 
lives, China can significantly strengthen its influence on the continent, certainly 
implying that the impression left by the Chinese triggers positive emotions among the 
locals.  
 
Chinese companies see the long-term potential that African markets offer for their 
businesses (Alden et al. 2008, 4-6), an assumption that is underlined by the often 
unprofitable and risky investments from China (Crabtree 2008, 4-6). 
 
As stated above, the rising demand for energy and commodities presses China to find 
new sources for the supply (Davies 2010b, 7-9) and is clearly a major incentive for 
China’s overseas investment. It is also important to consider political, especially UN-
related factors. China is dependent on support to counter Japanese moves as a strategic 
competitor and in need of backing of the one China policy and to counteract Taiwan’s 
intentions to become an independent state (Alden et al. 2008, 4-6). At present, four 
African states recognize Taiwan (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe 
and Swaziland) (GIO Taiwan, yearbook foreign relations, 75). This factor has been 
successfully used as a pressure tool by Zambia’s current president Michael Sata during 
his (lost) 2006 presidential campaign, where he threatened to recognize Taiwan as a state 
if elected. This statement was followed by massive Chinese protest and threats to cut 
diplomatic ties with Zambia if Sata were elected (Schatz 2006), but the tone became 
more moderated after Sata won the elections in 2011. Taiwan competes directly with 
China in Africa regarding investments and loans, for instance a forum similar to FOCAC 
with Taiwan’s African allies has recently been established (Alden et al. 2008, 4-6).  
 
A survey performed by Gu among Chinese private investors in Africa showed three 
main reasons for their engagement in Africa:  
1. Access to the local market 
2. Too strong competition in the Chinese market  
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3. Production transfer to Africa due to excessive domestic production capability  
 
The entrepreneurs interviewed also stated that their goals included striving for 
consolidation of the position they had already gained in the existing markets and an 
increase in the investment size, both clear long-term strategies.   
These priorities, at least for the small sample of 80 Chinese firms interviewed, indicate 
that the size and the condition of the market seem to be the most attracting factor while 
governmental subsidies and arrangements, which were ranked lower in the investors’ 
priorities, are not as crucial for the investment decisions (Gu 2009, 9-14). 
 
2.5 Sino-African trade relations 
 
Although Africa is a rather minor trading partner for China, Sino-African trade is 
expanding more rapidly than trade with other regions (Sandrey/Edinger 2011, 15). 
According to official Chinese data, the trade volume with African countries grew from 
USD 10.6 billion in 2000 to USD 160 billion in 2011 (Chenxi/Jianhua 2012). The 
intercontinental trade balance shows a clear pattern: China’s main imports from Africa 
are oil and other commodities while its exports to Africa are well diversified – a fact that 
fuels the concern of resource exploitation and export of value added goods to Africa. Yet 
if we have a closer look, it can be noticed that this pattern is largely true also for the rest 
of the world, as both China’s and the rest of the world’s share of commodities has 
increased significantly in the last 20 years. Although African exports to China are widely 
dominated by oil, the main importing countries are not only oil-rich countries with a 
growth rate in trade much higher than that of other African countries. China’s imports 
from the rest of the world are mainly dominated by electrical goods, which indicate that 
China is very well in need of importing value added goods – a chance for African 
countries to diversify their exports if they can gain competitive advantage in these 
sectors (Ye 2010, 6-9).  
 
At the moment, there is only a small number of African countries, who managed to 
move into higher technology sectors. Some blame the World Bank and IMF 
liberalization policies, but certainly the African governments are playing a key role in 
this underdevelopment due to poorly implemented programs and weak educational 
sectors, to name a few reasons (Bräutigam 2009, 192). 
 
During the G 20 summit in 2011, China’s President announced that 97% of the tariffed 
exports from LDCs with diplomatic relations with China will be given zero tariff 
treatment (Chenxi/Jianhua 2012). But as Sandrey has calculated, these announced 
benefits already exist. The average duty in African exports to China was 0.8% in 2008, 
which means that Africa already has almost duty free access to China’s market. 
However, important imports of raw cotton still remain taxed with high duties of around 
40% due to their significance for the Chinese clothing export sector (Sandrey/Edinger 
2011, 26) and as a protection measure for Chinese cotton farmers. Note that Western 
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countries have similar duty free programs for LDCs. For example, the European 
Everything But Arms initiative or the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act allowing 
tariff free import of most commodities, but these agreements still set several 
preconditions which aggravate their use (Bräutigam 2009, 96-97). In general, African 
industries have been hit hard by Chinese imports and competition, and apparel sector in 
particular (Bräutigam 2009, 190). 
In the following pages, I will present a more detailed analysis of this development and 
later focus on the implementation of Chinese economic strategies in Angola and Zambia 
in particular. 
2.6 China’s approach to FDI, loans and other financial flows 
 
The nature of China’s capital flows, whether it’s FDI, ODA or export credits, often 
differs from “traditional” definitions and approaches. In China’s case, these instruments 
are often mixed up and linked together, which, on the one hand, makes it challenging to 
isolate and analyze the financing instruments and, on the other hand, to compare them 
with the same instruments when used by other investing countries. What is clear, though, 
is that large parts of credits from Chinese banks are export credits and have little to do 
with aid and ODA as often assumed (Bräutigam 2011b, 10-11).  
 
Bräutigam gives a well arranged overview of the instruments involved in global 
development finance as shown in Figure 2.1. The “official” section is divided into the 
ODA according to the definition of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and Other Official Flows (OOF), which account for the majority of Chinese 
loans (Bräutigam 2009, 184) and therefore are not aid in the classic sense. The “private” 
section includes several instruments for capital transfer of which FDI inflows are the 
most relevant in the Chinese case.    
 
 
Figure 2.1: Global development finance (Bräutigam 2011a, 204) 
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In the following, I will analyze both private and official instruments used by Chinese 
investors and the Beijing central government. 
 
2.6.1 Private development finance 
 
As learned in the previous sections, data of China’s FDI distribution varies significantly. 
Depending on the definition, the data range from a rather balanced picture with a strong 
focus on Asia and North & South America, to figures showing Asia as the primary 
investment destination (Crabtree 2008, 6). However, especially investments on the 
African continent became subject of an intense focus by media and scholars, maybe due 
to individual controversial projects and Chinese collaborations with internationally 
isolated regimes. As briefly mentioned above, Chinese companies behaved quite 
differently than other investors during the 2008/09 global economic crisis. At a time 
when Western companies were withholding capital from the African continent due to 
high risk prognoses and strong uncertainty among the investors, Chinese investments 
have increased by 81% in the first half of 2009 compared to 2008 (Davies 2010b, 5) and 
Chinese banks expanded their loans to Africa. These moves seemed to be part of a 
strategy, since, for example, the chairman of the Industrial Commercial Bank of China 
stated that China’s investment is “growing and becoming more diversified, even as the 
global downturn curbs investment by other countries.” (Davies 2010b, 10). 
 
Kiala and Corkin published a clear-cut overview of Chinese enterprises currently active 
in Africa by dividing them into four categories with certain characteristics they have 
observed in Angola. This overview can also be used for a raw illustration of the situation 
in entire Africa. I expanded their overview with additional data from other sources to 
present a more complete picture. Chinese FDI actors in Africa can then be classified as 
follows: 
 
1. Centrally owned Banks 
 
In 1994, three policy banks have been created in the course of numerous reforms: the 
China Development Bank (CDB), China Export Import Bank (Exim) and China 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADBC). All of them can be seen as tools for the 
Chinese government to enforce its going global strategy. 
Their principal purpose is the provision of concessional loans and the support of 
strategic acquisitions from the government, with a strong focus set on resources and 
infrastructure projects (Bräutigam 2009, 79-80; Kiala/Corkin 2009, 23-24). 
 
2. Provincial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
 
These companies emerged as a consequence of economic decentralization. Very often, 
they operate as joint ventures with African state-owned companies. SOEs are supported 
by the government with funds for the undertaking of key projects sometimes initiated by 
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Beijing (Gu 2009, 20-21), not only on central level, however, as many regional and 
provincial funds are involved in the financing procedure (Alden et al. 2008, 8).  
This clearly implies that the governmental influence is very strong, in most cases 
through co-or complete ownerships. It’s especially these companies who are frequently 
blamed for the violation of labor right or environment laws (Davies 2010b, 5-6). 
 
3. Small and Medium enterprises (SMEs) 
 
Small and medium businesses account for the lion’s share of Chinese investments 
overseas and tend to operate on rather lower margins. However, these companies also 
receive support through special funds initiated by the government, with an estimated 
number of 76.000 SMEs profiting from this programs (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 23-24; Gu 
2009, 20-21). As a result of their size and structure, SMEs are very flexible and can 
adapt easily to local conditions, contrary to larger private companies, such as Huawei or 
ZTE, for example, whose number remains very low in Africa (Gu 2009, 9-10). 
 
4. Individual entrepreneurs 
 
In most cases, individual entrepreneurs do not receive governmental support and 
incentives as they tend to be mainly self-financed and dependent on family networks. 
These individuals can have various occupations ranging from farmers to a strong focus 
on retail and service sectors. This group also has a strong involvement into local 
communities and therefore shows a higher level of integration than other Chinese 
entrepreneurs (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 23-24). 
It is widely believed among researchers that Chinese investments are more long-term 
oriented compared to other investors. This assumption is mainly driven by the 
acceptance of lower profit margins by Chinese companies:  As Gu puts it: “When 
Western firms see risk, Chinese firms see opportunity” (Gu 2009, 10). 
 
A significant part of Chinese companies from the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 categories described in 
above overview, are supplied financially through Exim Bank, the world’s largest export 
credit agency in 2008. Through its main function as China’s official export agency, the 
bank is responsible for trade and investment guarantees, aid administration and also acts 
as a policy bank managing Chinese aid flows. With regard to Africa, the bank is the only 
provider of Chinese government concessional loans with around 40% of the bank’s loans 
had been directed to African countries in 2007 according to Exim Bank’s CEO Li 
Rougu. Interestingly, Exim Bank is expected to operate on break even basis, i.e. it is not 
expected to make profit (Bräutigam 2009, 113-114; Davies 2010b, 12).  
 
Exim Bank’s credits can be divided mainly into concessional aid loans and preferential 
export buyer credits. Referring to China’s official definition of the purpose of 
concessional loans, the main target is to promote business relationships and economic 
cooperation between the recipient country and China and therefore to improve the living 
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standards in the receiver countries by financing infrastructure and industrial projects 
(Bräutigam 2010a, 17-19). These loans are characterized by an interest rate lower than 
the usual market level and higher grace periods than the common practice (Kiala/Corkin 
2009, 7), financed through subsidies of the interest rate by the Chinese government 
(Bräutigam 2009, 113-114). Preferential export buyer credits are mainly serving the 
promotion of Chinese goods by allowing a purchase at a price below the market level - 
for instance as used in Zambia for the acquisition of airplanes or in Nigeria for the 
acquisition of Chinese satellites (Bräutigam 2010a, 17-19). 
 
The China development Bank (CDB), China’s second major instrument for overseas 
loans, is more than five times larger than Exim Bank (measured by its assets). However, 
the bank’s activities in Africa in terms of project quantity are not as frequent as in Exim 
Bank’s case, as only 30 projects have been financed by 2007. It provides non-
concessional development loans rather than ODA and more often finances domestic 
investments in infrastructure, especially projects other banks are less interested in 
(Bräutigam 2009, 115-116). In addition, the CDB launched the China Africa 
Development Fund (CADF) in 2007, an equity fund especially focusing on Sino-African 
joint ventures and therefore is, according to the fund’s CEO, more market-oriented than 
aid oriented (Bräutigam 2009, 93-94).  
Typical investments associated with Exim Bank or CDB involve Chinese companies, 
banks and exporters which often take part in competitive bidding among each other, with 
the certain consequence of keeping the money in China, however, as direct cash 
transfers are performed relatively infrequently (Bräutigam 2010a, 33-39). Credits are 
also being offered to Chinese exporters to support their sales and to Chinese buyers 
importing these goods into the investment destinations (Bräutigam 2011a, 206-207).  
 
Concrete examples and their impacts will be explained more in detail in the following 
chapters. Given the illustrations above, it is obvious that capital flows from China can be 
linked through different instruments and that they should therefore be analyzed from a 
bigger perspective. The following section focuses on official development finance, ODA 
and OOF in particular. 
 
2.6.2 Official development finance 
 
The first recipient of Chinese aid programs, which currently are controlled by the 
Department of Foreign Aid in the Ministry of Commerce, was Egypt during the end of 
1950s. Since then, every country in Africa except of Swaziland has received Chinese aid 
(Bräutigam 2010a, 7-8). 
China’s position is contradictory with regard to aid as it presently is both recipient and 
donor (Bräutigam 2010a, 26), offering grants and zero interest or soft loans to every 
developing country it has diplomatic relationships with (Bräutigam 2011b, 4-5).  
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A straight comparison of aid figures between China and traditional donors is, however, 
not possible for at least two reasons: First, since China is not a member of the DAC 
(OECD DAC 2012), the country is not reporting its ODA to the official OECD statistics. 
Second, there are significant differences in the definitions of ODA between DAC 
countries and China.  
Official DAC data states that in 2010, the USA have been the largest donor to Africa 
with a total volume of USD 7.8 billion, followed by EU institutions with USD 5.4 billion 
and IDA with USD 5.2 billion (OECD 2012a, 2). According to the most recent official 
data from China, its aid was totaling USD 39.3 billion by the end of 2009, with an 
African share of 45.7%. This means that Africa received aid of around USD 18 billion 
(Brant 2011), according to the Chinese definition, a figure that would exceed that of all 
other donors. However, when using estimates close to DAC definitions, aid to Africa 
amounted only to USD 1.36 billion in 2009. A different estimate based on Chinese 
figures of concessional loans and external assistance adds up to USD 1.4 billion in 2008 
(Bräutigam 2010a, 25-28; One data 2011), while the USA provided USD 7.2 billion of 
aid in this year (OECD StatExtracts).  
 
In Figure 2.2, we can clearly see, that China has a comparatively minor role in the total 
aid contribution to Africa and at the same time the share of official aid is very low 
compared to Europe in 2007 (in this case EC, France, Germany and UK). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Global development finance - regional overview in USD billion (Bräutigam 2009, 
184) 
 
One should keep in mind, though, that these figures are only estimates made by 
researchers, based on official data. Still, they indicate the major differences occurring 
from a differing understanding of what actually an aid loan is. Therefore I will briefly 
explain the main differences in these two definitions. 
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DAC definition of aid 
The 24 members of the DAC agreed on a uniform definition of ODA in 1972. Among 
other points, aid has been defined as: 
 
 Financing with the main purpose of the promotion of economic development and 
welfare. 
 Concessional in character, meaning that ODA loans ought to have an interest 
charge of zero or below market level.  
 Loans that include a grant element of minimum 25% with a discount rate of at 
least 10% – a point which is no longer up to date as common benchmark rates are 
much lower today
2
. In practice, however, the World Bank and IMF use current 
commercial rates, fixing the grant element at 35% which is a much stricter 
approach. 
The definition also clearly excludes: 
 Lending by export credit agencies with the purpose of export promotion 
 Funds for companies from the donor country to support their private investment 
 Military aid 
 
Due to the common practice to qualify not only the grant value, but the entire value of a 
loan as ODA, it is difficult to compare the amount even among DAC members as the 
grant shares vary significantly among them (Bräutigam 2011b, 2-3; World Bank 2012c). 
 
Chinese Definition of aid 
In 2011, the Chinese government published a white paper on foreign aid to counteract 
the ongoing criticism regarding the transparency of Chinese figures. It was clearly stated 
that the Chinese aid model has its own characteristics. Aid is therefore provided in three 
forms: grants (41% share), interest-free loans (30% share) and concessional loans (29% 
share) in 2009. Also, an annual growth of 29.4% in foreign aid between 2004 and 2009 
is mentioned a figure that clearly confirms the massive increase in Chinese activities 
overseas, this time though official Chinese channels, however. The paper also tries to 
underline the humanitarian and development-oriented character of Chinese aid by 
providing various figures, probably to counteract common accusations of resource 
exploitation. Chinese aid is mainly directed to agriculture, industry, economic 
infrastructure, public facilities, education, as well as medical and health care. However, 
it does not provide a clear definition like of what is actually considered as aid in the 
Chinese view, as provided by the DAC countries (Brant 2011; Bräutigam 2011a, 207). 
 
Bräutigam elaborated the main differences to the DAC definition. One of the few points 
the two approaches have in common is the main objective: the promotion of economic 
development and standards of living.  
__________ 
2
 The usual benchmark LIBOR, for instance, is ranging far below the 10% range. 
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Moreover, also in the Chinese case, preferential export credits are not categorized as 
official assistance and the entire value of grants is classified as aid. Still, there are much 
more differing points in the definition, since the following facts are true for the Chinese 
form of aid: 
 
 Concessional loans are subsidized in their interest rate, moreover, this subsidy is 
not accounted in the face value of the loan 
 Military aid is included  
 The support of joint ventures in connection with private investments is also 
counted in 
 Scholarships are not included 
 Debt relief is not regarded as official aid  
 
(Bräutigam 2011b, 4-5; Bräutigam 2010a, 18)  
 
2.6.3 Inaccurate reports of Chinese aid and competition among donors 
 
At this point, it seems appropriate to provide examples of reports about Chinese aid, 
whose accuracy suffered from these differences in definition and that also regularly 
found its way into official and media-related publications. Researchers at the 
Congressional Research Service, a sub-organization of the US Congress, made an 
estimation of the total Chinese aid by collecting various media reports, assuming that aid 
from China was disorganized, without any strategy or governmental institutions to 
regulate, plan and manage it. These assumptions were proved to be incorrect as we saw 
in the sections above. Moreover, their calculations included numerous activities of state-
owned companies and banks, simply due to their state-run nature and resulted in the 
number of nearly USD 18 billion Chinese aid to Africa in 2007, an amount outreaching 
the aid figures of DAC donors by far. In addition, a direct comparison with OECD 
figures has been made without considering the differing definitions.  
Reporters of The Economist defined official data of foreign economic cooperation –that 
is all work performed by Chinese enterprises in Africa – as a figure for Chinese aid, 
which is obviously a wrong assumption. This figure was then published in 2005 in 
World Bank and IMF Reports (Bräutigam 2011a, 215-218). Also, trivial mistakes lead to 
wrong assumptions about the amount of Chinese aid: press articles and an important 
World Bank report mentioned a figure of USD 44 billion of aid since the beginning of 
China’s aid program, referring to the Chinese Premier Minister. The figure was correct, 
but the currency was not as the Premier Minister was referring to Chinese RMB which 
amounts to around USD 5.7 billion when naming these numbers (Bräutigam 2009, 177).  
 
On the one side, there are Chinese reports with figures not nearly defined and of rather 
infrequent and incomplete nature compared to OECD standards. And on the other side 
there are numerous working papers and articles using simply wrong calculations and 
figures to formulate a conclusion.  It should also be kept in mind that even among the 
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OECD countries, commercial loans and export credits, which are very often part of 
China’s “aid “ packages criticized for their lack of transparency, are not entirely 
transparent because of their commercial character (Bräutigam 2011b, 10-11).  
 
One should also keep in mind that China and OECD countries stand in direct 
competition, no matter whether with respect to loans, FDI or other financial instruments. 
And both sides do not shy away from provocations: Hillary Clinton recently made the 
following statement in her function as a secretary of state at the Busan conference on aid 
effectiveness in the direction of aid recipients: “be wary of donors who are more 
interested in extracting your resources than in building your capacity.“ This statement is 
regarded as a side blow at China by some analysts (The Guardian 2012). The president 
of the European Investment Bank accused Chinese donors of unscrupulous behavior 
after the organization lost contracts to Chinese banks. Some Western countries accused 
China of tying aid to exports. However, at the same time the US Agency For 
International Development, for example, has to justify its budget requests in front of the 
congress by demonstrating that the aid is beneficial for America (Bräutigam 2009, 12-
25). China tried to underline its role as a new protective hand over Africa with by asking 
the donor community to increase development assistance and support Africa to reach the 
UN development goals in 2006 (Alden et al. 2008, 12).  
 
2.7 Channels for Chinese Official development finance 
 
Financial development flows from China are channeled through three main instruments:  
 
 Infrastructure projects: Chinese companies have undertaken numerous projects 
involving the construction and maintenance of buildings and infrastructure, often 
with a symbolic characteristic and diplomatic focus as, for example, the 
construction of the houses of parliament in Mozambique or Gabon. This channel 
will be one of our main focuses in the following pages. 
 Scholarships: technical cooperation projects involving training and instruction 
of local workforce and officials (even though not counted as aid by Chinese 
official statistics) 
 Debt Relief (not included in official debt statistics):  until 2011, China has 
cancelled USD 2.79 billion of overdue debt in Africa (Alden et al. 2008, 10-11; 
Bräutigam 2011a, 205). However, almost no Exim Bank loans are among this 
figure. Note that China only cancelled debt to countries supporting the one China 
policy (Bräutigam 2009, 129-130). 
 
Three main institutions are involved in the process of distribution of official 
development finance: overseen by the State council, who approves the aid budget and 
major grants, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Exim 
Bank are usually involved in the decision process (Bräutigam 2009, 107).  
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The actors are very well illustrated in the Figure below: 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Institutions involved in the distribution of Chinese ODF (example of EXIM 
Bank) (Bräutigam 2009, 143)  
 
In the following, I will present a detailed observation of the main channels for aid 
distribution by China. 
 
2.7.1 Infrastructure projects 
 
China’s activities in the construction sector in connection with large infrastructure 
projects received wide attention, which lead to the impression that such investments 
represent a common method of beginning Chinese economic activities in Africa. The 
focus has been set on few admittedly large projects, financed by resource-backed loans. 
This opinion was supported by a World Bank study, claiming that the bulk of China’s 
activities in sub-Saharan Africa have the purpose of resource extraction and their export 
to China.  
However, according to Bräutigam, a very small part of the projects financed by Exim 
Bank and the Chinese department of aid was related to loan-backed infrastructure 
projects, although those performed were very large in size. An OECD study illustrates a 
sample of major resource-backed projects undertaken in nine different countries, 
including dam power plants and other constructions. According to this overview, these 
major projects amounted to more than USD 12 billion between 2001 and 2008. 
Interestingly, Chinese petroleum or mineral firm companies tend to stay away from the 
involvement in loan-backed investments and purchase shares of firms directly or through 
bidding auctions (Bräutigam 2010a, 20-24; Davies 2010b, 15).   
 
A major focus of Chinese aid infrastructure projects is the construction of hydropower 
projects with recent cumulated investments of USD 5.3 billion. According to the World 
Bank, these Chinese financed projects will generate over a third of Africa’s current 
hydropower capacity in the near future. Other areas with strong Chinese involvement are 
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the reconstruction of the rail sector and the telecommunication sector, where Chinese 
telecommunication companies supplied equipment amounting USD 3.2 billion (Davies 
2010b, 19-22).   
 
Chinese projects in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) probably contributed most 
to the public perception of China’s role in Africa: in 2007, major agreements were 
signed for the construction of roads, railways, health centers, hospitals, housing and 
universities. These enormous plans would be financed by loans secured by a 
copper/cobalt mining venture with a 68% Chinese ownership, provided by Exim Bank 
with a LIBOR + 1% interest rate amounting to USD 6 billion in total. Moreover, another 
loan would be provided to finance the mining investment totaling 3.25 USD billion 
(Bräutigam 2010a, 20-24). This deal has led to numerous discussions, especially among 
Congolese opposition groups and the IMF, who stated that this agreement, although 
helping the country’s growth, could hinder the DRC from reaching its targets as a HIPC 
to reduce its debt burden. As the DRC was asking for a complete debt cancellation and, 
at the same time, wanted to make new debt with non-concessional financing terms, the 
parties involved then agreed on a removal of the sovereign guarantee from debt 
associated with the mining project. This pressure from the IMF has led to a renegotiation 
of the deal to a value of USD 6 billion (Davies 2010b, 15-17; Bräutigam 2011a, 213-
214). A 2011 report by Global Witness finds that the consequences from this deal are 
very difficult to estimate at the moment. Due to a low level transparency, including 
lacking information on the sales price of the minerals which back the loan, no up to date 
information is available that would illustrate what infrastructure will be built exactly and 
how the calculation of the profits will be performed. Moreover, the whole deal has been 
negotiated by a small group of the Congolese government officials with very little or no 
control from the Congolese parliament (Global Witness 2011, 4-7).  A research 
specialist on Africa commented on this issue that countries like the DRC with very weak 
or largely destroyed infrastructure have little sources to raise money to rebuild their 
infrastructure. Here, the Chinese donors are filling a huge gap. However, as sometimes 
the same companies are extracting the resources which back the loan and rebuild the 
infrastructure, as another economist points out, it’s an enormous challenge to ensure that 
the DRC will get value for money (Bräutigam 2009, 146-147).  
 
In Sierra Leone, a number of government buildings, a stadium and a university have 
been constructed as part of aid programs. Moreover, China has provided scholarship 
collaborations, agriculture projects and cancelled parts of the debt. Furthermore, Chinese 
companies invested in the (re)construction of hotels and have made other numerous 
investments in the tourism sector. There are two special facts about China’s aid and 
investments in Sierra Leone: first, major projects were undertaken during the civil war, a 
highly risky undertaking that most investors naturally stayed clear. As a result, Chinese 
companies had the largest share of the modest FDI inflows in the country. Second, at 
least at that time, the Chinese investment focus was definitely not set on Sierra Leone’s 
richness in natural resources as diamonds and gold (Crabtree 2008, 12-15). However, the 
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areas of activity seem to expand since a Chinese steel company recently completed the 
acquisition of a 25% stake in an iron ore project in Sierra Leone, investing USD 1.5 
billion (Swanepoel 2012). 
Angola is one of the pioneers in applying the Chinese infrastructure financing model. 
The country received loans of around USD 10.5 billion between 2004 and 2010 from 
Exim Bank for the reconstruction of its infrastructure. These loans were secured by the 
oil reserves and included several contractual premises like, among others, the 
involvement of Chinese construction firms. Because of its non-concessional character, 
most of these loans are not qualified as official ODA (Bräutigam 2011b, 6-8; Corkin 
2011, 2).  
 
In Nigeria, a major preliminary agreement between the Nigerian state-owned company 
NNPC and the China State Construction Engineering Corporation on the construction of 
three refineries and a fuel complex was signed in 2010, with a total value of USD 23 
billion, partly financed by Exim Bank. Chinese investors are supposed to build and run 
the refinery as the majority stake holder. Nigerian officials expect these projects to 
generate thousands of jobs and reduce the country’s paradoxical need to import refined 
oil products (Egbula/Zheng 2011, 13).   
 
As mentioned above, Chinese construction activities also involve numerous projects of 
high diplomatic relevance. A recent move that could be seen as an obstacle for further 
negotiations due to its obviously charity-like nature and therefore likely manipulative 
character was the funding of the new headquarters of the African Union by China. The 
USD 200 million building, now the tallest building in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa, 
has been entirely financed by China (Reuters 2012a). Additionally, according to official 
Chinese sources, food donations of nearly USD 70 million were delivered by 2011 to the 
horn of Africa, followed by an announcement to provide even more support to African 
countries suffering from hunger and draught (Chenxi/Jianhua 2012).  
 
These examples indicate that the often repeated Chinese approach that its engagement is 
based on win-win development and business cooperation, rather than the provision of aid 
(BBC World News), is not universally valid. Moreover, these developments hold a very 
strong symbolism as China provided support for the entire African continent. 
 
2.7.2 Scholarships and medical aid 
 
According to official Chinese figures, over 5700 scholarships were provided to African 
countries in the years 2010 and 2011. In contrast, the US government provided only 
3540 scholarships for all foreign students in the academic year 2006/07. A partnership 
program for Science and technology (CASTEP), which performs various projects on 
technological research, has been launched in 2009 and is expected to guarantee the 
transfer of know-how and the provision of equipment to African partners and 
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additionally allow 100 African PHD students to perform sponsored research in China 
(Chenxi/Jianhua 2012; Bräutigam 2009, 121). In Nigeria, aid has been provided for the 
construction of 300 schools and scholarships for Nigerian students. In addition, two 
institutes were opened with their main purpose to offer Chinese proficiency 
examinations, language and cultural exchanges but also to support students willing to 
study in China. To counter the common language barriers from the opposite perspective, 
a language center has been set up to teach Mandarin Chinese as a second language 
(Egbula/Zheng 2011, 17).  More than 4000 Africans were invited to China to take part in 
courses and seminars on agriculture between 2003 and 2008. In 2008, the Chinese 
Premier Minister announced the construction of 30 agricultural technology centers, the 
provision of 1000 experts and the organization of trainings for 3000 Africans in China 
within the next five years (Bräutigam/ Xiaoyang 2009, 695).  
 
There have also been numerous cooperations in the medical sector and even more 
announced recently (Bräutigam 2009, 315). Still, if confronted with the terms of medical 
aid, the construction of hospitals or medical centers, it is natural to classify these 
measures as classic aid without significant benefits for the donor. It should be kept in 
mind that these projects also promote the export and market position of Chinese 
pharmaceutical products and services and therefore create a potential new market for 
these goods. Therefore China’s Ministry of Health formed a list of Chinese high quality 
suppliers for medicine and medical equipment and announced to use these partners for 
further aid cooperation and consequently the worldwide promotion of Chinese products 
(Bräutigam 2009, 118-119).  
 
2.8 Channels for Chinese FDI 
 
As indicated earlier, it is challenging to make a clear distinction between ODA, OFF and 
FDI. This section will provide an overview of the financial inflows that can be rather 
counted as FDI. A significant move in China’s Africa policy with regard to FDI took 
place after the Beijing summit in 2006. For FDI with regard to project volumes rather 
than quantity, prior to the summit, the focus had been on investments in commodity-
related areas in return for mining rights and concessions in resource reserves. However, 
this focus has been extended to sectors other than financial services or agriculture and 
manufacturing, resulting in an acquisition of 20% of one of South Africa’s largest banks 
by a Chinese bank and the establishment of agricultural technology centers and the 
creation of Special Economic Zones, respectively (Alden et al. 2008, 14; 
Sandrey/Edinger 2011, 22).  
 
The exact number of companies operating in China is difficult to estimate as media 
coverage and working papers present strongly differing figures. Estimations by the Exim 
Bank refer to a number of around 800 Chinese companies working in Africa in 2006, 
most of them privately owned. All the same, Chinese embassies and business 
organizations suggest a number of more than 2000 when asked between 2007 and 2008. 
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A Chinese senior official from interviewed by Gu made a more realistic statement: “To 
be honest, we don’t know how many firms, especially private firms, invest overseas. 
There are only about 2.800 companies registered with us [in our Province]. In fact, I 
believe that there are more than 28.000. Even 10 times is a conservative figure.” (Gu 
2009, 7). 
 
In the following sections, I will dig deeper into the main destinations of FDI by 
analyzing Chinese investment activities broken down into SSA’s main economic sectors. 
 
2.8.1 Agriculture 
 
Projects in the agriculture sector cannot be classified entirely as FDI s they are very 
often associated with aid. Nevertheless, I find it appropriate to categorize these projects 
as FDI since the long-term target of most of these activities is clearly investment-
oriented. Especially with regard to the upcoming concern of land grabbing, which is the 
acquisition of arable land by foreign countries for the domestic foodstuff supply, 
Chinese investments in this sector have caused wide concern. There were several articles 
and media reports of Chinese buying land in Africa (Bräutigam 2012). Organizations 
like GRAIN, an association dedicated to protect the rights of small farmers, named 
China as one of the big players in land grabbing. However, during her research 
Bräutigam found little or no evidence supporting these accusations.  Moreover, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the UN stated that there is little proof for a national 
Chinese strategy in the acquisition of African land and that there are no identified 
examples of Chinese enterprises acquiring land exceeding 50.000 hectares (Bräutigam 
2010b).  
 
Still the picture might change in the future: at the moment, 95% of China’s total 
consumption is supplied by local farmers, at the same time the limit of 120 million 
hectares of arable land set by the government is being rapidly approached (Bräutigam/ 
Xiaoyang 2009, 687). 
 
So it is only a matter of time until China will be dependent on new sources for their 
nutrition supply. Alex Pestana, strategist at the Sanlam Investment Management, stated 
that China’s consumption patterns in terms of agricultural industry will definitely change 
in the next years since both the living standard and the percentage of consumers in the 
Chinese economy will grow significantly (Wood 2011). 
 
China’s first steps in overseas agricultural activities began in the 1960s with the 
construction of large state-owned farms in numerous African countries. This approach 
lasted until the mid-1980s, when first experiments with Sino-African agricultural joint 
ventures were initiated, also pushed by the ongoing competition with Taiwan. It has 
been a highly politically driven issue, on the one hand to demonstrate the powers of 
socialist technology by building large farm complexes and on the other hand to repulse 
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Taiwan’s rising engagement in this sector. Most of these projects, however, required 
further assistance from the Chinese and could not operate autonomously (Bräutigam 
2009, 237-240). In the 1990s, China’s investments were facilitated by structural 
adjustments in African countries that had to be performed as terms for World Bank and 
IMF loans. As a result, potentially productive parts of their former aid projects were 
taken over by Chinese investors and transformed into profit oriented units. Resulting 
from the FOCAC summit held in 2006, experts were assigned with the elaboration of a 
new Chinese investment plan in the agriculture sectors. Their main finding was that 
agricultural technology and seed cultivation are the most promising areas for Chinese 
companies to offer their products in Africa (Bräutigam/ Xiaoyang 2009, 688-700). 
Therefore, technology centers to be run by Chinese private and state-owned enterprises 
were planned, subsidized by grants from the ministry of commerce for the initiation 
period. The promotion of improved seeds is one of the main objectives of these centers. 
What is essential, however, is that this step is not regarded as aid to solve the starvation 
and malnutrition problems in Africa, but African farmers are clearly seen as potential 
customers in need of new technologies (Bräutigam 2009, 252).  
 
The Economist presents the figure of USD 5 billion planned Chinese investments in the 
African farming industry (The Economist 2011a). However, as Bräutigam finds, this 
figure also includes other sectors which will be targeted by equity investments 
subsidized by CAD and therefore is not accurate in this context (Bräutigam 2011c). In 
reality, most Chinese companies are rather conservative regarding agricultural 
investments in Africa, mainly due to the weakly developed infrastructure and high 
market risk. Measured in 2007, Chinese agricultural investments amounted only to USD 
272 million, only 1% of total FDI. Still, there are a small number of Chinese companies 
doing commercial farming in Africa, including individual farmers trying their luck 
(Bräutigam/ Xiaoyang 2009, 703; Bräutigam 2009, 255). 
 
In Zambia, for instance, about 20 state-owned and private Chinese farms were counted 
with more than 10.000 hectares under cultivation. The focus of these entrepreneurs and 
farmers is set on the production for the domestic markets or, in some case, for global 
markets, often courting the local farmers’ resentment (Bräutigam/ Xiaoyang 2009, 696-
698). 
 
Only a small number of products are exported to Western countries, making use of the 
duty free agreements. At present, there is no evidence that China is using Africa as a 
food production facility for the domestic market. There are also no incentives from the 
central government for the overseas production of everyday products such as wheat or 
rice (Bräutigam 2009, 257). 
 
Still, one problematic aspect of Chinese farm construction and land acquisition should 
not be underestimated: Chinese investors often expect that the government is the owner 
of the land and, once agreed, the expansion has green lights. But it is taken into 
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consideration that the land owners are private individuals, expecting at least 
compensation or rent for the land. If this practice expands, a potential clash of interests 
is anticipated. Moreover, it is evident that the promotion of modern technologies and 
seeds in Africa is a danger for small farmers, whose existence depends on simple 
farming practices. 
 
It is clear that this concept for the development of Africa’s agricultural sector differs 
significantly from the Chinese history, where most domestic issues were solved and 
regulations were reformed before allowing foreign investments in the country 
(Bräutigam 2009, 309).  
 
2.8.2 Manufacturing  
 
Sub-saharan Africa’s manufacturing industry is much less productive than that of its 
Asian competitors, mainly due to high indirect costs and losses related to the 
unfavorable business environment. Digging deeper, the main reasons for its 
underdeveloped state are low investments, poor infrastructure, weak official institutions, 
high risk and suboptimal industry policies. The success of countries with traditionally 
strong manufacturing sectors as, for example, South Africa’s textile sector, is often 
based on tariff preferences which may change rapidly, and therefore the industry doesn’t 
have a stable foundation (Sandrey/Edinger 2011, 7-14).  
 
Chinese projects in manufacturing began in the mid-1960s, when large cotton textile 
complexes in Africa were financed by the Chinese government, all of them fully 
vertically integrated. However, again they required continuous assistance and financing 
to keep them running (Bräutigam 2009, 216). In the case of manufacturing, the story told 
above repeats itself: Similar to other sectors, African manufacturing industries were 
strongly hit by the liberalization measures, which were mainly imposed by donors as 
prerequisites for new loans. As a result, Chinese companies bought shares of the former 
aid projects and created joint ventures, also supported by loans from Exim Bank 
(Bräutigam 2009, 217-218).  
Starting in the 1990s, several new factories were constructed by China all over Africa 
(Bräutigam 2009, 201). As part of its ongoing global strategy, the Chinese government 
created numerous incentives for manufacturing companies. Funds have been established 
to encourage the local businesses to move overseas, but also costs for the domestic 
producers have been increased and several benefits have been removed (Bräutigam 
2009, 91).  
These incentives and the recent establishment of industry parks and Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) go hand in hand, with the zones’ main purpose of clustering production and 
creating a beneficial investment environment. I will highlight the concept of SEZs in the 
following section more in detail. 
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Around 2000, Chinese investors were already involved in around 230 manufacturing 
projects in better developed African countries and the number of small Chinese-owned 
factories has been constantly rising (Bräutigam 2009, 190). Today, most Chinese 
companies operating on the African continent are SMEs in the manufacturing sector, for 
example in Ghana, with a share of 30% and in Ethiopia with a share around 66% in the 
manufacturing industry (Gu 2009, 7). There has also been a significantly rising number 
of Chinese traders importing different Chinese goods to Africa. However, it is important 
to underline that there is no evidence that Chinese operations in Africa are centrally 
controlled and instructed by the government. These are rather decisions by individuals 
who see opportunities and make use of the several subsidies provided by the government 
(Bräutigam 2009, 86).  
 
One reason that may still be responsible for Africa’s weak non-commodity exports is the 
Chinese-caused reduction of prices for manufacturing products, leading to a strong 
pressure on the African clothing-export industry in countries like Kenya or Mauritius 
(Alden et al. 2008, 7). The Chinese impact on the Ethiopia’s shoe market, for instance, 
had a mixed result: following the liberalization, more than 80% of the market has been 
captured by Chinese imports, which led 30% of the local firms that were surveyed to 
bankruptcy and 45% to downsizing. However, several years after the first inquiry, most 
of the SMEs analyzed stated that they were now competitive against the imports, which 
indicates that the existing production techniques had been upgraded.  
Very little research has been done with regard to the analysis of spillovers on the local 
population. There were numerous reports of locals who built up their own enterprises 
after have worked with Chinese in Mauritius and Nigeria (Bräutigam 2009, 213-225). 
Still, the potential for spillovers is large: as the level of technology used in 
manufacturing is not too advanced in general, more examples may follow. Moreover, 
competition in local markets can encourage local companies to look for new 
technologies and therefore increase competitiveness. At the same time, the widespread 
lack of skilled personnel may hinder the transfer of know-how in technically more 
advanced areas (Bräutigam 2009, 193-194; Gu 2009, 23-25). 
 
Eifert et al argue that structural changes and diversification in the manufacturing 
industry may be achieved through a critical mass of companies generating economies of 
scale, technology transfer and network effects, as it has been observed in many East 
Asian or Latin American countries. Besides, China can support Africa’s diversification 
in the manufacturing sector with further tariff preferences. Although, as stated above, 
Africa has almost duty free access to China, there are still some import duties that 
remain high which certainly are a potential leverage to support selective African 
industries (Sandrey/Edinger 2011, 24-26) 
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2.8.3 Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
 
The emergence of Special Economic Zones in China contributed significantly to its 
development after the first economic reforms. Initially set up around 1979, the zones 
served as experiments for market liberalization management and subsequently changed 
the affected regions considerably: one of the first zones, the former fishing village 
Shenzhen, for example, became a large metropolis in a very short time. The number of 
today’s zones is estimated to be around 100, with focus points ranging from free trade to 
highly technical development zones. In 2006, the Chinese government announced to 
expand the concept of SEZs by constructing around 50 additional overseas zones within 
the next years, 3 to 5 of these zones to be located in Africa. This announcement has been 
followed by an expression of interest from more than ten African countries. After 
experts evaluated the individual business environments and opportunities, the 
construction of seven zones in countries ranking relatively high in the World Bank’s 
Doing Business report, namely Zambia, Nigeria (two zones), Mauritius, Ethiopia, Egypt 
and Algeria, was approved. China’s motivations for this move are obvious – beside the 
aspect of stronger influence, presence and expansion of the Chinese development model 
– the new zones would encourage domestic companies, for example in the textile or 
construction sectors, to move offshore and as a result to have a better long-term position 
in the market and at the same time win new market shares in Africa. The Chinese 
government is supposed to support the zones with material deliveries and other 
assistance. Moreover, it announced to incur up to 50% of the moving expenses into the 
zones and provide incentives like income tax or export rebates on Chinese materials 
among other subsidies. Additionally, governmental subsidies cover up to 30% of costs 
for preconstruction (Bräutigam/Xiaoyang 2011, 30-34; Farole/ Akinci 2011, 73-82). 
While host governments are expected to guarantee basic infrastructure in the zones such 
as electricity, water, gas or roads, Chinese companies are responsible for the 
infrastructure as African shares in the zones are relatively small (except the Nigerian 
Leki Zone with 40% Nigerian ownership) (Bräutigam/Xiaoyang 2011, 36-37). 
 
Since the share of manufacturing value added in GDP is very low in African economies, 
it may be a great chance for these countries to experience a similar success story as 
Asian countries did with the help of SEZs in the past. According to Porter (1998), the 
concept of clustering increases the productivity of the company located in the space of 
the cluster. Moreover, it is a good channel for innovative developments. Finally, new 
businesses can appear in these clusters. Well-functioning zones may also have the great 
chance to finally move away from simple resource exploitation without value added, a 
problem most African countries are facing today. SEZs may also create new 
employment opportunities and higher foreign exchange income and successively lead to 
higher government revenues (Davies 2010b, 24-26; Farole/ Akinci 2011, 94-95).  
 
The first Special Economic Zone was established in 2007 in Zambia in the Chambishi 
mining area, with a Chinese governmental investment credit of USD 800 million 
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directed to Chinese firms to stimulate their investment. The ambitious target was to 
provide 6.000 jobs for the local population and attract 50 to 60 enterprises (Corkin et. al 
2008, 12; Farole/ Akinci 2011, 73). The Zone has been successfully constructed but, at 
the time of writing, it is still facing challenges to attract non-Chinese investors. The 
construction of the Ethiopian Zone developed rather sluggishly: initially, it planned as an 
industrial park by two private steel fabricators, but since, it has been facing financial 
difficulties in the construction stage that lead to the reduction of the planned area, 
followed by continuous financing-related negations with Exim Bank.The Nigerian Leki 
Free Trade Zone has been created through a joint venture between the Nigerian state 
(20% stake), a private Nigerian investment company (20%) and a consortium of four 
Chinese enterprises (60%), with specialization on transportation equipment, 
telecommunications, textiles and other light industries and above all, the construction of 
a new oil refinery. While most other zones tend to have nearly entirely Chinese 
ownership, the  Leki zone shows an unusually high local involvement in the 
management with a 40% stake held by the Nigerian shareholders, including their 
presence in several key management positions (Farole/ Akinci 2011, 76-89; 
Egbula/Zheng 2011,14).  The Mauritius zone was initiated to encourage Chinese 
companies to locate their regional headquarters in the zone and construct congress 
centers, medical centers and also bilingual schools in the zone, among other projects 
(Bräutigam 2009, 108). 
 
The companies active in these zones are composed of national, provincial SOEs and 
private companies, most of them already operating for several years in the host 
countries. The construction and extension of the zones is commonly performed by both 
local and Chinese companies. Although no official limit has been set, the Chinese side 
expects 70 to 80% of the enterprises to be Chinese. However, this has not always been 
the case: in the Nigerian Ogun zone, all companies that announced to invest are of 
Chinese origin. A share of 20% non-Chinese investors is expected in the Zambian SEZ, 
stimulated by the distribution of bilingual promotion material, following, however, on 
Chinese initiative, since the Zambian government wanted the zone to be purely Chinese. 
This move is hardly understandable from the Zambian perspective since the participation 
of local companies could lead to technology transfer and more involvement of domestic 
work force. Still there are currently only Chinese investors operating in the zone.  In the 
case of Mauritius, local investors are not even allowed to in the Zone, again an initiative 
set up by the Mauritian government. The government legitimates this step by arguing 
that it wants these jobs to be truly new and not created by local investors who would 
have invested anyway.  (Farole/ Akinci 2011, 83-89; Bräutigam 2009, 101-108). 
 
Aside from the subsidies, the Chinese government took action mostly on diplomatic 
level as negotiations with the host governments had been executed by the active 
companies. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that the Chinese government follows a 
complete hands-off approach after the formal decisions are made. In the case of 
Mauritius, the visit of the Chinese president had significant impact on the progress in the 
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implementation of the zone. Government influence was also felt in the establishment of 
the Nigerian Leki SEZ. Its construction process was accompanied by financing problems 
caused by internal discussions of the Chinese consortium partner. Also, 
misunderstandings in the way of the capital provision were stated, where the Chinese 
partners expected to contribute through infrastructure development while Nigerian side 
wanted capital. Additionally, protest came from locals due to associated resettlements 
and the impact on their living environment. All these factors led to significant delays in 
the construction progress. However, after the Chinese government was addressed by 
Nigerian officials, it successfully interfered by asking the involved companies to follow 
the time schedule and proposing new solutions. In Ethiopia’s case, on the other hand, the 
initiators of the zone had to solve their financial problems without governmental support 
(Bräutigam/Xiaoyang 2011, 35; Farole/ Akinci 2011, 93). 
 
Since the majority of the Zones are currently in construction or early development 
phases, it is too early to draw final conclusions. Still, for some areas, a first balance can 
be made. The Zambian zone is the only one in SSA that can be properly analyzed with 
respect to the assignment of local workforce after its construction phase. It can be 
observed that after a nearly balanced Chinese/Zambian engagement in the construction 
phase, shares of the Chinese workforce currently active in the zone are ranging from 
17% to 25%. During the construction phase of the Leki Zone, 33% of the personnel were 
Chinese, while the Mauritius zone had a share of 60-65%. Despite various incentives, 
the interest of new investors to get active in the zone is not exuberant, mainly due to 
several challenges the zones are associated with. First the economic crisis of 2008/2009 
certainly slowed the investments and led to financing problems in the SEZs. 
Additionally, some zones are located rather distant from larger cities, which leads to 
difficulties of finding qualified local workers and to problems due to the lacking or poor 
quality infrastructure in rural areas. Finally, frequent policy changes, complications in 
the enforcement of these policies and the often high level of bureaucracy contributes to 
the absence of new investors. A serious issue that can already be observed is the lack of 
transparency and weak communication, as most of the contracts have never been 
published (Farole/Akinci 2011, 90-95).  
 
Another challenge is the establishment of links between the Chinese and domestic 
private sector investors in the zones. Bräutigam and Xiaoyang suggest that no actions 
have been set by host governments to develop links between local suppliers and the 
zones. Therefore it is essential to make use of potential transfer of know-how and to 
build linkages to academic institutions. Although African officials, ranging from 
parliament members to high representatives and ministers, who are involved have been 
invited to China for workshops about the proper management of SEZs, this is not 
sufficient to guarantee an information transfer to local management 
(Bräutigam/Xiaoyang 2011, 47-48).  
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There is a real risk that these zones will become Chinese enclaves cut off from local 
businesses due to the fact that Chinese companies represent the majority. To counteract 
this concern, it was the Chinese, not African governments, who announced in 2009 to 
create an assistance program for African SMEs to invest in the zone, backed by a USD 1 
billion fund.  Additionally, African officials issued the concern that the SEZ concept 
would make it possible for Chinese manufacturers to bring potential export articles into 
the zones, relabel them as African and export into areas with rebates and incentives for 
African exports (Farole/ Akinci 2011, 89-95).  
 
Without any doubt, the concept of SEZs offers huge opportunities for the development 
of African economies. Again a major part of the responsibility lies within the hands of 
the local governments by ensuring that the currently often speculative challenges 
mentioned above are being countered on time. If the first zones are successful, the model 
might expand throughout Africa and as a result attract also more risk averse investors 
from other countries. However, as stated above, it is still too early to draw final 
conclusions and therefore it is inevitable to perform a further evaluation of the zones’ 
performance within the next years. 
 
2.8.4 Commodities 
 
As already mentioned above, the focus of FDI with regard to the project volumes was 
initially set on commodity-related investments but started to diversify in recent years. 
Investments in copper, nickel or diamond mining, but also in oil field stakes in return for 
mining rights and concessions are very common among Chinese investors 
(Sandrey/Edinger 2011, 22). In the following, I will provide an overview of several 
selected projects in Africa’s numerous resource-related sectors. Since a major part of 
commodity investments was made in Angola and Zambia, I will highlight this topic 
more in detail in the following country analyses.  
In general, it can be stated that China’s investments in connection with Africa’s natural 
resources made it an easy target for criticism. First, a significant number of labor law 
violations has been occurring in the mining sector. Furthermore, China’s intense 
engagement in these sectors in a comparably short period earned the new investors a 
reputation of being new colonialists and exploiting Africa for its raw materials. 
 
Let’s first focus on the oil sector: in Angola, which is one of the main oil exporting 
countries in Africa, China plays a comparably minor role in the acquisition of oil stakes 
as the majority of Angolan oil fields is assigned to numerous Western oil companies, 
although China’s presence is continuously growing (Zahao 2011), however, and China is 
Angola’s primary export destination for crude oil (Trade Map). Sino-Angolan joint 
ventures secured stakes in Angolan oil blocks with shares ranging from 20% to 50% 
(Kiala/Corkin 2009, 30; Zhao 2011).  
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In Nigeria’s case, the situation is similar, although China plays a much smaller role as 
an export destination of Nigerian oil than it does for Angola (Trade Map). Chinese 
companies acquired several Nigerian stakes and licenses in oil blocks, again playing a 
minor role compared to Western companies. A remarkable project is the above 
mentioned planned construction of three refineries and a fuel complex with a total value 
of USD 23 billion, outpacing many other investment plans (Egbula/Zheng 2011, 13; 
Oilgasarticles).  
 
In Sudan, China's engagement has been criticized extensively. In this country, China is 
the largest stake holder in oil and was responsible for the construction of most oil- 
related facilities in both Sudan and South Sudan (Sudantribune 2012). 
 
Let us now turn to Chinese mining investments. In Zambia, Africa’s largest copper 
exporter (Trade Map), the Chinese parasternal CNMC currently owns two copper mines, 
one copper smelting plant and one copper processing plant (HRW 2011b, 21). In 
addition to these investments, the Chinese own a coal mine which has caused much 
attention due to the killing of protesting workers by Chinese managers. Yet again in 
Zambia’s case, China is only one actor among Canadian, South African or Australian 
mining investors (Copper Investing News). 
 
An investment that received huge media response was the acquisition of an 18% stake of 
Angola’s Catoca Diamond Mine in 2011 by China-Sonangol International, which was 
the first case of a Chinese partial ownership in an Angolan mine. The deal came as a big 
surprise for experts and even Chinese officials viewed the acquisition with skepticism 
(Walters 2011).  
A Chinese steel company recently completed an acquisition of a 25% stake of an iron 
ore project in Sierra Leone with a total investment of USD 1.5 billion, including the 
license to receive 25% of the standard production (Swanepoel 2012). 
 
While the examples mentioned above indicate a high Chinese interest in African 
commodities, it is also evident that China is not just engaged in Africa to exploit the 
continent's natural resources. It rather joins the club of investors already present. Their 
engagement is of rather recent nature and logically every new major player winning bids 
for oil stakes worth billions of dollars and purchasing numerous mines, causes much 
attention, although still having a much lower share than the traditional investors. 
 
2.8.5 Other sectors 
 
There has been a substantial increase in telecommunications FDI in the last years. For 
instance, Nigeria became one of the most important markets for Chinese 
telecommunication equipment and technology. Two major Chinese companies appeared 
on the Nigerian market offering a competitive pricing up to 5%-15% (Huawei) and 40% 
(ZTE) below the prices of international competitors, but at the same time also competing 
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among each other. In 2005, ZTE won a contract to expand the country’s 
communications network and provide a high number of terminals and handsets to 
Nigeria’s main operator. Moreover, ZTE was assigned to construct a USD 400 million 
worth national security communication system financed by Exim Bank (Egbula/Zheng 
2011, 12-13). Contracts totaling billions are signed in the area of (re)construction of the 
mobile network and telecommunication infrastructure (Bräutigam 2009, 279).  
There are also numerous examples of Chinese investments in the tourism sector. 26 
African countries have recently been officially approved as Chinese tourism destinations 
by Beijing. In Sierra Leone, for example, Chinese companies have constructed or rebuilt 
hotel complexes seeing potential in this market (Alden et al. 2008, 9; Crabtree 2008, 14-
15).  
 
The largest investment, however, happened not in the commodity, construction or 
agriculture sector, but in the financial sector: in 2007 the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China acquired 20% of one of South Africa’s largest finance groups the 
Standard Bank by investing USD 5.6 billion. Although the banking sector suffers from 
lacking property right enforcement and weak rule of law, Chinese companies continue 
their investments in the financial sector, for instance with a recent investment of USD 
245 million for a 25% stake of the South African investment group Shanduka. 
Additionally, there have been strategic partnerships between the China Constructing 
Bank and the major bank First Rand of South Africa (Schiere/ Rugamba 2011, 17; 
Lourens 2011 ). However, at the moment the investments are focused on the comparably 
developed South African financial sector.  
In 2011, the Central Bank of Nigeria introduced the Chinese Yuan as a trading currency 
in the domestic FOREX market, according to media reports. This resulted in Nigerian 
banks seeking new partnerships with Chinese financial institutions (Egbula/Zheng 2011, 
15). In addition, the central bank added Yuan to its reserves with the plan to increase the 
Yuan share in its total reserves to 10%, a unique move on the African continent of strong 
symbolic character (Mcgroarty 2012).  
As this brief overview indicated, Chinese FDIs in Africa are very well diversified and 
certainly not strictly commodity-oriented. Before getting more into a detailed analysis, I 
will illustrate the main impacts of both China’s role as a donor, investor and exporter 
and draw preliminary conclusions regarding their performance and effects on African 
economies.  
 
2.9 Impacts of Chinese ODA, OFF and FDI 
 
Keeping in mind that China’s understanding of aid doesn’t equal the Western approach 
as stated above, numerous worries were issued by the OECD countries about China as a 
donor. These concerns can be summarized as follows: first, it is claimed that China is 
not putting enough conditions on debt cancellation and gives new loans to countries, 
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whose debt to OECD countries has recently been cancelled. Doing this, Beijing 
competes with the agreement set up in 2005 between the World Bank and the IMF to 
protect low income countries from taking new loans and sanctioning those receiving 
countries that don’t follow the guidelines, excluding the lending countries. This is 
certainly a problematic issue and bears a great danger for African economies. However, 
as Chinese aid often goes along with investments and their high consumption of 
commodities that back the loans, an OECD study pointed out that Angola’s debt dropped 
from 100% in 2000 of GDP to 30% in 2006 and Sudan’s from 162% to 75% 
respectively, significantly driven by higher prices coming from China’s strong demand 
for raw materials. Another widespread concern is the fact that agreements imposed by 
the West are simply overruled due to the lacking political, social and economic 
prerequisites of Chinese loans. As an obvious example, China relies on its own standards 
or those of the receiving country regarding environmental issues. To counter this claim, 
Chinese officials argue that even if the political and social conditions are not well 
developed in most African countries, one has to respect the countries’ sovereignty 
(Bräutigam 2010a, 33-39).   
 
At the same time, one shouldn’t forget that China itself is not a model pupil with respect 
to human rights or democratic institutions. Why should Chinese donors then follow 
Western ideas of how a country should be ruled and regulated if China itself often is an 
object of criticism in these areas? To analyze the legitimacy of these accusations, it is 
necessary to examine the differing approaches of OECD donors and Chinese donors 
more in detail: OECD follows a policy of inclusion of preconditions as key tools for loan 
provision, a policy that has been arranged among the members not to clash in their 
interests. In the late 1980’s World Bank loans included about 60 conditions and 
benchmarks as prerequisites. Yet, most prerequisites were ignored by the recipient 
countries in the past, while donors continued to provide loans, a fact that makes a clear 
evaluation of the practical benefits of conditions on loans even more difficult (Bräutigam 
2009, 135-149).  
Western donors agreed on a game, whose outcome was summed up very well by 
Bräutigam as: “aid recipients pretending they would reform and donors pretending to 
believe them” (Bräutigam 2009, 76). Certain economists are not drawing a positive 
balance of this policy as most African economies are still suffering from 
underdevelopment and poverty (Bräutigam 2009, 308). Moreover, the fact that Britain 
and Norway eliminated economic preconditions of their aid packages, is favoring the 
Chinese approach.The Chinese government has no preconditions included in its aid 
packages, but Chinese financiers and investors often do so. According to the Chinese 
model, funds are usually not provided directly to the government except for creditworthy 
countries, but directly to Chinese enterprises that will perform this project (Bräutigam 
2009, 142-150).  
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The fact that Chinese companies show a rather high level of corruption, as we learned 
above, leads to the justified concern that they may import corruption to Africa following 
the approach described. At the same time, the policy of not deposing aid to 
governmental accounts as it is common, the Chinese model is in the first place less 
vulnerable to corruption.   
Still, there is no evidence yet that the Chinese approach leads to less corruption due to 
the low transparency level of Chinese loan agreements. Bräutigam states that even if 
China should import corruption, it would only raise the bar as corruption is very 
common among the traditional investors in Africa, naming the example of two major 
American companies who were charged guilty of paying bribes to Nigerian authorities 
for construction projects with volumes to USD 6 billion in total (Bräutigam 2009, 293-
295).  
 
In the past, China’s aid was bundled with the strict principle of non-interference in 
internal issues. This means that China has never been involved in the management of a 
completed facility as this was already seen as interference. However, this approach led 
to an average 1/6 of the projects requiring the Chinese to return to perform various 
maintenance issues. This policy has been changed by Premier Zhao Ziyang by 
announcing that management and technical assistance should no longer be perceived as 
interference in internal affairs.  
For traditional donors, the responsibility and the payments usually end with the 
finalization of the project (Bräutigam 2009, 57-58). They also follow the belief that well 
governed countries should make their own decisions of foreign aid use and therefore 
provide the funds directly to these governments (Bräutigam 2009, 124-125). For 
countries that are not governed well in the Western belief, the approach is different. 
Sierra Leone’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs has put it the following way: “There is 
a difference, and it is huge. What they [the Chinese] want to help you with is what you 
have identified as your need. With Britain, America, they identify your needs. They say: 
“Look, we think there is a need here.” It also happened that loans whose purpose was 
defined by the donor were differing from the recipient country’s proposal (Bräutigam 
2009, 139-140). In China’s case, however, the decisions which projects will be carried 
out with the funds provided are mainly made by the respective African governments 
(although the decision, who performs these projects, is not) (Davies 2010b, 19-22).  
 
China’s loan packages, from zero interest loans, over grants to concessional loans, are in 
very often so called tied aid. This means that the recipients have to use goods and 
services and contract companies from the donor country. Inter-Chinese competition is 
allowed, but still outcomes of a study show that this restriction makes aid less effective. 
The practice of tied aid has been used by traditional donors for a long time but has 
constantly decreased in the last years. However, in 2001, while this fact being true for 
most cases observed, interestingly Italy’s ODA was 92% tied, Canada’s aid 68% tied 
and 50% of Portugal’s and Greece’s aid was tied to domestic firms and goods in the year 
2005 (Bräutigam 2009, 151-153). 
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China has learned certain aspects of foreign aid from its former (and in some cases 
present) donors. For example, they guarantee benefits for both sides through the 
provisions of loans. Their motivations for aid, including strategic diplomacy, 
commercial benefit and reflections of ideologies, are very similar to that of traditional 
donors like the USA (Bräutigam 2009, 13-15). In many cases, OECD loans were little 
focused on adding power to Africa’s economic competitiveness, as for instance the 
assistance for industry and trade was on a very low level with a share of about 5% of all 
World Bank loans to SSA in the years 2005-2007. It’s especially such investments that 
create jobs, wealth and add value and competitiveness to African products. At the same 
time, about 50% of the loans of the Word Bank’s private equity organization, the IFC, 
went into mining and oil in the 1990s (Bräutigam 2009, 91-92).  
 
According to cables published by Wikileaks, Kenya’s ambassador to China stated: 
"Africans were frustrated by Western insistence on capacity building, which translated, 
in his eyes, into conferences and seminars. They instead preferred China's focus on 
infrastructure and tangible projects" (The Guardian 2010). Additionally, he stated that 
Africa would have no benefit from China starting to cooperate with the traditional donor 
community as China’s practical approach is more beneficial for Africa (The Guardian 
US embassy cables 2010b). 
Exim Bank’s president Li Ruogu stated that the traditional donors’ approach is static, 
meaning that they rate a country as indebted as a whole and follow the credit ratings. 
The Chinese approach, in contrast, focuses on individually realizable projects that might 
not need subsidized concessional loans. He also argues that before the Chinese invested 
in Angola, the country’s credit rating was “highly risky”. Now, as it has been updated, 
many Western countries rush to invest (Bräutigam 2009, 185-186).   
 
For China, the obvious benefits of this approach are many. First, the loan model supports 
the trade and the development of Chinese multinational companies. The way China 
bundles aid avoids a paternalistic attitude towards the recipient which was often an 
aftertaste of Western aid, leading to a “donor-beggar” relationship as Uganda’s 
president Museveni stated. This approach therefore may open doors for further 
cooperations (Bräutigam 2009, 25). Second, it is a logical consequence that Chinese 
companies are also positively affected by the investments. Because the Chinese are not 
only donors but also investors, the infrastructure problems and lacking transport and 
logistics systems are also a highly problematic factor for them. That is why the heavy 
investments in infrastructure will benefit Chinese investors as well and facilitate market 
access for Chinese products. Also, investments in the telecommunication and electricity 
infrastructure are beneficial for the Chinese long-term plans and for the reduction of 
transport and maintenance costs (Corkin et. al 2008, 14).  
One of the biggest advantages for large Chinese companies compared to other investors 
is their access to enormous capital sums due to the backing by loans. Small companies, 
however, get loans at flexible rates from Chinese policy banks as well. Corkin et al. 
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estimates that Chinese are working at low profit margins of fewer than 10%, in some 
cases under 5% while foreign competitors operate at 15-25%. This approach may lead to 
competitors from other countries being pushed out and as a result China could gain 
ground and develop the business under higher margins – a development which has 
recently been observed in the Ethiopian construction market (Corkin et. al 2008, 4-7). 
 
Aside from the clearly beneficial factors for China resulting from their loans, it is 
important to understand that a working infrastructure is the base for a growing economy. 
A report by the Infrastructure Consortium in Africa (ICA) found that the lacking 
infrastructure soaks away 40% of a firm’s productivity. Figures published by UNCTAD 
show that freight costs make about 5.4% of the imports globally while they are about 
five times higher in Africa. Therefore, African countries should focus on the creation of 
competitive companies and value chains in the production, a move that can only be 
performed with a well-developed basic infrastructure (Davies 2010b, 18-19). Still, the 
question remains if the quality of the infrastructure built is sufficient to support African 
development in the long-term (Ye 2010, 18-20).  
 
In the following, I will highlight the detailed aspects of the Chinese impacts on the 
construction quality, labor and environment.  
 
2.9.1 Labor Issues  
 
When articles about the Chinese in Africa appear in the media, it is very probable that 
the poor working conditions associated with Chinese investors are the catalyst for such 
reports. Still, these accusations do not arise out of thin air and they are intensified by the 
serious violations of industrial safety and labor conditions in China itself. Moreover, 
China is frequently being accused of importing both qualified and unqualified workers 
and therefore contributes little to the wealth of the local population. 
 
In general, it has been observed that the local workforce is mainly used for unskilled 
positions in countries where Chinese engagement is recent. However, when looking to 
Tanzania or Zambia, given that both countries have had a comparatively longer Chinese 
presence, it is observable that the local share in more qualified positions is constantly 
rising. This outcome is also a result of the establishment of technical institutes to train 
the local workforce, like in the case of Huawei. The company built training centers for 
locals in several African countries, simply because it is too expensive to import qualified 
workforce in the long-term as Huawei’s CEO points out. There are various reasons 
which may explain the tendency to employ Chinese workers abroad. One main cause, 
often underestimated by the Chinese, is the language barrier, a logical obstacle 
especially in non-English speaking countries like Angola as a lusophon country. For 
example, there have been reports of Chinese overseers giving instructions while not 
speaking a word of Portuguese. Usually, Chinese working personnel is both living and 
working on the construction sites, so it is self-evident that they are much more flexible 
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and willing to work additional shifts. At the same time, there are no big differences in 
the living conditions between the working and the managerial or engineering staff. This 
is a clear advantage compared to the Western qualified staff that is often lured to work in 
Africa with monetary benefits.  A frequent claim by Chinese managers is the lacking 
skills of the local workforce. The employment of domestic workforce abroad is also 
beneficial for Chinese workers and management staff from a training perspective as they 
can be responsible for an assignment from beginning to the end, a procedure they maybe 
could not experience at home (Corkin et. al 2008, 8-9; Bräutigam 2009, 156-160). 
 
At this point, it is appropriate to look at the differences in minimum wage regulations 
both in China and SSA countries. Therefore, I observed the minimum wages in the 
provinces Zhejiang (Bräutigam 2009, 212), Goandong and Fujian (Bräutigam 2009, 74) 
where numerous Chinese companies and therefore migrants to Africa originated. In 
2011, the minimum wage in these provinces varied from USD 150 to USD 235. 
However, there are also provinces in China as Heilongjiang for example with a 
minimum wage of about USD 130 ranked at the lower end (China-briefing 2012). If we 
look to Angola, the minimum wage ranges from USD 90 to USD 135, depending on the 
sector. In Nigeria, the minimum wage is USD 110 (CSR Westaftrica 2011) and in 
Zambia around USD 77 (Wageindicator) 
3
.  
These figures indicate that for some African countries, the minimum wage lies very 
close to Chinese standard, or slightly below.  
 
Given the factors aggravating the employment of local workforce from a Chinese 
perspective mentioned above, it is self-evident why so much labor force is imported 
from China. It is clearly understandable that people rather choose to work in familiar 
conditions and circumstances, but Chinese investors should keep in mind that they are 
investing abroad and therefore have to take a certain necessary degree of assimilation 
into account. The regularly issued claim that mainly Chinese workforce is used is simply 
wrong as the situation varies depending on the project and the host country: as we have 
seen in the example of the SEZs’ constructions, the major part of workers involved were 
locals except for the case of Mauritius.  
 
Gu performed a survey among private Chinese enterprises in China and found that these 
companies tend to employ mostly Chinese in the managerial positions and keep locals 
working in production. Again, however, most of the workforce was local with peeks of 
90-93% in some companies (Gu 2009, 12-14). In Nigeria, for instance, Chinese 
companies employ about 30.000 Nigerian workers in total according to official Chinese 
data. At the same time it is claimed by labor unions that 350.000 jobs in the 
manufacturing industry have been lost because of cheap Chinese imports and that the 
number of domestic textile producers has fallen significantly (Egbula/Zheng 2011, 18).  
 
__________ 
3
 2011 figures, calculated with June/2012 exchange rates 
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This is an obvious example how Chinese investments created a large number of jobs but 
at the same time China’s strength in the manufacturing sector eradicated a number of 
jobs ten times higher - to my mind, this comparison is not liable because it’s the result of 
a free market and China should not be blamed for the strength of its manufacturing 
industry. 
 
Another claim often read in the media articles or found in reports by Human rights 
watch, for example, is the accusation that Chinese companies pay very low wages, 
especially compared to Western companies. But in all examples observed in the 
following country focuses, the minimum wage requirements are followed, even the level 
stays very close to the minimum.  
In Nigeria’s case, companies interviewed argue that both Chinese and Nigerians receive 
low wages and that the salaries are in line with the salaries in comparable companies 
(Egbula/Zheng 2011, 18). Again, this claim cannot be rejected or accepted in general as 
only conclusions can be drawn of the companies’ surveyed. What is evident, though, is 
that again it’s up to the local government to increase minimum wages, with the natural 
trade-off of potentially frightening off new investors with this measure. 
 
The state of the working conditions in Chinese-controlled businesses is also subject of 
high criticism. In a report by Human Rights Watch on working conditions in Chinese-
owned Zambian copper mines, the authors reported of numerous safety and labor law 
violations. These findings included low security and safety standards, working hours 
exceeding the maximum allowed by law and threats of being fired if refusing to work in 
unsafe places (HRW 2011b, 1-2).  
 
All the same, some reports regarding the working conditions in Chinese companies are 
exaggerated, again even in usually serious media sources: in a recently published report 
by The Economist on Chinese working conditions, the author states that in Zambia’s 
Chinese-owned copper mines, local workers have to work two years before getting 
safety helmets. Moreover, it is stated that accidents occur almost daily in these mines 
(The Economist 2011a). 
 
However, Bräutigam finds that studies of Zambian copper mines analyzing the number 
of casualties in the copper belt show an entirely different figure with around 20 
causalities per year starting in 2001, with the exception of the explosion in the Chinese 
Chambishi Coppermine that led to the death of more than 50 Zambian workers, an event 
I will analyze more in detail in the following chapters. The British scholar Dan Haglund 
states that Chinese in Zambia often tend to ignore labor regulations including demission 
of personnel without giving notice. But he didn’t find any evidence of workers that 
didn’t get helmets in their first two years. At the same time he underlined that while 
these claims could possibly have been true for the first years of Chinese operations in 
Zambia, the conditions have improved significantly over the last years (Bräutigam 
2011c). 
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2.9.2 Quality and Environment issues 
 
The common perception of Chinese products is that their quality is rather low or below 
average. But in the case of Africa very little measurable information exists to underline 
this line of criticism. It seems to be more a conclusion drawn from single events and 
experiences. However, the guarantee of quality standards is clearly a task of the local 
government and can only be counteracted by further supervision. Countries with weaker 
governmental control organs tend to have a higher number of substandard construction 
projects than countries executing the legal regulations. This also because the latter 
countries tend to import high quality construction materials (Corkin et. al 2008, 7). The 
Angolan government has set an example in this area by engaging German engineering 
specialists to supervise Chinese construction projects (FAZ 2007). In Nigeria it is 
reported that Chinese products are widely regarded as inferior. Moreover, Chinese 
importers are accused of exploiting tariff concessions. China admits the strong presence 
of cheap goods but at the same time argues that Nigerian importers pressure Chinese 
suppliers to deliver cheap imports to reduce prices (Egbula/Zheng 2011, 18). 
 
Common media coverage also supports further accusations, often true, but equally often 
strongly subjective and exaggerated. In Angola's capital city Luanda, for instance, cracks 
in the walls of the Chinese-built hospital have been reported a few months after the 
opening – at least according to The Economist and other sources. There were also reports 
of a new main road built by Chinese in Zambia that has been swept away by rains 
shortly after its completion (The Economist 2011a). However, Bräutigam argues that 
reports about the hospital are exaggerated as the cracks appeared four years after the 
opening and the hospital was closed down for repairs. With regard to the “swept away 
road”, she stated that caves were found in the road but that certainly not the whole road 
has been swept away (Bräutigam 2011c). 
 
Chinese companies also have a rather bad reputation in their approach to environmental 
issues – once again, I found little information and hard facts available about the harms 
for the African environment caused by Chinese. There has been one case of a mine 
closure in Zambia because the harmful emissions were much higher than the allowed 
standard and therefore dangerous for both the environment and locals (Corkin et. al 
2008, 10-11). At the same time, this example shows that the pressure on China in terms 
of environmental issues was strong enough to close down an entire mine. Some Chinese 
companies were reported of being involved in illegal harvesting, illegal fishing and 
sometimes ignoring local communities when receiving concessions (Bräutigam 2009, 
301).  
China’s investment in hydropower also implicates potential harms for the environment. 
However, the hydropower potential of the continent is not properly used as the sector is 
extremely underdeveloped (Bräutigam 2009, 118). By the end of 2007, China had 
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invested more than USD 3 billion in 10 hydropower projects across Africa (Schiere/ 
Rugamba 2011, 15).  
China’s rising awareness regarding environmental issues at home can have both benefits 
and downsides for Africa. Benefits might occur due to the rising standard of the 
environmental regulations their consequent export to African countries.This assumption 
is underlined by the fact that in 2008, a Ministry for Environmental Protection has been 
established in China with the target to work out regulations and guidelines for Chinese 
companies, also for those involved overseas. Additionally, Exim Bank has been using 
European consultants for many projects to become more credible (Bräutigam 2009, 
118). A remarkable step has been the signing of a memorandum of understanding by 
Exim Bank and the IFC, to collaborate on various environmental issues (Bräutigam 
2009, 303). However, due to the fact that numerous domestic firms have been closed 
down by the Chinese government as they could not meet the domestic environment 
standards, they relocated to other places with looser regulations, including African 
countries (Gu 2009, 25-27). This move implies the danger for African countries that 
these companies may continue their practice overseas. 
It is evident that China is on its very beginning with regard to environmental regulations 
and can hardly meet the standards developed by traditional investors. Still, recent 
progress shows that Chinese investors are willing to adopt these standards. At this stage, 
however, it is too early to evaluate the real picture. 
 
2.10 Chinese View 
 
When analyzing China’s implications on African businesses, it is essential to look at 
opinions of Chinese entrepreneurs and officials on their engagement in Africa. Gu 
performed a survey among Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa, where they explained their 
thoughts about the African business environment and their motivations to invest abroad. 
As the most challenging factors associated with their investments in Africa, the business 
men listed customs and trade regulations, the quality of the overall infrastructure, the 
weak macroeconomic management and labor regulations. Surprisingly, factors mainly 
criticized by Western investors, such as corruption, crime and bureaucracy, were at the 
lower end of the disturbing elements. The two main reasons for the entrepreneur to 
invest in Africa were primarily friends and networks and on the other hand their own 
research and trading experience. The central government was named as an important 
factor, but it was not among the most crucial points. The activities of African 
governments were on the bottom of the businessmen’s motivation to invest, an outcome 
that emphasizes that African countries didn’t manage to attract Chinese investors just by 
promoting business opportunities. One of the CEOs interviewed stated that the 
motivation for developing the China- Africa relationship tends to be much more 
enthusiastic on the central governmental level than on the local level, as there was a 
rather small number of training sessions provided by local governments to explain the 
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policies in the region. If this is true for the bigger part of African host countries, it’s a 
clear failure in their policies. Especially trainings on local regulations and conditions for 
new investors are essential to prevent violations of labor or environmental laws (Gu 
2009, 16-19). 
 
Current director general of China’s Department of African Affairs, Lu Shaye, made clear 
statements regarding his view on China’s Africa engagement: he openly defended the 
export of cheap Chinese products, but at the same time indirectly admitted that these 
products may be of poor quality, stating that Africa’s consumption is on very low level 
and therefore people prefer cheap products. Additionally, he indicated that African 
importers pressured Chinese manufacturers to lower the prices and, as a result, the 
quality suffered. Referring to the question of weak integration of the Chinese workforce, 
he admitted that there still is a barrier of both language and culture, also supported by 
the fact that Chinese in Africa often do not have incentives to learn the local language as 
they often stay only for the duration of their respective projects. He advised African 
countries to rethink their labor laws and regulations since they should keep the status of 
their economic development in mind. In his view, Chinese workers are more willing to 
work under hard conditions than workers from other countries - an attitude that makes 
them more competitive compared to Western companies, for example. He also openly 
admits that Chinese workers are keen to work in three shifts per day or all day and night, 
to meet the expectations for the project’s completion. As a result, government assistance 
is spent more on the project costs rather than on the work force (Adewunmi 2012).  
 
China’s Economic and Commercial Councillor for Namibia has put it even clearer when 
he stated: “If you sacrifice on labor costs now for future generations, then Namibia will 
develop. Let people be paid lower wages now and attract more FDI and set up 
manufacturing so that the future generation will reap the benefits of the sacrifices.” 
(Bräutigam 2009, 301).  
China’s approach to corruption and good governance overseas also seems to be 
influenced by the domestic situation, if following the words of the president of Exim 
Bank, Li Rougu: “We spend most of the time discussing issues such as transparency and 
good governance. And that would not help because they are part of a development 
process. I do not think that Britain was as transparent as it is today some 200 years ago, 
let alone the United States a hundred years ago.” (Bräutigam 2009, 296-297).  
While such statements by these high officials are unusually straightforward, at the same 
time they are alarming to some extent and they are indicating very well why Chinese 
companies are using Chinese workers and why violations of local labor laws occur. It 
seems that China expects Africa to go through the same hard path that China went 
through before. This includes for instance the acceptance of low quality products, low 
wages and disregard of labor laws. In addition, it is clearly understood as a benefit that 
Chinese are willing to work under conditions that are illegal in most civilized countries 
and certainly are illegal in the hosting African countries as well. Why then should 
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Chinese investors respect foreign labor laws and encourage local labor if there are 
enough Chinese workers who are ready to work under such conditions with another clear 
benefit, namely the abolition of language barriers? Keeping this in mind, it is essential 
for local governments to take action by demanding percentages of local involvement and 
enforcing labor laws, ideally on African Union level to prevent foreign investors from 
relocation to other countries with weaker regulations.  
 
All the same, these measures can be achieved as a side effect of China’s ongoing 
development. It can only be a matter of time before Chinese investors will be switching 
more and more to local workforce as life standards and therefore wages in China are 
increasing continuously (Bräutigam 2010c). The ball is in the court of African policy 
makers. By performing the measures mentioned above and additionally establishing 
networks for inter-African information exchange concerning the experiences made with 
foreign investors, Africa can counteract violations done by foreign investors who are, 
naturally, profit oriented (Corkin et. al 2008, 15-16).  
 
2.11 Chinese Immigration to Africa 
 
It is as difficult to provide accurate and complete figures of Chinese companies 
operating in Africa, as it is to find proper data of Chinese immigration to Africa. Again, 
there are many different numbers circulating in working papers and the media: political 
scientist Sasha Gong reports a number of currently 100.000 workers in Africa. Data 
from Ohio University names a figure of 137.000. China's official news agency Xinhua 
estimates a figure of 114.000 Chinese workers and immigrants on the continent, while 
other internet sources vary from 750.000 to 1 million (Olander 2012), probably due to a 
misinterpretation of the official figures which are referring to the total number of 
743.000 Chinese working overseas (Politzer 2008; Bräutigam 2009, 154). In a recent 
article in The Economist, a senior official of the African Development Bank is quoted 
claiming that more Chinese have come to Africa in the last ten years than Europeans in 
the last 400 years (The Economist 2011a). Still, although there are no 100% accurate 
official figures of Chinese immigrants to Africa, their number is certainly not higher 
than that of Europeans that came to Africa in the last 400 years which is estimated to be 
around 10 million during the colonial period (Bräutigam 2011c). 
 
Another challenge is estimating the number of Chinese migrants in transit to other states, 
as they enter on legal visas and often simply overstay (Politzer 2008).  
There is also a substantial number of Chinese migrating to Africa from other countries, 
mainly due to language similarities, but also business opportunities.  For instance there 
were reports of Portuguese speaking Chinese citizens, who migrated from Cape Verde to 
Angola and Mozambique due to increased competition on the island (Park 2009, 8).  
 
The journalist Eric Holleander provides a short categorization of Chinese immigrants to 
Africa in one of his articles, which strongly resembles the impression I got during my 
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research work. However, I have extended the overview by certain points, to present a 
more generalized picture. Chinese immigrants can thus be roughly divided into: 
 
 Senior diplomats and high managers of Chinese enterprises. 
 
 Engineers or managers with high levels of education, who are managing 
various Chinese projects in Africa and stay only temporarily for the duration of 
the project.  
 
 Independent business men working in small or medium sized enterprises and 
acting autonomously from the central government. Seeking for investment 
opportunities as their main motivation, this group often shows a very high 
assimilation factor as they have to interact directly with the local population 
(Olander 2012). This group is mainly active in retail businesses and in wholesale 
trading as it is clear from Nigeria data: in 2004, a Chinatown emerged in Lagos 
with around 120 Chinese shops selling goods often produced by Chinese 
manufacturers in Nigeria (Egbula/Zheng 2011, 17; Park 2009, 8). Their strong 
engagement sometimes leads to extraordinary measures as in Tanzania, where 
Chinese traders have been banned from markets in Dar es Salaam, followed by a 
statement that Chinese are welcome as investors in large businesses, but not as 
traders of that kind (The Economist 2011a).  
 
 Farmers working and living under conditions similar to Africans. According to 
the China-Africa Business Council there are several thousand farmers who 
migrated to Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and other African countries in the last years 
(Park 2009, 8). 
Chinese farmers also tend to be highly assimilated and to stay in Africa for a 
comparatively longer period, supported by Chinese institutions assisting them in 
their relocation procedure (Politzer 2008; Olander 2012). 
 
 Temporary construction workers, a category missing in Hollander’s listing.  
Similarly to immigrants of the first and second categories, these workers stay in 
most cases only until the completion of their projects and are living directly 
nearby their working facilities, which naturally leads to a very low level of 
integration.  
The level of Chinese integration in Africa is widely regarded as low, mainly driven by 
the short time periods they intended to stay and therefore have little incentives to 
integrate (Daniel 2010). Although there also are well integrated groups among Chinese 
immigrants, temporary contractual workers are seen to be in the majority and therefore 
nourish this opinion (Politzer 2008). 
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Generally spoken, Chinese immigrants are characterized through their profit orientation 
with the target to return to China with new wealth, but also improved skills. As one 
Chinese ambassador in Africa stated, the hardships of life in Africa are accepted as they 
are seen as temporary in most cases. Ma Mung underlines that the increased immigration 
of Chinese creates a chain reaction as other fellow citizens are attracted by the new labor 
opportunities in Africa initiated by Chinese. However, due to the common isolation of 
Chinese migrants, there are often ridiculous rumors and accusations trying to explain 
their reasons to invest, their success and their working practice that are unusual to some 
Africans. Often working 10 to 12 hour shifts 6 to 7 days per week, some claim that 
Chinese workers are “unemployed and prisoners” that are shipped to Africa and forced 
to work in construction and mining.  As we will learn in the coming sections, Chinese 
immigrants are also regularly victims of racially-motivated physical aggression. All the 
same, locally performed surveys showed that, apart from locals who stand in direct 
competition with Chinese or work for Chinese employers, many Africans express 
admiration to their work attitude and their success (Park 2009, 8-12). 
 
2.12 News coverage and public perception of Chinese activities 
 
During my research, I found numerous articles published by Chinese, but in most cases 
by Western or African media, with exaggerated or simply wrong reports of China’s 
presence in Africa. Some of these are mentioned by Bräutigam in her working papers 
and blogs highlighting the difficulties that appear if one tries to form a conclusion from 
media reports without further investigation. While I have given several examples of 
wrong Chinese aid figures in working papers and media reports earlier, I want to 
illustrate certain interesting and to some extent disturbing statements and analyses 
published by papers and institutions that are regarded as serious sources. 
After the China State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation (CSFAC) came to Zimbabwe 
on the invitation of the internationally isolated president Robert Mugabe to analyze 
investment opportunities, rumors were spread that the former “white farms” taken away 
from them during Zimbabwe’s land reform are now being operated by Chinese. The 
truth is, however, that the CSFAC decided to reject the investment plans due to security-
related worries, according to Zimbabwe’s ministry of Agriculture.  
Even if not true, news like these appearing in the media support the opinion that China 
does in fact collaborate with criminal regimes as it is often accused. At the same time, 
the increasing cooperation with Zimbabwe announced in April 2012 with projects 
amounting to USD 180 million should not be seen uncritically. The former editor Moises 
Naim published an article in the New York Times claiming that China overthrew plans 
between the Nigerian government and the World Bank by offering a USD 9 billion loan 
for rebuilding the country’s rail network without demanding structural reforms - 
however, this deal never happened (Bräutigam 2011b, 8; Focac 2012b). 
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Several articles referring to the common accusation of land grabbing Chinese companies, 
written by then PhD student Loro Horta, caused a sensation. He published stories about 
China’s land grabbing and agricultural exploitation on serious websites like the Center 
for Strategic International Studies or The Diplomatic Courier for instance. There he 
accused China of several offenses by Chinese farmers, including investments of USD 
800 million to grow rice in Mozambique and export it to China. Moreover, he declared 
the planned arrival of thousands of Chinese settlers and the transformation of 
Mozambique into one of China’s main food suppliers. However, Bräutigam showed in 
her blog that most of the information provided is pure fiction and that Horta neither did 
any fieldwork for his research nor provided references for most claims. The most 
disturbing fact is that these articles were regularly cited and taken as an example for 
Chinese land grabbing, even by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(Bräutigam 2012). 
 
I came across another article that was printed in the widely distributed paper Daily Mail. 
Here, the author Andrew Malone highlights China as a major threat for both Africa and 
the Western world. Lurid passages like: “In the greatest movement of people the world 
has ever seen, China is secretly working to turn the entire continent into a new colony” 
or accusations like “the land is scarred with giant Chinese mines, with 'slave' laborers 
paid less than £1 a day to extract ore and minerals” (Malone 2008) may cause 
awareness about the seriousness of the author. Still, one should not underestimate the 
influence that fictional reports like these may have on the perception of Chinese 
activities in Africa. On the other end of the spectrum regarding fictional news stories, 
announcements from official Chinese sources, for example found on the websites of 
FOCAC or China’s state news agency Xinhua, draw an exaggerated picture of Chinese 
goodwill and the benefit Beijing brings to Africa, presenting China’s engagement mainly 
as acts of support and solidarity.  
 
It is evident that China is not giving more ODA to countries with more resources as high 
concessional loans are given mainly to creditworthy countries that are able to repay 
them. It also true that the clear focus in terms of the project volumes is set on 
commodities, however the claim that China is exploiting Africa just for its natural 
resources is not accurate.  
China’s revenues resulting from resource-backed loans are tremendous: in 2007 alone, 
Chinese construction companies signed contracts totaling USD 29 billion in Africa. 
Other sectors are flourishing as well, which shows that Chinese investments are very 
well diversified rather than only commodity-oriented. The common claim that major 
Chinese activities in general are centrally planned is only partially correct as Chinese 
companies are considered to have a strong freedom to operate, often with no obligations 
to ship the resources extracted to China but rather to sell them at the best price as it is the 
case for oil companies or copper companies in Zambia (Bräutigam 2009, 279-281).  
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2.13 Chinas support of criminal regimes and fueling of corruption  
 
One of the main points of criticism is China’s noninterference policy, especially related 
to its engagement in critical and internationally isolated countries as Sudan or Zimbabwe 
supporting their regimes’ further existence with aid, investments and trade relations. As 
this is not the focus of the thesis, I will illustrate this complex topic very briefly.  
 
It’s clear that the accusations of Chinese collaborations with Sudan and Zimbabwe are 
absolutely legitimate and not made up out of thin air. In the Sudanese case, China 
purchased Sudanese oil and at the same time sold arms to the regime which have been 
used against the Darfur rebels. Moreover, China supported Sudan in the construction of 
arms factories. However, in recent years, China seems to have realized its vulnerability 
on the international scene caused by these relations and adjusted its policy by insisting 
on peacekeeping troops in Darfur and supplying engineers for the peacekeepers. 
(Bräutigam 2009, 281-284). All the same, the arms exports seem to continue 
(Sudantribune 2011). While these facts speak for itself, one should also keep the 
following facts in mind: by 2006 Japan was the largest customer of Sudan’s oil, a 
Canadian company was the major player in the mining sector and Russia sold five times 
more arms to Sudan in the years 2001 to 2008 than China did (Bräutigam 2011d; 
Bräutigam 2009, 281-284). At the same time the USA supplied arms to regimes clearly 
violating human rights like Saudi Arabia amounting to USD 3.5 billion in 2011 and the 
UK supported several questionable Middle East and North African regimes with arms 
deliveries (Reuters 2011a). 
After China’s engagement in Zimbabwe had been followed by rumors about billions of 
Chinese aid given to the isolated dictatorship, this topic became very present in media 
reports. This impression mainly arose due to indeed ambitious project planning and 
initiation, however, very little of these plans were transformed into reality as Zimbabwe 
faced various financing problems. But Zimbabwe has been supplied with arms 
amounting to USD 28 million by China between 2005 and 2007. Nevertheless, also in 
Zimbabwe’s case, there were several Western banks and companies who financed 
numerous commodity-related businesses and provided millions of resource-backed loans 
to the county.   
 
Traditional donors have been supporting African dictatorships and corrupt regimes for 
years but quite recently started to withhold the funds for countries with poor governance 
and dictatorial regimes as we learned above. Prerequisites were formulated focusing on 
the improvement of governance issues, but less on progress in democracy and human 
rights. But still not every questionable or poorly governed state is affected, as billions of 
fresh loans to Cameroon or Ethiopia in the last years demonstrate (Bräutigam 2009, 284-
291).  
The complete picture is more complex. Obviously, such facts have to be kept in mind 
and Chinese activity in Sudan or Zimbabwe stays questionable, but these two countries 
do not represent all of the characteristics of Chinese activity in Africa. 
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3. China in Angola 
 
Angola is currently one of China’s main trading partners and investment targets in Sub 
Saharan Africa. Similarly to my second focus Zambia, the country’s economy is almost 
entirely dependent on the export of oil. In 2010, 99% of Angola’s exports were oil-
related with China having a 47% share of these exports. This intense partnership made 
Angola China’s second largest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia (Trade Map).  
Aside from the prosperous trade relations, Chinese companies agreed on projects and 
loans amounting to billions of dollars in recent years. Western countries and traditional 
donors have shown great concern for the oil for infrastructure approach followed by 
Chinese companies and banks in Angola, also driven by the fact that China became a 
serious foreign player in a very short period in the economy’s various sectors and that, as 
a result, it displaced numerous existing Western stakeholders. In the following section I 
will analyze the Sino-Angolan relationship in the last years and highlight the impacts of 
China’s recent investments on Angola’s economy. Also, I will review the defensibility 
of the repeatedly voiced criticism about this new partnership.  
 
3.1 Angola Country Snapshot 
 
The former Portuguese colony gained independence in 1975 and has since suffered from 
a dramatic civil war which lasted 27 years until 2002 and caused the loss of nearly 1.5 
million lives (CIA World Factbook). During this time, the country became a pawn in the 
East-West conflict as the Soviet Union supported the new socialist government while the 
USA and South Africa supported the rebel movement. The war, which had been mainly 
financed by oil revenues, left the country’s economy highly indebted and its 
infrastructure largely destroyed. Shortly after the war ended in 2002, Angola became an 
important investment target and regional economic power dominated by a politically 
stagnating environment led by the longtime ruler Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, who has 
been in power since 1979 (Bräutigam 2009, 273-275). Angola has borders with the 
Democratic Republic Congo (DRC), Republic Congo (RC), Namibia and Zambia. With 
a population of about 18 million and a total land size of 1.246.700 km
2
, Angola is more 
than three times the size of Germany. Even though the country’s economy is nearly 
entirely based on oil, Angola is rich in many other raw materials such as diamonds, iron 
ore, phosphates, copper, gold, bauxite or uranium. As a consequence of Angola’s 
dependence on oil, its economy has been hit very hard by the crash of the global oil 
prices leading to a significant drop of the country’s GDP growth (3.4% in 2010 and 
3.7% in 2011 compared to 13.4% in 2008, before the crisis). With regard to inflation, 
Angola is currently one of the world’s tail lights with 14.3% in 2011 (CIA World 
Factbook; (AOE 2011b, 3).  
Despite remarkable social and economic advancements – including an enormous credit 
financed construction program to rebuild the country's destroyed infrastructure – the 
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attributes of a developing country and the traces of war can still be clearly observed. 
About 68% of the population lives below the poverty line and the labor force is highly 
underqualified, which is a major obstacle for economic development and FDI attraction. 
The agricultural sector employs nearly 85% of the labor force (2003) and is largely 
unproductive due to its life-sustaining character. Angola is classified as a LDC country 
but is not quoted as a HIPC country contrary to our second focus Zambia (Kiala 2010, 
32; US Aid Angola). 
The country’s external debt statistics show a constant development in the last years with 
an average around USD 10 billion of external debt in the first 6 years of the millennium. 
After an increase of debt in 2007 it fell significantly during the crisis, however 
subsequently exploded in the two following years amounting to USD 18 billion in 2011, 
nearly twice as much as before and during the crisis years (Indexmundi, 2012). In 
addition to the debt burden, Angola suffers from inequality in the regional wealth and 
GDP distribution as 75% of the total GPD is generated in the region around the capital 
Luanda (AOE 2011b, 13).  
As stated above, Angola’s exports were dominated by oil with a 98.7% share of the total 
export revenue in 2010. The remaining 1.3% is shared between diamonds and vehicles 
(cars in particular). The main export destinations are China (42%), USA (23%) and 
Taiwan (10%), followed by Canada, France and Italy (Trade Map). Angola is among the 
most powerful economies of SSA in terms of its total GDP (CIA World Factbook) and 
currently one of the region’s main FDI targets (AOE 2012, 44). As shown in Table 3.1, 
the mining sector (mainly oil and quarrying in Angola’s case) makes the largest 
contribution to the total GDP: 
Table 3.1: Sectoral distribution of Angola's GDP in 2010 (AOE 2011b, 5-6)  
Sector Contribution to GDP  
Mining (mainly oil and diamonds) and quarrying  44.2% 
Wholesale and retail trade 22.1% 
Agriculture 10.9% 
Construction 8.0% 
Manufacturing 6.5% 
Other services 8.2% 
 
Setting a clear sign for diversification efforts widely expected from the government, the 
finance minister forecasted the contribution of oil to the GDP to be only 13.4% in 2012 
and prospected the diamond, electricity, construction and agriculture sectors to grow 
(Allafrica 2011a). Given the figures shown above, an effective achievement of such an 
ambitious target would mean that the economy would have to diversify significantly 
over a very short period. Chevron’s president for Africa and Latin America, Ali Moshiri, 
representative of one of Angola’s largest foreign oil producers, has made a similar 
prognosis concerning the oil sector. He stated that Angola and subsequently Chevron’s 
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operations are diversifying from oil into natural gas; moreover, its further exploration 
could have even larger potential than crude oil (Reuters 2009).  
 
As an LDC, Angola is clearly dependent on international donors:  while donors have set 
the focus on peacekeeping, humanitarian and security aid during the civil war, today’s 
international aid policy concentrates on the reconstruction of the destroyed 
infrastructure, the revitalization of the domestic industry and, therefore, on poverty 
reduction in the long-term. Another major objective of the loans is the promotion of the 
economy’s diversification, for instance with the help of a World Bank loan of USD 1 
billion granted mainly for this purpose (Kiala 2010, 3-13).  
 
Similarly to other SSA countries, the Angolan government tries to support local 
businesses and the local workforce not to get lost among the large amount of new 
investments.  
Therefore the so called Angolanisation campaign has been initiated. This is a regulation 
framework which includes among other measures guidelines to guarantee beneficial 
treatment for domestic businesses or to ensure commitment to the usage of Angolan 
goods and services and limit the number of foreign workers to a maximum of 30% 
employed by foreign investors. Especially the latter measure is often very challenging 
for foreign companies due to the lack of a proper qualified workforce in Angola 
(Kiala/Corkin 2009, 12). 
 
3.1.1 Political Environment 
 
Angola’s political landscape and establishment is, roughly, limited to the party and 
person of President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos who has been in power since 1979, which 
makes him the second longest serving leader on the continent. Although there had been 
signs of democratic reforms in recent years, the changes had very little impact in effect. 
While a maximum of two five-year presidential terms has been announced, Dos Santos’ 
previous 30 years in power were not taken into account. This allows him to stay 
president until 2022 although it is reported that he has chosen Manuel Vicente, former 
head of the state-owned oil monopolist Sonangol and current minister for economic 
development, to be his successor (AOE 2011b, 16;Reuters 2012b). Moreover, the new 
constitution established in 2010 involved significant reforms of the election process, 
especially by combining presidential and parliamentarian elections, making the 
president’s position even stronger (Vines/Weimer 2011, 7).  
Despite justified concern about the underdeveloped democratic institutions and human 
rights violations, this stable political environment in particular has certainly contributed 
to the countries attractiveness as an investment destination for foreign investors.  
Not everything suggests stability, however. Memories of the chaos associated with the 
civil war continue to trouble the minds of the Angolan population. Also, most Angolans 
still experience enormous poverty although the country’s oil revenues are quite high. 
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This unequal distribution of wealth, as well as the concentration of power in the 
president’s immediate environment, might be indicators of future instability.  For 
example,  the president’s daughter Isabelle Dos Santos is one of Africa’s richest women 
while his blood cousin was recently designated the country’s vice president and is also 
seen as a potential successor to Dos Santos (Reuters 2010; Forbes 2011). 
In addition, the dependency on oil could be a catalyst for instability in case of price 
shocks as a constantly low oil price may result in fast chain reactions both politically and 
economically. These potential risks may be the key factors for the Angolan government 
and the World Bank to support diversification, for instance by providing loans especially 
designed for that purpose (Vines/Weimer 2011, 2-3). 
 
3.1.2 Business Environment 
 
Despite numerous measures initiated by the Angolan government to attract new 
investments, the country is still seen as highly unattractive regarding its business 
environment, at least according to Word Bank data. It was ranked 172
th
 out of 183 
countries worldwide and 37
th
 out of 46 SSA countries in the recent 2012 Doing business 
report which mainly analyzes the challenges when starting a business, registering a 
property or enforcing contracts (WB Doing Business 2012). 
 
As stated above, the government has created investment incentives like a tax exemption 
of max. 15 years for industrial or capital gains or exemptions from custom duties. 
Starting in 2009, investments in the construction sector were attracted by a permission of 
duty free and consumer tax free imports of construction materials. However, the 
authorities also put up obstacles to potential new investors: for example, parties looking 
to invest in petroleum mining or construction must first get their projects approved with 
respect to the environmental impact by providing an impact study to the authorities. 
While measures like these sound reasonable in theory, the outcome and effects of such 
constraints are foreseeable in a country that is regarded as one of the most corrupt 
countries in SSA and in the world. Angola ranks 168th among 182 countries, only 
outpacing Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Somalia in Africa. Legal conflicts between 
companies are usually settled without the involvement of the judicial system which is 
seen as inefficient and expensive to deal with. Bribes are common in different spheres of 
the business life. Investments in the nationalized oil and diamond industry can only be 
made within partnerships with state-owned enterprises.  Foreign companies describe the 
infrastructure as underdeveloped, criticizing the weak transportation system or the 
lacking capacity of ports, for example. The strong deficit of skilled local labor force 
makes investments in the country even more challenging. All the same, some progress 
has been made with respect to transparency: there is a commitment to publish 
regulations and financial information in journals and international consulting and 
accounting firms have gained permission to audit public enterprises (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 
11-15; Transparency International 2011b). 
56 
 
One of the most important improvements made by the government has been the detailed 
publication of oil and diamond revenues on the website of the Ministry of Finance.  
According to the World Bank, the detail of the publication is one of a kind compared to 
other oil producing countries. The authorities also implemented a system for tracking the 
use of the country’s funds (SIGFE), with a serious limitation, however: the information 
was not provided to the public and according to a recent IMF report, about 15% of 
Angola’s total spending was performed outside SIGFE which means that it could not be 
tracked (HRW 2011a, 5-8; IMF 2011c, 6). 
 
In a 2011 report, the IMF claimed that USD 32 billion, thus ¼ of Angola’s GDP, were 
missing in Angola’s accounts – however, on a later mission the IMF analysts could track 
the major part of the amount as “quasi fiscal operations” performed by the oil 
monopolist Sonangol on behalf of the government (Reuters 2012c). So far, no 
publication or detailed explanation of this cloudy number has been provided. Because of 
this, institutions like HRW suggested to freeze upcoming loan tranches from the 
international donor community (HRW 2012). This request, however, has not been 
followed by the IMF which approved a major loan trance end of March 2012 (Reuters 
2012d). Additionally, in 2006 the head of the Angolan internal intelligence service 
Fernando Miala claimed that billions of Chinese loans for infrastructure projects have 
disappeared from the Angolan accounts  and accused senior officials of having it 
transferred to accounts in Hong Kong, an incrimination that lead to his imprisonment 
(The Economist 2011b).  
 
In general it can be concluded that although Angola has accomplished certain 
improvements, the country’s complicated regulations still hinder the emerging of an 
open, transparent and competitive business environment (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 15-16).  
 
3.2 Brief History of the Sino-Angolan cooperation  
 
Sino-Angolan relations began in the early 1960s when Angola was on its way towards 
independence. At that time, China’s aid was mainly military-oriented and aimed to 
support all three Angolan liberation movements. The focus on military aid persisted until 
the end of the civil war in 2002. The first bilateral trade agreement was signed in 1984, 
followed by the establishment of a joint economic and trade commission in 1988. Since 
then, bilateral trade increased continuously (Corkin 2011, 1; Zhao 2011) leading to 
Angola’s current status as China’s second largest import partner in Africa and making 
China Angola’s main export partner in 2011 (Trade Map). 
 
After the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 2002, the Sino-Angolan cooperation 
became more focused on economic issues. Short time after that, China’s Exim Bank 
provided the first loan totaling USD 145 million dedicated to a partial reconstruction of 
Angola’s railway and electrical system. In 2004, Exim Bank granted another credit line 
amounting to USD 2 billion backed by Angola’s oil resources with a comparatively low 
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interest rate of 1,5% over LIBOR. The provision of this loan has been a remarkable 
move by China as non-conditional loans with low interest rates and with the absence of 
the usual prerequisites were clearly not compliant with the policy of traditional OECD 
donors. Moreover, the terms required 70% of the loan- financed projects to be contracted 
to Chinese companies. This approach has been kept for numerous the subsequent 
Chinese loans. China has become one of the main financiers of Angola’s reconstruction 
program with a total volume of USD 10.5 billion oil-backed credit lines provided 
between 2004 and 2010 by Exim Bank. Angola and China have close diplomatic 
relations which includes regular visits from both sides, ranging from high state official 
level to business level (Kiala 2010, 20; Corkin 2011, 2).  
 
In comparison with the traditional donors, China’s loans have been a highly appreciated 
alternative due to the lacking preconditions. However, today Angola is widely regarded 
as a “construction site” for Chinese enterprises that dominate and control the rebuilding 
of the infrastructure, to a great extent dependent on China’s supply of construction 
materials (Zhao 2011; Sandrey 2009, 30).  
 
Below, we look more deeply into the principles of the model of oil-backed loans and 
analyze the benefits and drawbacks of this cooperation for the case of Angola. 
 
3.3 Chinese Loans - the Angola mode 
 
The concept of resource-backed loans is understood as initially having appeared in 
Angola in the early years of the millennium and therefore named after the country of its 
first emergence. However, this method is not entirely new as the Japanese used the very 
same model in China already more than 30 years ago (Bräutigam 2009, 46). Besides, oil 
companies and banks have provided oil-backed loans for years to oil producing 
countries, but these loans were not tied to development projects as they are Angola’s 
case (Bräutigam 2009, 56). 
 
The Angola mode is easily explained: China lends capital to African countries that has to 
be used for reconstruction projects, secured by the country’s resources. The agreements 
usually include prerequisites that guarantee Chinese companies to be the main 
contracted firms, so that in the end a major part of the funds never leaves China 
(Kiala/Corkin 2009, 8).  
The first major Chinese loan amounting to USD 2 billion was provided by Exim Bank in 
2004. Here, the interest rate has been fixed at LIBOR + 1.5% and the repayment agreed 
on 10.000 barrels of crude oil per day. The loan would be repaid after 17 years including 
a five year grace period. These conditions differ significantly from the usual standard in 
Angola as money has been usually borrowed with an average premium of 2.5% over 
LIBOR with a repayment term of four to five years without any grace period (Bräutigam 
2009, 275; Kiala 2010).  
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Between 2005 and 2007, two other credit lines were added totaling USD 2.5 million 
with even better conditions: a payment term of 15 years, an interest rate of 1.25% over 
LIBOR and more involvement of local firms. In total, China provided around USD 10.5 
billion oil-backed credit lines to Angola between 2004 and 2010, an impressive figure 
considering the fact that China – a country still receiving foreign aid – allocated these 
funds to an underdeveloped high risk country in course of only six years (Corkin 2011, 
2; UNIDO). 
There have been several major loans provided by Western banks in recent years: 
numerous international banks from Brazil, Portugal and other countries provided billions 
of loans to Angola (Kiala 2010, 21). Barkley’s and the Royal Bank of Scotland gave 
loans totaling USD 2.35 billion. However, the media focus has been primarily on 
Chinese activities (Bräutigam 2009, 276).  
Prior collaborations with the IMF were characterized by agreements requiring the 
implementation of economic reforms, and at the same time by their frequent failure. 
Most of these arrangements emerged at a time of low oil prices which clearly put an 
undiversified economy like that of Angola into a weak position on the bargaining table. 
After the oil price climbed between 2002 and 2009 and China appeared as a new 
potential provider of capital, Angola’s preference could be clearly seen as there had been 
very little cooperation with the IMF during these years. In 2009 however, as a result of 
the crisis and the lower oil price, the IMF announced the provision of a USD 1.4 billion 
emergency loan with several prerequisites such as the requirement of concrete measures 
to enforce transparency and performing an audit of Sonangol and other state-owned 
companies. As one of Angola’s biggest investors and oil consumers, the United States 
also tried to promote transparency measures, mainly through regularly indicating 
problematic issues. However, the recent criticism from the Obama administration, in 
particular from Hillary Clinton, was unexpectedly reserved: when confronted by the 
press with the fact that Angola has a very high level of corruption, she replied that 
corruption is a problem everywhere in the world, also underlining the recent efforts 
undertaken by Angola to increase transparency (HRW 2011a, 20-27). It’s possible that 
the USA simply realized that by ongoing judgment and criticism of Angola’s internal 
issues it might lose even more influence on the African continent to China, especially 
when the oil price is on a level which facilitates the acquisition of new loans and 
partnerships. 
In general, Angolan authorities have a very low involvement into the distribution of the 
loans, instead most the capital is provided directly to Chinese contractors. As a result, 
major parts of the funds are bypassing the Angolan government and are used directly to 
finance infrastructure projects (Kiala 2010, 47-48). This can be seen as a clear benefit in 
Angola’s case since its state apparatus is among the most corrupt in the world, as we 
learned above. In general, China also has to consider the risk that the loan receiving 
country may stop the delivery of the resource backing the loan due to a potential 
collapse of the price or industry (Christensen 2010, 21). 
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However, this concept is not necessarily set in stone for forthcoming Sino-Angolan 
cooperation: a cable recently published by Wikileaks reported of a conversation between 
the US ambassador to Angola Dan Mozena and the Chinese Ambassador to Angola 
Znahg Bolun in which the diplomats discussed the recent negotiation of a new big loan 
package between China and Angola recently made by Exim Bank. But this time, the loan 
would be not backed by oil. The funds should be made available through private Chines 
banks, and mainly used for the construction of the Luanda airport and infrastructure 
projects (Wikileaks 2009). 
 
A significant part of Chinese loans to Angola is coming from Hong Kong, more 
precisely, from the China International Fund (CIF) (Kiala 2010, 20). This organization 
has been the topic of numerous controversial discussions and articles because of its non-
transparent nature and unclear relation to the Chinese government.  
Box 2: The China international Fund (CIF) 
In a recent report in The Economist titled "The Queensway syndicate and the Africa 
trade” the authors made strong accusations directed at the operations of the CIF in 
Angola. According to the authors, the CIF was founded in 2004 by Cantonese business 
men around an acquaintance of the Angolan President from student times in Baku. It 
became one of China’s main trade channels for oil, diamonds or other minerals in 
Africa, especially in Angola (The Economist 2011b). The company operates through a 
joint venture called China Sonangol between Sonangol (30% share) and Dayuan 
International Development, which itself owns the CIF, meaning that Sonangol indirectly 
owns the CIF with a 30% share (Bräutigam 2011e).  
 
The company itself is highly controversial as it has been likened by some to an arm of 
the Chinese government. The Royal Institute for International Affairs for instance 
reported that the CIF serves a specific role both between the Chinese and Angolan 
governments and between Sonangol and Sinopec, namely controlling the access to the 
country’s resources. (HRW 2011a, 17-18). At the same time the CIF was subject to 
criticism from Chinese officials who made several concrete statements denying these 
suspicions. Another hint for the independency from the Chinese state is the fact that 
Sonangol hindered Chinese state-owned oil companies to buy stakes in an oilfield in 
2008 and made sure that the contract went to China Sonangol instead (The Economist 
2011b ;The Economist 2011c).  
Moreover, the Chinese ambassador to Angola, Zhang Bolun, clearly distanced the 
Chinese government from the CIF in a cable published by Wikileaks stating that the 
consortium promised much in Angola but suffers from a weak management and lack of 
leadership. He added that the embassy is not active in the monitoring of the company’s 
relationship with Angola. However, the Chinese government did not officially ask the 
CIF to present a full accounting of Exim Bank loans to Angola (HRW 2011a, 24; 
Wikileaks 2009). 
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The main aspect of criticism is the low transparency of the company as the list of 
profiteers from the lucrative deals is relatively unknown, also handicapped by the 
company’s complex corporate structure as subsidiary companies are not vertically 
integrated.  
Furthermore, the terms under which the joint venture buys oil from Angola are not 
publicly accessible and some insiders insist that the price has been fixed and has not 
changed since the creation of the joint venture contracts. If true, this means that profit 
for the CIF is immense as the price for crude oil was far below today’s level (The 
Economist 2011b). 
In their recent report, Human Rights Watch encourage the Chinese government to make 
all business relationships with CIF public and to clearly disclose whether government 
officials function as CIF’s executives or if there are known cases where CIF acted as a 
representative of the Chinese government.  In addition, the authors request Beijing to 
pressure the CIF to fully reveal its business interests in Angola and its relations with 
Sonangol (HRW 2011a, 29-30). 
 
3.3.1 The Angola Mode in practice  
 
As mentioned above, Angola’s infrastructure faced enormous damages as consequences 
of the long civil war: World Bank observers described the condition of the infrastructure 
as “in a shocking state of disrepair”, with roads having been destroyed and fertile 
ground contaminated with landmines (Bräutigam 2009, 275). Financed by Chinese 
loans, the country made strong improvements in the rebuilding of their ruined 
infrastructure. Countless construction projects ranging from new housing to road 
rehabilitation have been undertaken, although the country still lacks traffic planning or 
mass transport systems. An estimate of 3.5 million people are living without adequate 
housing in Luanda alone, that is around 3/4 of the capital’s population. As a 
consequence of this highly critical housing situation, in 2008 the government committed 
itself to build 1 million new homes by 2012 making it the largest social housing project 
in Africa (AOE 2011b, 7; CIA World Factbook). 
 
To give an impression of the magnitude and importance of Chinese projects in Angola, 
most of them resulting from oil-backed loans, find below an overview of selected major 
construction projects contracted to Chinese companies in recent years: 
 Housing: Angola has launched urbanization and housing programs in 2008/09 
with major, often state-owned Chinese companies involved in the construction. 
The actual construction of the entirely new city Dundo is one example. It is 
planned to build about 200.000 new residences and to involve about 2400 
Chinese and 1900 Angolan workers into the construction process.  
Another major housing project is the construction of a military compound in 
Funda with a total volume of USD 300 million, which makes it the largest 
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project initiated by the ministry of defense in Angola’s history. Another Chinese 
company was recently awarded the construction of 10.000 houses in Benguela 
province 
 
 Electrification: With its focus set on Luanda, the project has a volume of USD 
298 million and includes the construction of transmission lines and power 
distribution facilities. 
 
 Infrastructure: The largest infrastructure project ever awarded to a Chinese 
company in Angola amounting to billions was Angol-Ferro 2000. It included the 
construction of 3100 km of railway, 800 km of extensions and numerous bridges. 
Chinese companies were also involved in the building of sporting facilities for 
Angola. In the field of social infrastructure, Chinese companies funded the 
building of several schools and a USD 93 million project for building colleges 
and management institutes. From 2006 to 2008 numerous renovations of 
hospitals have been undertaken and some new have been built, such as the 
Central hospital of Luanda. Further cooperation in the medical sector like the 
transfer of Chinese doctors to Angola has been announced (Kiala 2010, 30-39; 
Angop 2012a; Angola Hub 2012a).  
Given these examples, it seems to be a legitimate claim to call Angola a “construction 
site” for Chinese companies as China is currently mainly responsible for the 
rehabilitation of the country. However, apart from the easily measurable impact for 
Angola, these oil-backed projects involve several challenges.  
 
The quality of Chinese-constructed buildings and roads, for example, is a highly debated 
topic, fueled by individual incidents like the closure of the Chinese-built Luanda 
Hospital a short time after it opened due to cracks in the building. An Angolan civil 
engineer stated:  “You have buildings built by the Portuguese fifty years ago still 
standing, while Chinese buildings just a year old are collapsing. Yes they build very fast 
and very cheap. But it also comes down fast” (Horta 2011).  However, common claims 
like these from the Angolan side are very subjective and often exaggerated as 
conclusions over countless projects are drawn referring to single incidents. In fact it is 
very challenging to measure the real quality of Chinese constructions in Angola because 
the time that passed after their completion is simply too short. An increased 
commissioning of foreign independent experts or engineers to oversee the construction 
sites could lead to a general increase in quality of the constructions and at once raise the 
confidence in the quality of Chinese construction works (Kiala 2010, 55).   
 
A serious consequence for the population is the acceleration of traffic speed due to the 
ongoing road reconstruction which leads to people risking their lives when crossing 
roads as they are used to very slow traffic (Kiala 2010, 39).  
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The prerequisites of Chinese loans clearly facilitate the entry for the Chinese companies 
into the Angolan market which leads to a strong advantage compared to both foreign and 
local competitors (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 8). At the same time, these businesses can become 
investors in areas that local companies cannot invest in due to lack of capital. This would 
increase FDI inflows which are badly needed by the country. 
 
Chinese companies in Angola and all over Africa have been regularly accused of 
disregarding labor laws and restrictions imposed by the local government. Emmanuel 
analyzed three different projects contracted to Chinese companies in Angola’s 
construction industry focusing on the working conditions. His findings were distressing: 
the author finds that the first project analyzed, has been undertaken mainly by Chinese 
personnel without giving exact numbers, however. None of the local workers had signed 
contracts, even when employed for a longer period. Some of them were working up to 
71 hours a week including weekends. The monthly salary was between USD 93 and 
USD 120 per month, hence slightly exceeding the minimum wage in Angola, but not 
including any overtime payments mandatory by law. Training and protective equipment 
was inexistent or limited in this sample. For the second project, Emmanuel interviewed 
about 140 workers from two companies and found that these employees also lacked 
signed contracts and in most cases were deployed as assistant workers. Their wages were 
between USD 120 and USD 150, again without any overtime payments included, and 
similar situations with regard to the provision of training.  These workers, however, 
received sufficient working equipment, contrary to the first example. Although wages at 
this level meet the minimum requirements mandatory by law as mentioned above, they 
are absurdly low if considering that Luanda is currently seen as one of the words most 
expensive cities, even outpacing New York or Moscow, Angola’s price level is not a 
problem to be solved Chinese investors but by the government by enforcing clear 
policies to counter this development.The author’s last focus was one of the main 
infrastructure development projects contracted to Chinese companies, the Kilamba Kiaxi 
housing project. Again the mandatory 30/70 regulation has not been fulfilled as only 
40% of the 10.000 workers were local, once again mainly responsible for back working 
and simple jobs. The project, however, also involved plans to establish a technology 
center and thereby attract and train more locals.  Chinese companies seem to feel the 
consequences of Luanda’s price level because understandably wages paid to Chinese 
specialists must be significantly higher to attract them for a temporary assignment in 
Africa. Another significant challenge observed on Chinese construction sites are the 
omnipresent language barriers as there are often no translators or locals in comparable 
positions to properly explain the coordinator’s instructions to the workers (Kiala 2010, 
40-44; Raupp 2008).This problem implies the potential lacking of proper transfer of 
know-how, one of the most relevant benefits of foreign investment, and potentially leads 
to dependence on Chinese competence in the long-term (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 16-17).   
 
Corkin reports of problems reported by Chinese investors referring to the lacking 
capacity in administration and general problems in understanding the working 
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environment in Angola (Sandrey 2009, 57). As there is a continuously growing number 
of Angolan scholars trained in China, including learning Mandarin, the government 
should strive for a coordinated usage of the new skills by filling the gap described above 
(Kiala 2010, 55). In an article published by Loro Horta, whose controversial publications 
were outlined earlier, he states that the lack of a qualified workforce wasn’t a problem 
for Portuguese, Brazilian or American companies. He provides only one concrete 
example as a base for his conclusion, however: the American company Chevron 
employing 3100 local workers 
4
 which makes it one of the largest foreign employers in 
the country (Horta 2011). 
 
The huge volume of loans provided by China to Angola can have serious impacts on the 
country’s ability to meet its financial obligations in the future. Reisen states that Chinese 
authorities are reported to consider 90% of its loans to African countries to be written off 
overtime. This might incite Angola to start borrowing even more. As, for example, 
China cancelled debt related to all interest free government loans maturing in 2005 for 
all HIPCS and LDCs with diplomatic ties with China, this is a very probable scenario 
(Kiala 2010, 45-46).  
 
On the other hand Bräutigam argues that there is no evidence that China might cancel 
the debt resulting from Exim Bank or CDB loans which account for the lion’s share. 
Moreover, an OECD study concluded that China’s investments in Angola and its raw 
material demand significantly improved the debt distress indicators (Bräutigam 2009, 
185-187).  
 
Another main point of criticism of Angola mode loans is the nearly inexistent pressure 
on Angola to reduce corruption and increase transparency (Sandrey 2009, 23-24).These 
two targets are widely regarded to be a part of loans from traditional donors by default. 
Although this claim is certainly true and the consequences are harmful, especially for the 
Angolan population, it is essential to look at the complete picture: in the past, Western 
loans didn’t require much transparency and paid “cash for oil” without tying it to 
infrastructure projects like done by China today (Bräutigam 2009, 276). Between 2000 
and 2003, there were numerous large Western banks providing Angola with large sums 
of loans. In 2004, China joined the “club” by announcing a major loan from Exim Bank.  
During the same period however, other Western banks like Barclays or the Royal Bank 
of Scotland announced even larger oil-backed loans. Moreover, as Angola’s Minister of 
Finance stated, the interest rates on Chinese loans were low enough for Angola to have a 
stronger position in the negotiations with Western banks, which is a clear advantage for 
Angola and a drawback for the traditional Western donors (Bräutigam 2010c). 
__________ 
4 
He mentions the figure of 3500 workers, but the original source he refers to lists only 3100 workers. 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All products 372.794 894.186 1.234.519 2.942.470 2.385.960 2.003.873 2.783.660
1 Electrical, electronic equipment 15,7% 19,8% 16,2% 14,1% 14,2% 16,7% 16,8%
2 Articles of iron or steel 4,9% 7,5% 8,5% 11,1% 12,5% 7,2% 10,7%
3 Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc 11,8% 15,7% 13,6% 16,5% 13,8% 11,1% 9,8%
4 Vehicles other than railway, tramway 18,7% 19,2% 19,5% 19,5% 13,5% 10,7% 8,7%
5 Iron and steel 3,2% 7,0% 3,8% 8,6% 6,4% 5,7% 6,5%
6
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime 
and cement 3,6% 3,1% 3,5% 3,5% 5,4% 7,4% 5,8%
7
Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated 
buildings 2,1% 2,1% 2,6% 3,1% 3,2% 3,4% 3,6%
8 Plastics and articles thereof 2,4% 2,1% 2,7% 2,5% 2,5% 2,6% 3,4%
9
Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts 
thereof 4,9% 2,6% 2,7% 1,6% 2,6% 4,9% 3,3%
10 Ceramic products 0,9% 0,7% 0,9% 0,9% 1,5% 2,7% 2,8%
Product category
As one of the main destinations of Chinese investments and loans, Angola has a unique 
opportunity to set an example among other African countries rich on resources how to 
distribute its riches among the population – given that China will stay a major actor in 
the country’s reconstruction as assumed by Alves, Senior Researcher at the South 
African Institute of International Affairs, (Willoughby 2012) and that the labour, quality 
and transparency related issues mentioned above will be challenged from both the 
Chinese and Angolan side. 
 
3.4 Sino-Angolan trade relations  
 
The trade balance between the two countries shows a clear misbalance: while oil 
accounts for 99% of all Chinese imports from Angola, Chinese exports are much more 
diversified and mainly dominated by electrical equipment and construction material as 
shown below in Table 3.2. Chinese imports from Angola are nine times higher than 
exports, but they started from a very low basis and they have increased sevenfold since 
2005 while the exports “only" increased fourfold. 
Looking the data below, a dramatic increase in both import and exports can be observed, 
making China Angola’s most important export partner and Angola China’s second 
largest trading partner in Africa (Trade Map). 
 
Table 3.2: Composition of Chinese imports to Angola, calculated by author (Trade Map)  
 
Angola is getting preferential treatment with regard to its exports to China as one of the 
least developed countries. These special regulations cover 466 products and guarantee 
Angola duty free access to China. Still the exports to China are consisting mostly of oil 
and diamonds, a clear failure with respect to taking advantage of these policies 
(Kiala/Corkin 2009, 40). 
 
As stated above, the quality of Chinese constructions and imported materials used 
caused wide, often unjustified, concern. However, a report by the Centre for Chinese 
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Studies argues that this is more the result of poor quality work and supervision, rather 
than of the quality of the imported products. Sandrey examined these claims by 
analyzing the average prices of Chinese exports to Angola and comparing them to the 
average prices of these products exported by China to the rest of the world. He found 
that around 87% of these exports to Angola had their average price above the world 
price by around 6%. This leads to the assumptions that Angola either gets worse prices 
or better quality compared to the rest of the world, and certainly to the rejection of the 
hypothesis that Chinese goods imported to Angola are inferior in general. The rising 
number of imports made consumer products ranging from electronics to clothing 
significantly cheaper, leading to a beneficial effect for African consumers. Especially 
financially weak consumers can now participate in markets previously inaccessible to 
them (Sandrey 2009, 46-49).  
 
3.5 Angola’s Oil Sector and Chinese investments 
 
As Africa’s second largest oil-producing country after Nigeria in 2010 (AEO 2011b, 6), 
Angola became a member of OPEC in 2007 and subsequently began with the 
implementation of OPEC Production cuts. The implementation of this policy led to oil 
exports not being dependent on supply-demand rules, but rather on the oil market price 
and OPEC production quotas (Sandrey 2009, 45). As Figure 3.1 points out, the price for 
crude oil increased continuously during the last 10 years. While the peak in the oil price 
in 2008 has been highly beneficial to Angola, the crash in commodity prices including 
oil in 2009 has led to serious economic difficulties because of the country’s 
undiversified economy. Aside from Angola’s weaker position on the negotiation table 
for loans, the government announced to cut public spending due to the price situation 
(Sandrey 2009, 44).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Development of the global oil price, created by author (Indexmundi)  
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Ironically, even though Angola’s economy is nearly entirely based on the export of oil, it 
has to import the major part of oil for its own use as only 30% of the domestic demand is 
covered by the single refinery in the country. This situation, however, is expected to 
change by 2014 with the planned opening of a new refinery in Lobito. While the steps 
from refining to distribution of oil are controlled by the state-owned company Sonangol, 
there are several foreign companies participating and investing in oil extraction. Also 
Sonangol expands internationally, for example by creating joint ventures with 
Venezuelan and Cuban state-owned oil companies (AEO 2011b, 6-7).  
As we learned above, Sonangol is frequently accused of weak transparency and 
irregularities including the disappearance of billions of dollars from the company’s 
accounts. The company had never been audited until 2003 (HRW 2011a, 8), but starting 
in 2008, regular audits have been performed and published, (Freedomhouse 2011)  
which is an essential measure towards a transparent fund and revenue management. Still 
Sonangol is associated with practices unthinkable in Western business environments: 
The Economist reported that Manuel Vicente, former Chairman of Sonangol, current 
economic coordination minister and potential successor of president Dos Santos (Reuters 
2012b), has been awarded a 1% ownership stake of Sonangol, a step which was taken 
back after protests from public (The Economist 2011b). This shows that although used to 
a strongly privileged elite in government related functions, the Angolan population does 
not put up with everything. 
As the majority of Angolan oil fields are assigned to numerous Western oil companies, 
the country’s main economic sector is very well diversified in terms of the investors’ 
countries of origin. This strategy is underlined by a statement made by President Dos 
Santos: “Globalization naturally makes us see the need to diversify international 
relations and to accept the principle of competition, which has in a dynamic manner 
replaced the petrified concept of zones of influence that used to characterize the world.” 
(Zhao 2011). 
 
China’s presence in the oil sector is continuously growing, but Chinese companies play a 
comparatively minor role in the purchasing of oil fields. Still, it’s China that has 
significantly influenced the course of the oil price and therefore is partly responsible for 
the strong Angolan growth rates in the past years, simply through their hunger for oil. 
An analysis by Hamilton showed that while price shocks in the past were caused by 
supply issues, the high 2008 prices originated in the strong demand in combination with 
static global oil production (Zhao 2011; Sandrey 2009, 42).  
China’s investments in Angola’s oil sector are disproportioned to the significance of 
Angola as one of China’s main energy suppliers: the Chinese oil company Sinopec 
entered the oil blocks one by one starting in 2004 by establishing a joint venture with 
Sonangol named Sinopec International (SSI) with its official launch in 2006. Sinopec’s 
first acquisition of blocks in 2004, before the creation of the joint venture, was 
accompanied by inconsistencies as the same oil blocks were promised to an Indian 
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company by the former owner Shell but with the help of a veto from Sonangol were then 
awarded to Chinese companies due to reported irregularities in the buying process. After 
that, SSI secured stakes in Angola’s blocks 15, 17, 18 and 32 together with the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) with shares ranging from 20% to ca. 50% 
(Kiala/Corkin 2009, 30; Zhao 2011). Attempts by Sinopec to acquire further oil fields 
outside the joint venture were successfully restrained by Sonangol (Willoughby 2012). 
At this point it is important to note that even though China currently one of Angola’s 
most important partners in several areas, Chinese companies do not automatically 
receive special treatment when it comes to project bidding: a Chinese joint venture 
proposal for the construction the new oil refinery in Lobito, for example, has been 
refused due to disagreements regarding the destination of the exported oil produced from 
the refinery (Sandrey 2009, 44). The government later awarded the project to a US based 
construction company although the production costs were significantly higher than the 
Chinese proposal, arguing that the prices for construction material have increased during 
the project awarding period (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 31). In 2011, Sinopec also lost the 
bidding for a block against an Indonesian company (Wang 2011). Several Chinese 
diplomats stated that there have been other deals promised to China and later called off 
after receiving the relevant concession from China (Horta 2011). 
As there is comparatively little Chinese investment in oil field stakes yet, a conclusion or 
realistic prognosis of the oil related investments is difficult to make.  
Alves holds that future Chinese investments in the Angolan oil industry are unlikely to 
increase in the next years and that she expects Angola’s oil fields to be dominated 
mostly by Western companies in the future. This forecasted reservation is mainly driven 
by the lack of technology and know-how on the part of China as Angola’s oil reserves 
are located in deep water for the most part (Willoughby 2012).  
 
3.6 Non-Oil related investments 
 
Investments by Chinese state-owned and private enterprises aside from the oil sector and 
loans are rather difficult to identify and to quantize. On the one hand, this is due to the 
common inclusion of investments in oil-backed loan contracts and on the other hand due 
to obscure agreements and, for most sectors, incomplete data.  
There has been a significant increase in Chinese FDI inflows in the last years, also 
outside the credit agreements especially in the non-oil sectors, according to the director 
of Angola’s National investment agency (ANIP). However, although only limited data is 
available, it can be certainly stated that these inflows are much smaller than promoted by 
the media and perceived by the public. To a large extent, it is the reporting system that 
hinders a proper evaluation of investment figures since Chinese investors that are 
contractually bound to projects related to Exim Bank, for example, are not regarded as 
investors and consequently don’t have to register themselves at ANIP. Consequently, 
due to one of Exim Bank’s functions as an institution granting financial support for 
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Chinese companies doing business overseas, it’s possible that a significant number of 
investments is not be covered by official ANIP data. Moreover, this could mean that 
even if the companies’ first project was aid related, businesses that resume investments 
never appear in official investment data (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 26-27).  
 
As there is no recent data describing which describes the composition and origin of FDIs 
obtainable from ANIP, and in addition, not even the official website was working at the 
time writing, only the figures from 2005-2007 can be provided. It can be seen in Figure 
3.2 that the major part of non-oil related investments is performed in the construction 
and industry sectors and a rather small part in the agriculture and service sectors. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Chinese non-oil-related FDI to Angola (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 27) 
 
Chinese companies are mainly linked to Angola through two organizations: the Chinese 
Business Association (CBA), established in 2002, consisting mostly of being small or 
medium sized entrepreneurs and the Chamber of Commerce of Chinese Companies in 
Angola (CCCCA), established in 2006, with Sinopec and other major Chinese 
companies among its members (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 26-27). The number of Chinese 
companies investing and operating in Angola is estimated around 450 by 2010 (AEO 
2011b, 15).  
 
The following section provides an overview of Chinese investments and their impacts on 
Angola’s main non-oil related sectors as far as availability of accurate data allows. 
 
3.6.1 Diamonds and mining 
 
Angola has the world’s 5th largest diamond production (Almeida 2012) which is 
controlled nearly entirely by the state-owned company Endiama (Walters 2011) which 
generated a revenue of USD 1.1 billion in 2011 (Angop 2012b). Similarly to Angola’s 
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oil industry, the diamond production has been hit significantly by the 2009 crisis (AEO 
2011b, 6). 
However, the exact turnover of Angola’s diamond sector is difficult to calculate as 
illegal mining activities are very common. It is estimated that only 40% of the potential 
is being exploited. Above all, this is because of lacking infrastructure between the 
capital city and the mines. The situation might improve in the next years as the Angolan 
government actively started to promote the access to the country’s diamond reserves in 
2011. All the same, it is reported that efforts are made to diversify Angola’s mining 
industry by stimulating the exploration of previously unattended resources such as 
copper or iron ore (Walters 2011).  
Chinese activities in Angola’s mining, in particular in the diamond industry, started in 
2005 with the creation of a joint venture between Endiama and the CIF. The function of 
the new company should have been the export of raw diamonds to Hong Kong where 
they would have been converted into a final product. However, this joint venture was 
cancelled by the Angolan Ministry in 2007 (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 32-35).  
 
An investment that received huge media response was the acquisition of a 18% stake of 
Angola’s Catoca Diamond Mine in 2011 by China-Sonangol International, which 
previously focused only on oil-related investments. The seller, Lev Leview, a Russian-
Israeli diamond magnate with reportedly good relations to the president’s surroundings 
sold the mine to the joint venture at a price twenty times higher than the amount he had 
originally invested in the 1990s. This purchase was the first case of a partial Chinese 
ownership in an Angolan mine. The deal came as a big surprise for experts and even 
officials in Beijing viewed the acquisition with skepticism, calling it a “purely a 
commercial entity” (Walters 2011; Melman/Carmel 2005). 
Apart from the diamond industry, it was reported that USD 3 million were recently 
invested in the construction of a granite manufacturing factory by a Chinese company. In 
this case, about 73% of the workforce is reported to be local, which means that the legal 
prerequisite is clearly fulfilled (Allafrica 2011b). Further investments can be expected in 
the future as Angola’s ambassador to China recently stated that Angola and China are 
together exploring possibilities to diversify Angola’s mining exports with the aim to 
export iron ore and copper in exchange for machinery from China (Angola Hub 2012b). 
As a representative of Endiama recently stated, Chinese investments in Angola’s mining 
industry and the rising demand are highly beneficial for Angola as both prices and 
exports of diamonds are expected to rise 2012 (Almeida 2012). Endiama’s chairman 
indicated that there are several collaborations with Chinese companies in the diamond 
sector and that there is still a desire for a stronger partnership in the exploration and 
production of diamonds.  
However, Chinese experts and representatives are less enthusiastic about a fast extension 
of the investments, warning of the still existing broad risk associated with overseas 
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investments in the diamond industry. As the vice-chairman of the China Mining 
Association stated: “[…] it is not a simple decision to make to invest in African diamond 
projects because of both the political and financial risks”. However, it can be expected 
that the rising diamond consumption in China will sooner or later simply require 
additional investment moves overseas (Antwerp Facets 2011).  
 
3.6.2 Agriculture 
The agricultural sector is one of Angola’s fastest growing sectors and like most areas of 
the country’s economy, it is slowly recovering from the consequences of the civil war: it 
contributes 10.9%  to the GDP (AOE 2011b, 5-6) but at the same time occupies 85% the 
country’s labor force with only 5% of the arable land being cultivated. These numbers 
imply that there is a huge potential for the sector’s development. On the one hand, this is 
because of the low level of cultivation and on the other hand due to the rather antiquated 
technology used by the farmers (Kiala 2010, 32). An article published in the AngolaHub 
refers to a study which concluded that only 1% of the 2000 Angolan farms analyzed 
were appropriately used (Angola Hub 2011). 
However, it is still very difficult to make accurate and objective statements about the 
state of Angola’s agriculture sector due to weak data availability, Angolan Secretary of 
State for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries even issued worries regarding 
the degradation of agricultural research institutes (AfricaSti 2012). The agriculture 
sector has been subject to numerous investments both from the Angolan government and 
from international donors like the CDB, driven by the ambitious target to achieve 
autarky in food supply by 2012. In 2010, the government announced a USD 350 million 
credit line for small and medium producers to support their activities and made plans to 
invest in the construction of small hydroelectric plants to support the autarky efforts 
(AEO 2011b, 6; Kiala 2010, 33). Angola also has ambitious plans regarding new 
investments as the country launched a plan to attract USD 6 billion of agriculture 
investments until 2013 (Burgis 2008).  
Chinese activities in Angola’s agricultural sector are dominated by projects resulting 
from loan and development agreements rather than by “real” FDI. Between 2004 and 
2005 the two countries agreed on the procurement of agricultural products and 
machinery with a total volume of USD 54 million. Shortly after that a Chinese company 
was contracted projects amounting to USD 59 million including the construction of 
irrigation systems and a hydroelectric dam among others. However, it has been reported 
that problems occurred during the distribution of the machinery and that no training for 
proper usage and maintenance was performed after the delivery, leading to a clearly 
shorter life time of the machinery.  
In 2009, a USD 1 billion loan has been granted by the CDB to support the agricultural 
sector and in particular cereal production and processing. About 200 officials and 
professionals from the agriculture industry were trained in China between 2007 and 
2008 (Kiala 2010, 34-44; Sandrey 2009, 55-58).  
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A potential market already being of high interest in other African countries is the buying 
of fertile land to cover the food demand in the investing country, however no evidence 
could be found during the research that China currently is focusing on the acquisition of 
fertile land in Angola.  
 
For future development, Sandrey recommends for Angola to analyze China’s historical 
agriculture development due to the very similar initial situation, as most of the 
workforce are peasants using simple technology to cultivate land (Sandrey 2009, 52-53). 
Kiala, for example, suggests to learn from the Chinese model of Town and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) which are small government run units giving employment to local 
peasants (Kiala 2010, 36). 
 
It is evident that Sino-Angolan agriculture collaboration is still in its early stages and 
thus an evaluation of the Chinese engagement would be simply too early, also given by 
the very limited data availability at present. 
 
3.6.3 Manufacturing and other sectors 
 
The output of Angola’s manufacturing sector declined considerably after the country’s 
independence due to the long lasting civil war. The government tried to counter this 
development by extending privatization with the expectation to attract new foreign 
investors (Britannica Online). However, today Angola’s manufacturing industry shows a 
low level of development for several reasons. First, there is a very strong competition 
from Chinese imports which reduce the general price level on the one hand and at the 
same time challenge the local production. Second, the strength of the Angolan currency 
in comparison to other African states makes the manufacturing industry less competitive, 
a result of the advancement of Dutch disease in Angola. Sandrey, however, states that in 
Angola’s case cheap imports can hardly lead to de-industrialization and unemployment 
as there is currently no existent industrialization. While this assumption may be true for 
the moment, one should keep in mind that successful long-term market entries of local 
companies into a highly competitive sector controlled by cheap imports from overseas 
may be very challenging if not impossible. Because of this difficult initiate situation and 
the low base, the Chinese manufacturing projects in Angola remain very few (Sandrey 
2009, 52-60).  
 
One major Chinese project was an investment realized by the car manufacturer 
Dongfeng, who recently established a car manufacturing plant together with the 
Japanese company Nissan with a total investment volume of USD 30 million. The target 
is to produce 30.000 vehicles per year and to create over 300 new local jobs. The 
investment has been made through a joint venture with Angola’s state-owned CGS 
Automovel, itself a wholly owned subsidy of CIF. If we keep the complicated ownership 
construction of this example in mind, it is evident that transparent accounting and fund 
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tracking might be rather problematic in such constructs. Another Chinese company that 
established a production facility in Angola was Haier, a company producing and selling 
air conditioners in Angola. Their investment provided around 700 new employment 
opportunities for Angolans. The company GDOCG is reported to have made investments 
of about USD 7.2 million in the manufacturing of motorcycles, however no recent 
evidence could be found by Kiala and Corkin during their research that the company is 
still operating in the local market. While these few examples illustrate the main Chinese 
investments in the manufacturing industry, Chinese vice president Wang Quishan 
announced stronger investments in this sector during his 2011 visit to Angola. 
According to Kiala and Corkin, more lobbying work should be done to promote 
investments in manufacturing, for instance by focusing on the China Africa development 
fund (CADF) mentioned earlier. The authors see ANIP’s role as an essential one in the 
development of Angola’s manufacturing sector, for instance through promoting proper 
steering of the FDI and actively involving local partners (Kiala/Corkin 2009, 28-40; 
Xinhuanet 2010).  
 
Apart from the major sectors described above, Chinese companies also invested in 
several other areas of Angola’s economy: ZTE, a major Chinese communication 
company, entered the Angolan market in 2004 by taking shelter of the management in 
Angola’s second largest mobile operator Movicel subsequently leading to several 
cooperation’s in this area. Huawei financed the optimization of Angola’s wireless 
technology following massive investments in Angola’s ICT sector. Moreover, the 
company initiated a telecom technical training center in order to train about 200 
Angolans annually. This is another indicator for the ongoing shift in the strategy towards 
a stronger involvement of qualified local workforce, which is a lasting benefit for 
Angola. Chinese enterprises are also active on a relatively small business level, in most 
cases in the retail and gastronomy sectors, but also by establishing companies in logistics 
and cargo management. It has been observed that especially these enterprises employ a 
very low number of local workforce because of their size and often family owned nature. 
Apart from the commodity industry, the number of M&E involving local businesses is 
very low. Chinese companies which entered the market through aid projects financed by 
oil-backed loans have gained ground and a competitive advantage to perform further 
investments.Here, the Angolan government should set clear steps and implement 
regulations to enforce the involvement of local businesses as soon as possible (Kiala 
2010, 28-46).  
 
The potential of new local partnerships with major Chinese companies like ZZNissan, 
who are actively searching for new activity fields in Angola, or ZTE, who are now 
involved in the sales of cell phones after the acquisition of Movicel, should be used to 
boost local businesses. A USD 1 billion fund to develop China’s relationships with 
Portuguese speaking countries was created in 2012, providing loans with beneficial 
interest rates and training opportunities, directed to the members of the Forum for 
Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries, an 
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opportunity for Angolan companies to enforce collaborations with Chinese investors.  
Angola desperately needs investment and more local involvement in non-mineral sectors 
to make its economy less vulnerable to crises and price shocks (Kiala 2010, 28-46; 
Angola Hub 2012c) but also to develop its economy structure away from the current 
patterns of a developing country. 
 
3.7 Chinese immigration to Angola 
 
Very limited and conflicting data regarding Chinese immigration to Angola is available 
at present. China’s ambassador to Angola claimed that in 2009, there were around 
50.000 Chinese workers employed in Angola. This figure however is contradicted by the 
officially published figure of nearly 40.000 working visas granted in 2008 alone 
(Kiala/Corkin 2009, 33).  
 
As we learned in section 2.11, Chinese workers, especially occupied in the construction 
sector of African countries, are mainly contractual employees living in rather isolated 
communities, however, no detailed information especially for Angola’s case could be 
found during the research so that only assumptions based on other African countries can 
be made. What is clear is that a major challenge for the business and social interaction 
particular to Angola is the language barrier. This issue has been reportedly 
underestimated by China as it is common that Chinese overseers do not speak a word of 
Portuguese and therefore cannot communicate with the local workers (Corkin et. al 
2008, 8). This factor clearly aggravates the low integration level of Chinese as observed 
in most African countries.  
This condition also leads to rumours and accusations since very few people are in 
contact and interaction with Chinese immigrants, leading to numerous ridiculous stories: 
for instance there are gossips that Chinese workers are prisoners that have to work off 
their sentence, driven by the assumption that as the wage level and living conditions are 
much lower than those of Western counterparts, it is hardly credible that they work as 
hard as they do for comparatively little money (Park 2009, 10-11). There were also 
reports of attacks on Chinese citizens and highly negative reports in the local media even 
including racist reproaches of cannibalism on the website of a local political party (Horta 
2011). In 2009, three Chinese workers have been doused with boiling water and as the 
Chinese Economic Council in Angola stated that there are two to three attacks on 
Chinese citizens every day, while most of them, however, are never registered 
(Weltonline 2010).  
It is self-evident that the driving force of such aggression is in part the rather negative 
picture of Chinese investors and their activities in much of the Western media coverage 
and the exploitation of such accusations directed against Chinese individuals by local 
policymakers and competitors in Angola. 
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4. China in Zambia 
 
In the last decade, Zambia has attracted China’s investment interests in various areas, 
making it one of the top recipients of Chinese FDI in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Carmody/Taylor 2009, 10). Historically, the country’s economy has been based on a 
single commodity, namely copper. Recent Chinese activities were mainly focused on 
mining related investments, but capital flows from China to other industries and sectors 
have been increasing continuously over the years. Also, trade between the two counties 
increased significantly within the last five years, with exports to China having grown 
nearly sixfold and imports from China having climbed nearly eightfold (Trade Map).  
 
Contrary to our first focus Angola, resource-backed loans play a comparably minor role 
in the bilateral relationship. The Sino-Zambian collaboration dates back to the 1960s and 
1970s, when the legendary TAZARA railway – the first major Sino-African construction 
project –   was completed. In addition, Zambia has taken a pioneer role with respect to 
China by establishing Africa’s first Special Economic Zone in the copperbelt region very 
recently.  
 
4.1 Zambia Country Snapshot 
 
The modern Republic of Zambia, formerly known as the colony Northern Rhodesia, 
gained independence from Great Britain in 1964. It has a land size of ca. 752.000 km
2
, 
which is about two times the size of Germany. The total population of the predominantly 
Christian country is around 14 million (recorded in July 2011) and is growing steadily 
having the world’s 11th highest population growth rate of 3.1% (CIA World Factbook). 
 
After independence from colonial rule, Zambia experienced an economic boom due to 
the rising copper price. However, this prosperous period lasted a rather short time since 
the economy had been hit by a continuous decline of the cooper price starting in the mid-
1970s. This development led to a drop of the GDP per capita by almost 30% between 
1975 and 1990. At the beginning of the 1990s, a liberalization program was initiated by 
the Zambian government in cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF, leading 
bottom line to an adverse performance in mining, manufacturing as well as agriculture, 
and subsequently to a very mixed result on the Zambian economy in general (Biz/ed 
Zambia). 
 
In the past years, Zambia’s economy has recorded substantial GDP growth with an 
average of 6% between the 2005 and 2010 and continued to grow at 6.7% in 2011. The 
origins of this impressive performance are in part due to several structural adjustments 
and reforms, but mainly due to the significantly risen copper price. Nevertheless, 
Zambia is one of the world’s poorest countries with a GDP per capita of USD 1.5, it 
ranks 197
th
 of 226 nations. The country suffers from one of the world’s highest inflation 
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rates amounting to 8.4% in 2011 (CIA World Factbook), moreover, about 64% of 
Zambia’s population is living below the poverty line (Unicef Statistics).  
The sectorial distribution of the GDP in 2011 clearly shows the picture of a developing 
country, with a substantial contribution of the agricultural sector with 21.5%. The 
industry and service sectors contribute 35.2% and 44.1% to the GDP, respectively (CIA 
World Factbook). The following Table 4.1 shows a more detailed breakdown of the 
GDP. 
Table 4.1: Sectoral distribution of Zambia's GDP (AOE 2011c, 5)  
GDP contribution/ sector 2005 2010 
Agriculture 21.4% 20.9% 
Manufacturing  10.9% 9.3% 
General government services  7.8% 9.9% 
Finance, RE and business services  15.1% 14.4% 
Construction  11.9% 19.4% 
Wholesale and retail trade 21.5% 18.0% 
Mining and quarrying  3.3% 1.3% 
Others 8.1% 6.8% 
   It is obvious from above table that there has been a clear shift to the construction 
industry in the sectoral contribution to the GDP, while the impact from all other sectors 
except for governmental services declined in the period analyzed.This trend is expected 
to continue: the construction sector is supposed to grow by double digits in the next 
years, while the growth of agriculture and mining is projected to be around 4.6% and 
13.4% in 2012, respectively. Besides, the secondary sector plays an essential role in the 
country’s economy and is supposed to grow by 10.1% in 2012 (AOE 2011c, 6; IMF 
2011b, 16).  
The occupational distribution of Zambia’s labor force indicates that the country is still 
an agriculturally dominated economy, as 85% 
5
 are working in agriculture, while only 
6% and 9% fall upon industry and services, respectively (CIA World Factbook). If we 
look at the distribution of the paid employment, the most recent figures available show a 
share of 36.7% in the public administration, 13.6% in wholesale and retail, followed by 
agriculture, manufacturing and finance with equal shares ranging from 11% to 12% in 
2006. Compared to data from 2002, this means that there has been a reduction of the 
workforce in the manufacturing sector which was around 15.7% at that time, and an 
increase in the agricultural, public administration and wholesale sectors. There has also 
been a fivefold increase in the construction sector, starting from a low base, however. 
The mining sector only occupies 5% of the paid workforce, even though it is the 
backbone of the economy (Calculated from IMF 2008, 11). 
__________ 
5
 Data established in 2004, most recent data available. 
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Zambia is very rich in resources, mainly copper, but also cobalt, zinc, lead, coal, gold, 
silver, uranium, or hydropower (CIA World Factbook). Still, the economy is nearly 
entirely dependent on the copper production which accounted for 75% of the total 
exports in 2011, followed by several minor product groups.  
Similarly to Angola, imports to Zambia are much better diversified, with 18.1% falling 
upon machinery on the top, followed by ores (mainly copper imported from DRC) with 
a share around 13.5%, and vehicles, oils and electrical equipment with nearly equal 
shares between 7 and 9%. The three main export destinations are Switzerland (50.1%), 
China (17%) and South Africa (9.5%) and the major import partners are South Africa 
(35.5%), DRC (19%) and China (9.7%) (Trade Map).  
 
As Africa’s biggest copper producer (AOE 2011c, 3), Zambia’s economy has been hit 
by very badly by the fluctuating copper prices between 1970s and 1990s, as briefly 
mentioned above. However, there has been a noticeable recovery in the recent years, 
especially due to the risen copper price as indicated below Figure in 4.1, which only 
slowed down because if the 2009 crisis. This development has led to the country’s 
reclassification from low to low-middle income status, declared by the World Bank in 
2011 (HRW 2011b, 2). 
Figure 4.1: Development of the global copper price, created by author (Indexmundi)  
Foreign direct investments to Zambia have also been increasing in the last years, again 
interrupted by the years of the economic crisis as shown in below Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Global FDI inflows to Zambia (Allafrica 2011c)
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Zambia’s former Commerce, Trade and Industry Minister Felix Mutati, an 
increase of FDI inflows to USD 1.28 billion and USD 1.55 billion is expected for 2012 
and 2013, respectively (Allafrica 2011c). In 2010, OECD countries accounted for around 
58% of the total FDI inflows (ZDA 2011, 29-30). Only four countries, namely Canada, 
Australia, Virgin Islands and the UK are responsible for 78.4% of total FDI inflows. 
These figures underline China’s minor role in FDI, at least in 2010. The mining sector is 
still the primary FDI destination with a share of nearly 70% of total FDI inflows in 2010 
(ZDA 2011, 11). 
 
Due to the enormous economic progress of the last years, Zambia recently moved away 
from the LDC category and is expected to become a middle income country in the next 
years (Lusakatimes 2011). The country’s external debt has been constantly decreasing 
since 2000: while it amounted to USD 6.7 billion in 2000, the debt level reached the low 
mark of USD 2.6 billion in 2008, driven in part by its status as a HIPC which led to 
significant debt reliefs. However, during the recent economic crisis the debt burden 
constantly increased and reached USD 3.5 billion in 2011 – still only around half the 
value of the debt figures in 2000. Compared to Angola’s debt burden of approximately 
USD 18 billion in 2011, Zambia seems to be much less indebted, but when put in 
relation to the GDP, the country has a very similar debt situation. In comparison to its 
neighboring countries, Zambia has a low level debt level relative to the GDP 
(Indexmundi – calculated by author; Ijdh 2008). 
 
4.1.1 Political Environment 
 
In terms of political stability, Zambia is one of the most exemplary countries in the 
region. It has a comparatively well-developed democratic system that was established in 
1991, after more than 20 years of a single party regime (AOE 2011c, 3). Recently, 
presidential elections were held in September 2011 and resulted in the victory of the 
long time opposition candidate from the Patriotic Front (PF), Michael Sata. His last two 
election campaigns were highly critical of Chinese investments and focused on anti-
Chinese rhetoric, for example accusing the Chinese of disregarding Zambian labor laws 
or enforcing excessive immigration of Chinese labor force.  
__________ 
6
 All data, except for 2009 (ZDA 2011, 28), from (Allafrica 2011c) 
Global FDI inflows to Zambia 
2006 USD 0.47 Billion 
2007 USD 1.32 Billion 
2008 USD 0.94 Billion 
2009 USD 0.70 Billion 
2010 USD 1.73 Billion 
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After his anti-Chinese campaign during the elections in 2006, which included threats of 
Taiwan’s recognition if elected, it was reported that Chinese officials announced to cut 
the diplomatic relations if Sata would win the elections (BBC News 2011; Leadership 
2012; HRW 2011b, 26). This was the first time after the Mao’s reign that China actively 
tried to influence an African election (Carmody/Taylor 2009, 12). Still, this interference 
is easily explained as it was reported that Sata, aside from the announcement of 
Taiwan’s recognition, had signed a memorandum of understanding with Taiwanese 
officials to restore diplomatic relations – a clear offence against the One China policy 
(Bräutigam 2009, 151). Despite these conflicts, it has been reported after the 2011 polls 
that China “welcomed the outcome of the vote” (Reuters 2011b). Although violent 
behavior and riots were registered during these elections (Simwanza 2011), the outcome 
can be regarded as a huge progress for the young Zambian democracy. After 20 years of 
reign by the MMPD, the opposition took over the power in a more or less peaceful 
election process.  
 
For China, the main question is whether Sata will redefine the FDI regulations and laws 
and force Chinese companies to follow these new guidelines promised during his 
election campaign, or whether he will drift back realizing the power of foreign investors 
and continue the easy access policy of his predecessors (Leadership 2012). In his 
inauguration speech, Sata stated that foreign companies must respect Zambian laws, but 
at the same time highlighted that their investment is very welcome. One of his first 
actions was to increase the monthly minimum wage and replace the heads of the anti-
corruption commission, the police and Zambia’s central bank. Other immediate actions 
were the announcement of new transparency regulations, followed by a ban on metal 
exports which was taken back two days later, however. In addition, a planned increase of 
the government shares in the copper mining industry has been announced (HRW 2011b, 
27-28). 
 
4.1.2 Business environment 
 
The Zambian government had introduced numerous measures to improve the business 
environment and attract new investments in the last years. In 2006, the Zambia 
development agency (ZDA) was created as a result of the merger of five already existing 
development and regulatory institutions. In addition, the country is member of MIGA, 
an organization ensuring FDI protection in cases of war or disasters and Zambia’s 
national bank follows a non-intervention policy with regard to foreign investments (Van 
der Lugt et al. 2011, 54-55). Additionally, initiatives like the Private Sector 
Development Program were undertaken to improve the investment environment and to 
set fiscal and non-fiscal incentives for new investors (Kamwang/Koyi 2009, 16). 
 
The fact that Zambia currently experiences a rising confidence on the part of foreign 
investors is also reflected in the recently assigned B+ rating by Fitch (Fitchratings) and 
by S&P (Standardandpoors) which is the higher derivative for African countries. 
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Furthermore, Zambia is ranked 7
th
 of 46 sub-Saharan African countries in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business ranking and 84th out of 183 nations worldwide. Compared to 
Angola, which ranks at the low end in this report, it is a significantly better position (WB 
Doing Business 2012). 
In a recent ZDA report, surveyed investors stated that political stability in Zambia had a 
significant impact on their investment decision, the most relevant factor being domestic 
economic growth. On the other hand, corruption and high cost of services, fuel prices in 
particular, were reported to have a strong negative impact (ZDA 2011, 11).  
 
Still, there were reports of serious transparency violations: no structured external 
examination of the foreign companies’ accounts and of the taxes they paid until 2011 has 
been performed until the publishing of the first Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative report for Zambia, analyzing 2008 figures in 2011 (Lusakatimes 2012). This 
report made public, for example, that mining companies paid USD 463 million in taxes 
to the government by mining companies in 2008, but there were claims about 
unexplainable discrepancies of USD 66 million. It was also reported that a large part of 
Zambia’s exported copper to Switzerland never appeared in the Swiss data. Also, there 
has been a recently publicized made case of corruption involving Clencore, the Swiss 
company behind the Mopani copper mines, which cheated the Zambian tax authorities 
(Sharife 2011). The fact that this mining operation has been subsidized by European 
loans from the EIB makes the situation even more critical (Simpere 2010).  
Hence, despite reports of an improved transparency situation in Zambia’s copper mining 
sector (Lusakatimes 2012), this sector is still very vulnerable to corruption and tax fraud 
and therefore is in need of continuous observations and enforcement of regulations from 
the Zambian authorities. 
 
4.2 Brief History of the Sino-Zambian cooperation  
 
Bilateral relationships between China and Zambia have already been established during 
the colonial period in the first half of the 20
th
 century. Similarly to Angola, a Zambian 
opposition party received financial and material assistance to support the country’s 
independence. Starting in the late 1960s, major projects in the sphere of economic and 
technical cooperation, including the construction of roads and a radio station, were 
undertaken. The most impressive of these projects was the construction of the TAZARA 
Railway between Zambia and Tanzania which will be discussed separately. After China 
began to enforce it’s going out policy in the 1990s, the focus shifted from development-
aid-related projects towards economic cooperation in Zambia, including direct 
investment and preferential loans. Another major step in the bilateral relationship was 
Zambia’s pioneer role as a host of the first African SEZ in Chambishi, initiated in 2007. 
Today, activities of Chinese companies include projects in many other segments apart 
from mining like agriculture, manufacturing as well as telecommunications. But for 
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Zambia, as well as for Angola, it is difficult to provide the exact magnitude and impact 
of Chinese investments on the country’s economy, especially subdivided in industrial 
sectors, due to limited data availability (Mwanawina 2008, 1-8). 
In total, China’s investment to Zambia amounted to USD 2 billion by 2010 according to 
the Chinese state-run agency, which makes China the third largest investor. In addition, 
the annual growth of bilateral trade is reported to be above 30% since 2000 (HRW 
2011b, 20). However, the time range and exact definition of “investment” was not 
provided in this announcement. A recently published report of the ZDA shows a purely 
FDI related figure of only USD 32,4 million in 2010 which would rank China as the 9
th
 
largest investor, while Canada or Australia have invested 14 and 12 times as much, 
respectively. In total, the OECD countries accounted for around 58% of the FDI inflows, 
underlining China’s rather minor role as an FDI provider in 2010 (ZDA 2011, 29-30).  
 
China’s engagement was also met with a mixed response. During one of his campaigns 
while being an opposition candidate, the current president Michael Sata said:  
 
“We want the Chinese to leave and the old colonial rulers to return. They 
exploited our natural resources too, but at least they took care of us. They 
built schools, taught us their language and brought us the British civilization 
[…] at least Western capitalism has a human face; the Chinese are only out 
to exploit us.” (Li 2010, 13).  
 
While it should be considered that highly populist statements like these were made 
mostly during Sata’s election campaign, they clearly draws a simplified picture of good 
and bad and they certainly ignore other positive impacts of Chinese activities on Zambia. 
As a consequence, such speeches contribute to the often wrong perception of Chinese 
investors in the country.  
In the following part, I will analyze the current situation and the influence of Chinese 
investments on the individual sectors in more detail, focusing both on non-mining-
related investments and on mining operations, since this still the main focus of Chinese 
investments in Zambia. 
 
4.3 Zambia’s mining sector and Chinese investments 
 
The commercial use of copper in Zambia already started in the 1920s during the British 
colonial reign and it has since become the main contributor to Zambia’s earnings. 
Shortly after independence in 1964, the mines were nationalized and consolidated under 
the long-term president Kaunda which led to great wealth, driven by the high copper 
price in this period. Zambia became one of the richest countries in the region, with an 
absolute GDP outpacing that of today’s developed economies like Brazil, Turkey or 
South Korea at that time. However, the success story ended in the mid- to late 1970s, 
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after the copper price had fallen significantly and Zambia entered a critical debt crisis. 
The following collapse of the whole mining industry made Zambia dependent on capital 
inflows in the form of aid. The main provision imposed by donors like the World Bank 
and the IMF in the 1990s has been the privatization of the consolidated mining industry 
and as a result, the former national mines were sold to various foreign investors. The 
selling process occurred at a time when the prices for the mines were at a rather low 
level. Moreover, there was no public discussion about the details of these sales 
agreements (Li 2010, 5-6; Bräutigam 2009).  
 
The privatization procedure also lacked incentives and regulations for the investors to 
perform long-term planning with their investments. The new shareholders were 
benefiting from various exceptions, such as lower corporate taxes than in other 
industries, leading to the result that the contribution of mining to total tax revenues 
became significantly smaller, while at the same time, revenues from mining were 
increasing. Another result of the privatization was the halving of the workforce 
employed in mining between 1995 and 2000 and, in addition, thousands of ex-miners 
were disposed of their pension payments (Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 20; 55-57; 3). The copper 
mines were formerly entirely state-owned and consolidated under the company ZCCM. 
Its successor, ZCCM IH, with the Zambian government holding 87.6% as its main 
shareholder, now owns shares of the copper mines and associated companies of between 
10% and 20.6% (ZCCM-IH).  
Not long after the first privatization wave, China entered the market by purchasing a 
copper mine in the Chambishi area in 1998 (Kamwang/Koyi 2009, 21). China’s copper 
consumption made significant developments in the last years: after having a share of 
only 10% of the world’s copper consumption in the 1980s, the copper import in 2010 
climbed to approximately 30% of the world’s production (Karithi 2010). That is why the 
motivations for this move are evident. In the following years, the purchasing and 
reopening of more mines and plants followed, providing about 6000 jobs for the region, 
some of them certainly rehiring the workforce that lost its jobs due to the crisis in the 
mining industry (HRW 2011b, 3). 
As briefly mentioned above, the first Chinese-African SEZ, the Zambia China Economic 
and Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), was created in Chambishi mainly to boost the 
investments in copper related industries (HRW 2011b, 21). The successful establishment 
of the zone heralded a new era in the Sino-African relationships and its importance was 
underlined by the visit of the Chinese president Hu Jintao to the opening ceremony in 
Zambia (Bräutigam et al. 2010, 3). Since the general concepts of SEZs were discussed 
above, I will focus mainly on a further description of the Chambishi zone and its 
performance in particular. One of the key policies of the zone, 95% of which is currently 
in Chinese hands, is the attraction of new investors by providing various incentives like 
special tax concessions. However, a minimum investment of USD 500.000 is required to 
take advantage of these incentives (Mwanawina 2008, 8; Farole/ Akinci 2011, 85-89). 
Although the Zambian government wanted ZCCZ to be purely Chinese, there are no 
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restrictions that limit potential participants with regard to their country of origin. The 
zone opened up to other investors on Chinese initiative, with the target of attracting 20% 
of non-Chinese businesses. Still, at the moment, Chinese companies are dominating the 
operations in the zone. During the construction phase, about 45% of the workforce was 
Chinese. This figure declined to 17% -25% of Chinese workers in the everyday 
operation, depending on their activity area, after the completion (Farole/ Akinci 2011, 
89-90). Eleven Chinese manufacturers began their activities in 2010 and more are 
expected to follow, leading to an expected output of USD 1.5 billion per year and the 
employment of nearly 6000 workers (Farole/ Akinci 2011, 73).  
 
Although there is general consensus that SEZs or industrial parks are promising concepts 
to develop Zambia’s economy, they bear the risk of overdevelopment in their respective 
areas. For example, it is planned to establish several zone extensions and industry parks 
(MCTI) in the already well-developed Lusaka region, but there is not a single clustering 
project planned in underdeveloped towns like Mansa or Mongu (AFRODAD 2009, 16). 
Aside from the major investment in the Chambishi copper mine, China also acquired the 
Luanshya Copper mine, where more than USD 400 million were invested in 
recapitalization. After the mine was closed for the past 13 years, 1700 miners were 
reemployed (AOE 2011c, 14; Li 2010, 9). 
 
To sum up China’s investments in copper mining: there are currently two copper mines, 
one copper smelting plant and one copper processing plant in Chinese ownership, all 
controlled by the Chinese parastatal CNMC (HRW 2011b, 21) through its subsidiaries, 
for example the NFC mining cooperation with partial ownerships by the Zambian 
ZCCM IH (ZCCM-IH). 
 
In addition to copper-investments, Chinese investors owe the Collum coal mine which 
has caused much attention due to the killing of workers, an event which we will briefly 
highlight in the next section. Moreover, the Chinese have bought the majority of shares 
of Zambia’s sole Nickel mine Munali, but in this case the success was far below the 
projected forecast, on the one hand due to the fallen nickel prices, but mostly because of 
the inefficient structures in the mine (Allafrica 2012d).  
 
Following these investments, especially in the Chambishi mine as the largest of all 
Chinese-owned mines (Li 2010, 6), the volume of Zambian copper exports to China 
exploded from USD 8.7 million in 2005 to USD 1.3 billion in 2011 (Trade Map). Still, 
in Zambia’s case, the Chinese copper-extracting companies are reported to have a strong 
freedom to operate, with no obligations to ship the resources extracted to China, but 
rather to sell them at the best price (Bräutigam 2009, 280-281).  
Before going deeper into the structure of Chinese investments, I will analyze the effects 
of privatization on Zambia’s mining industry. A special focus will be set on the impact 
of Chinese action, since the privatization procedure is also the origin of many 
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transparency-related issues which the Chinese in Zambia are frequently accused of. 
 
4.3.1 Effects of privatization on Zambia’s mining industry 
 
As mentioned earlier, the IMF and the World Bank started to promote the privatization 
of state-owned companies in the 1990s in Zambia as restructuring measures and 
prerequisites for new loans. As a result, more than 260 former state-owned companies 
were sold to private investors (IPS 2010). Especially in the mining sector, the new 
investors, including Chinese, agreed on so called development agreements that were kept 
in secret, taking advantage of Zambia’s weak position. These contracts guaranteed 
benefits like specific tax treatment or exceptions to environmental laws. In addition, 
some of these contracts cannot be changed for the next 15 to 20 years, a period after 
which some of the copper mines will be simply depleted.  These factors are very 
negative for Zambia, especially in a long-term perspective since the new investors nearly 
entirely eliminated flexibility in the contract design.  
Moreover, the low transparency level leads to the result that, although ¾ of Zambia’s 
exports are copper, it contributes only 10% to Zambia’s Tax revenues. This figure is also 
supported by the World Bank, which presented figures showing that tax revenues from 
mining are out of all proportion compared to its importance for the country’s economy. 
Being aware of the problem, newly elected president Michael Sata recently announced 
that all exports will be routed through Zambia’s Central Bank to counteract this issue 
(Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 55; Reuters 2011c). The special tax-treatments that were made 
public differed significantly among the new mine owners. While the Chinese owners 
were obliged to pay a 35% corporate tax rate and a 2% royalty tax rate for their revenues 
from Chambishi mines, corporate and royalty taxes were lower for the British-owned 
Concolla copper mines or the Swiss-owned Mopani copper mines at only 25% and 
0.6%, respectively (Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 70). 
 
By implementing these regulations for the new investors, Zambia followed the 
requirements of the World Bank and the IMF to create an investor-friendly atmosphere. 
Aside from the points mentioned above, these steps also resulted in the removal or 
freeze of many regulating procedures which were established over the last decades 
(Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 3).  In effect, the Zambian population benefited very little from the 
risen copper prices in terms of tax revenue and social benefits as a result of the 
privatization and the development agreements (Lungu 2009, 17).  
 
Still it seems that the Zambian government realized these problems and its impact on the 
attitude of the electorate, as numerous changes in the taxing regime have been made in 
2008: for example, the corporate tax was increased to 30% and 35% if the mine is not 
listed on Lusaka stock exchange (Zambiamining). In addition, the mineral royalty tax 
was raised from 0.6% to 3% and other variable taxes were introduced. Incomes from 
hedging were separated from mining incomes regarding their taxation. The intensely 
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discussed reintroduction of a windfall tax, which was supposed to be triggered at 
variable prices for several metals in 2008, was cancelled in 2009 due to protests from 
mining companies. After long discussions about the reintroduction of the tax, the new 
finance minister announced in 2011 that it would not be reintroduced due to unstable 
metal prices and the possibility of harming the mining industry (Lungu 2009, 19; 
Reuters 2011g). However, changes in the tax regime performed 2012 are reported to 
have led to significantly higher revenues from mining, although the figures are too 
recent to make a serious judgment at the moment (Sinyangwe 2012). 
 
Another consequence of the privatization was that many local companies went out of 
business because they could not compete with foreign suppliers that were contracted by 
the new owners. Although the government has announced to resolve this issue, there is 
still no concrete policy to support local businesses in the copper industry, in part because 
certain supplier agreements are part of such long-term contracts as described above.  
But as it is the case for many other developing countries, Zambia is dependent on 
foreign aid which prevents them of using certain radical quotas, since introducing such a 
quota would have to pass the “control” of the World Bank or the IMF who are still 
regulating many of the country’s internal policies (Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 4).  
 
4.3.2 China-specific impacts in mining 
 
The first Chinese investment in Zambia’s mining sector was the acquisition of the 
Chambishi mine in 1998, which led to a strong recovery for the region. The move was 
highly appreciated by local authorities, especially after Canadian investors had cancelled 
their ambitions for purchasing the mine due to the continuously low copper price. Also 
during the 2009 crisis, permanent Chinese investment were essential for keeping the 
industry alive, while many Western companies closed down production or reduced it to a 
minimum. Government data indicates that 85.000 Zambian mine workers lost their jobs 
as a result of the closings or production turndowns during the 2009 crisis. Trade unions 
are referring to an even greater number of 110.000 workers. The Chinese approach to 
investing differed from that of Western investment companies during the crisis as 
Chinese companies invested even more in the mining sector by acquiring the Luyashia 
copper mine and starting the Chambishi copper smelter during the crisis, as mentioned 
above (Li 2010, 7-8). 
 
Still, Chinese mine acquisitions led to a radical change in the social infrastructure of the 
Copperbelt region. Prior to the privatization, the former owner ZCCM provided many 
services to the local communities, like the construction of hospitals, schools or 
prevention programs for common diseases like malaria or HIV. But Chinese investors, 
like most other new financiers, dropped these services and made clear that the main 
purpose of their activity was the mining business (Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 4). 
On the one hand, it’s understandable that a foreign investor is mainly profit-oriented. 
But it should also be considered that, contrary to investment destinations in developed 
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countries, people in the copperbelt region are in need local support. If this responsibility 
is not taken over by the government, it might have a serious impact on the workforce in 
the region and therefore on the foreign companies’ profits.  
That is why Chinese and other foreign investors should keep in mind that the rising 
absenteeism, increases in nutritional defects and preventable infections as well as 
malaria rates as high as 30% among the local population in the Copperbelt region are 
clear signs. If this increase continues, foreign investors will also be affected by these 
problems in terms of lacking local workforce and therefore should reconsider their 
approach (Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 4). 
 
One of the main points of criticism with regard to Chinese-owned mines are reports of 
bad working conditions and low wages. A recent report by Human Rights Watch on 
Zambian copper mines presented an alarming insight into the workers’ current situation. 
The salary in Chinese-owned mines is usually higher than Zambia’s monthly minimum 
wage, but HRW claims that it is often lower than the wage paid by other copper mining 
firms. And even though the wage level in the Chambishi mine has doubled since 2004, 
this measure led to little real increase due to the high inflation, moreover it is reported 
that some competitors raised their wages to the same extent or even greater (HRW 
2011b, 25). From the Chinese perspective, the salaries demanded by Zambians are 
regarded as too high. Companies argue that Zambian workers often provide low quality 
work, lack experience and have an attitude towards work which doesn’t fit Chinese 
expectations (Mwanawina 2008, 7). 
 
Zambia’s mining regulations and labor laws are, in theory, very strongly developed. 
Following a serious mining accident in the 1970s, laws and regulations were adjusted to 
Western standards, Canadian in particular. But investigations by HRW found that 
neither international nor domestic working standards were met in Chinese-owned copper 
mines (HRW 2011b, 19). The complaints were ranging from poor health and safety 
standards and excess working hours which are not covered by Zambian law to threats of 
being fired if refused to work in dangerous environments. Still, most mine workers 
sacrifice their health and safety fearing that they might lose their job. Given the difficult 
situation on the Zambian labor market, such sacrifice might become understandable. 
HRW also reported that workers were put under pressure to join trade unions that are 
advantageous to the Chinese investors. Zambia has a strong trade union tradition 
because of its long mining history and it is alarming that some Chinese managers 
hindered the workforce from joining the second main trade union, the Mineworkers 
Union of Zambia (MUZ). Various consequences were threatened to follow public union 
activities. However, problems with union activities also occurred at other, non-Chinese 
companies. The fact that the Mines Safety Department is reported to be understaffed and 
corrupted makes further investigations from the governmental side even more difficult.  
 
Although miners interviewed in Chinese-owned companies expressed gratitude towards 
the Chinese investors for guaranteeing their jobs, nearly all Zambian workers and trade 
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union officials who spoke to HRW claimed that the working conditions with regard to 
health and safety in Chinese-owned copper firms are the country’s worst. Workers in the 
Chambishi mines said that working hours are often by far exceeding the 48 hour per 
week legal limit imposed by Zambian law and that they are expected to work in 12 hour 
shifts.   It is common that accidents and irregularities are not reported to the government. 
That is why interviewed trade union officials believe that hurt workers are being bribed 
by Chinese management. In addition, workers in the Chambishi mines do not receive 
any social protection apart from terminal benefits.A nurse interviewed by HRW 
mentioned that she experienced problems with Chinese management pressuring sick 
workers to return to work. Although physical abuse by Chinese overseers is reported to 
have decreased substantially in the last years (HRW 2011b, 32-95), several concrete 
incidents and violations have been reported: 
 
According to a trade union official, about 1000 miners have been fired by NFCA in the 
Chambishi copper mines after participating in strikes over wages in 2011 (Foxbusiness 
2011). During protests in 2010, thirteen protesting workers were shot and wounded by 
Chinese managers in the Collum Coal mine. The delinquents were not penalized, 
however: their case was dropped. A Zambian Journalist commented on this event: “It 
just confirmed how powerful the Chinese are in Zambia […]. The state dropped the 
charges; it just negotiated a compensation package. The message was, “Give them 
money, and any problems will be solved.” (HRW 2011b, 30; Sinkamba 2011).  
 
Safety inspectors recently found that the Chinese-owned Collum coal mine is operating 
without basic medical equipment like ambulances or first aid kits (Lusakatimes 2008). 
Moreover, it has been reported that injured workers received no compensation and that 
there were demands to close down the mine until the safety standards would be 
improved. A local health director complained that steam from the mine was responsible 
for several Cholera outbreaks in the neighboring villages (Bosshard 2010). 
 
To make a fair judgment of the working conditions and the consequences of Chinese 
investments on the local population, HRW also looked at several other non-Chinese 
copper corporations in Zambia. There was general consensus among the workers 
interviewed that the working environment is better in non-Chinese-owned mining 
companies. Examples like the option to refuse working in unsafe places without 
consequences, but also reports of better maintained working equipment in Canadian or 
Swiss mines, were named. However, workers are under higher pressure to meet 
production quotas. Western investors are also reported of having a more amicable 
management policy (HRW 2011b, 54-61), a judgment that may involve racist tendencies 
by the interviewed people due to the fact that negative comments about the habits of 
Chinese go hand in hand with the description of the working conditions.  
 
A report on the Swiss-Canadian-owned Mopani Copper mine contradicts the view 
presented in the HWR report in many points. It is stated that the miners’ wages in the 
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Mopani mine are also on a comparatively low level. In 2004 and 2005, they were even 
below the basic needs basket for workers operating on temporary or sub-contract 
agreements, a classification calculated by the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflexion. In 
2009 and 2010, these groups received half the payment of that of permanent employees 
for the same work.This subcontracting of local workers, who are subsequently often 
working under unacceptable conditions, is an approach frequently practiced by non-
Chinese investors in the mining sector.  
The researchers also stated that emission controls were insufficient and that miners were 
exposed to great risks of lung diseases like silicosis. Moreover, at least 71 miners were 
killed in 2005 alone in accidents associated with their occupation at the mine, which 
certainly underlines the low security standards (Simpere 2010, 17; Bräutigam 2009, 
301). 
 
At this point it is interesting to learn how the Chinese mining investors are approaching 
these accusations: Some Chinese investors complain that Zambia enforces a strong 
control over expatriate staff and that strikes occur very frequently (Bräutigam 2009, 5-
6). The vice general manager of ZCCZ was quoted by a Chinese newspaper with the 
following words: 
“[The laws are] really ‘too sound’– the standard of the legal system is a 
little too ahead of its time […] Almost 50 percent of the people are 
unemployed and yet they still want to have so many housing allowances, 
education allowances and transportation allowances. Also, employees can’t 
be dismissed without good reason. They can only be dismissed when their 
work record is poor […] It is necessary to have some laws in the early 
stages of development; equality gets sacrificed. Inequalities are a reality at 
every stage of development. They should learn to accept this.” (HRW 2011b, 
24). 
This statement implies that Chinese managers and investors are very familiar with the 
concerns of the Zambian workforce, but simply deny that Zambians “deserve” better 
working conditions. It seems that China underestimates the importance of these factors 
and the potential side-effects they might have on the Chinese engagement in the future.  
Instead, China tries to gain popularity on their own way – for example, by recently 
proposing a soft loan of USD 800 million (Carmody/Taylor 2009, 12) or cancelling USD 
75 million of debt in 2011 (Zambiaonline).  
 
With regard to the consequences Chinese mining investors have to expect, HRW found 
that little pressure is put on Chinese companies by the government since there are 
agreements between Chinese companies and the Zambian government that are clearly 
beneficial for the government, a fact Zambian workers are certainly aware of (HRW 
2011b, 5). 
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This brief analysis shows that serious violations of labor laws and local regulations are 
happening in Chinese-owned mines. Still other non-Chinese investors also tend to follow 
rather loose regulations and regularly break Zambian labor laws. This indicates that local 
authorities and the obviously understaffed safety department in particular should make 
more efforts to execute the international standards in the Zambian mining sector. 
From an economic point of view, China has brought many benefits to the Zambian 
mining industry. As Chinese companies bought and reopened two mines after they have 
been closed down, they secured thousands of jobs and brought new tax revenues to the 
Zambian government, at a time, when copper prices were indeed on a very low level and 
therefore of little profit for Chinese investors. 
 
The construction of the Chambishi Smelter represents a major opportunity for the 
development of the local businesses, also due to its location near the border of the DRC, 
potentially facilitating the processing of the neighboring country’s copper.  
Still, if looking at today’s situation, Chinese investments are primarily focusing on 
commodities, supporting the resource-enclave status of the country. Most of the copper 
is exported in its raw form, which preserves Zambia’s position as raw material exporter 
it has always been (Kamwang/Koyi 2009, 21). In a 2007 paper, Fraser and Lungu 
suggested to develop fabrication industries that would add value to the exported. But a 
World Bank report from 2011 finds that copper manufacturing is still on a very low 
level, with a few companies involved. However, the report also mentions that its 
promotion can be seen critical as the development of a copper-related manufacturing 
industry certainly doesn’t contribute to the diversification badly needed by the country 
(Fraser/ Lungu 2007, 67-72; World Bank 2011, 2-6).  
 
Apart from investments in copper, Chinese investors chose numerous other sectors to 
invest in or to support with aid. I will illustrate these in the following section. 
 
4.4 Chinese investments apart from mining 
 
4.4.1 Agriculture Sector 
  
As in the majority of Zambia’s neighboring countries, the agricultural sector is the 
livelihood for the largest part of the population in Zambia as well, occupying around 
85% (CIA World Factbook) of Zambia’s inhabitants. However, only 16% of the arable 
land is being used with the majority cultivated by small farmers with primitive 
equipment. The rather small part of Chinese capital that flows to Zambian agriculture is 
similar to the low percentage of agricultural investments with respect to the whole of 
Chinese investments in SSA. Bilateral cooperation in agriculture started in the mid-
1970s and involved minor projects like the construction of technical cooperation centres 
as forms of aid or the construction of a maize mill. However, the approach shifted with 
the market liberalization in the 1990s and, as a result, numerous Chinese-owned farms 
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like the China-Zambia Friendship Farm or the Johnken Farm have been established. A 
number of 23 farms was counted in 2008, with investments adding up to USD 10 
million. Chinese (co)owned farms vary significantly in their size, ranging from small, 
family-controlled farms, to larger commercial farms. All of them are producing for the 
local market. Only six of these farms are controlled by Chinese SOEs, while the majority 
is managed by Chinese individuals (Hairong/Sautmann 2010, 307-316).   
One manager of the China-Zambia Friendship Farm describes the concept behind the 
establishment of large commercial farms overseas, taking his employer as an example: 
the farm was created and developed by the China State Farm Agribusiness Cooperation 
(CSFAC) with investments of USD 2.2 million, and it is now worth USD 6 million and 
employs around 200 workers. In this case, the initial investment is set up as a loan which 
has to be repaid annually to the CSFAC. This kind of approach, with a clear long-term 
perspective, is not shared by countries apart from China. Instead of simply demanding 
their money back, the CSFAC lets the management reinvest it, a clear indication of a 
long-term strategy underlying the project (Bräutigam 2009, 254-255). Given such 
information, headlines like “Chinese farms control most of Zambia’s agriculture” on an 
Israeli land issues website or the statement by an official of South Africa’s Standard 
Charter Bank claiming that “In Zambia[…] there are a lot of Chinese farms and workers 
producing Food, which is being sent back to China” appear like pure fiction 
(Hairong/Sautmann 2010, 322). In reality, Chinese agriculturalists represent only a small 
share of Zambia’s commercial farmers and there is no evidence that China is preparing 
for a coordinated construction of large farms with the purpose of exporting goods to 
China. Zambian agricultural exports to China were indeed not substantial in 2011, with 
the top products cotton and tobacco having a 1.3% and 0.5% share, respectively, of all 
exports to China (Trade map). These figures clearly contradict accusations of land 
grabbing in Zambia, but support the logical assumption that Chinese produced or funded 
agricultural products are in competition with the local market. However, the agriculture 
cooperation might still increase apart from commercial farming since an agreement has 
been signed in 2010 to perform investments that would amount to USD 3 billion and 
would provide thousands of jobs in the sphere of biomass fuel production and usage 
(Hairong/Sautmann 2010, 322-328).  
 
Moreover, there have been investments in the cotton industry, where Chinese investors 
established the Chipata Cotton Company in Eastern Zambia. Regarding bilateral aid, 
Chinese provided schooling to Zambians in handling agricultural machinery, various 
fields of rice production and control of tropical diseases in recent years. Especially the 
latter is expected to bring clear and measurable progress (Mwanawina 2008, 8).  
China’s investment focus is still set on their own farms, therefore more transfer of 
technology towards local small scale farms is needed, since such farms make up the 
majority in Zambia according to Lungu (Li 2010, 13). However, this target is difficult to 
accomplish since the technologies of commercial, SOE owned farms are not really 
useful for local farmers (Hairong/Sautmann 2010, 321). 
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4.4.2 Manufacturing Sector 
 
The Zambian manufacturing sector is of high importance to the country. This is 
indicated by its contribution to the GDP of 9.3% in 2010 (AOE 2011c, 5) and the 
employment of about 11% of the paid workforce (IMF 2008).  
 
One of the first Chinese investments in manufacturing was the establishment of a 
partnership in the Mulungushi Textiles factory constructed by China in the late 
1970s/early 1980s. This company was of high importance for Zambia because it added 
value to its raw materials and allowed the sales of Zambian products to local and foreign 
markets (Daily Mail 2012) – a fundamental step towards escaping from the status of a 
resource enclave. But similarly to Zambian parastatals in the mining industry, the factory 
became unprofitable after a short successful period and has also been hit by the debt 
crisis. As a consequence, it was privatized in the 1990s, transformed into a Sino-
Zambian joint venture and renamed to Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles Joint Venture 
Ltd. Yet, paradoxically, not long after privatization, the company could not compete 
with the cheap Chinese imports and global standards and, as a result, closed down in 
2007. This development is another indicator that Chinese companies are also competing 
among one another in Zambia rather than a central government backing and coordinating 
every Chinese initiative. The closing of the factory in 2007 resulted in serious 
consequences for the local industry: local farmers and suppliers were hit badly by the 
loss of orders. In addition, around 1000 jobs have been lost and Zambia went back to 
being a resource enclave exporting cotton in its raw form (Kamwang/Koyi 2009 22; 
Daily Mail 2012). Until the present day, negotiations are being held between the newly-
elected Zambian government and Chinese investors about a possible reopening of the 
factory (Muganya 2012). High representatives of the Zambian government, like the 
former Defense Minister Kalombo Mwansa, already claimed in 2010 that negotiations 
on reopening of the factory are in an advanced state. Especially the new President Sata is 
reported of being aware of the factory’s importance to Zambia. Now all hopes of laid off 
workers lie in the government’s commitment to reopen the factory (Daily Mail 2012). 
The first steps have recently been made by announcing a new general manager at the 
beginning of May 2012 (Allafrica 2012e). Still it seems that the reopened factory will be 
run without Chinese participation since the Zambian government announced to take over 
the Chinese shares due to a lack of interest from the their side (Zambianwatchdog 2012). 
 
Another Chinese manufacturing and trade related investment has been their assistance in 
upgrading the Kamwala Trading center by constructing new retail shops. However, this 
resulted in Chinese traders starting to operate in these new shops by selling imported 
basic goods from China that ranged from clothing to consumer products. This led to 
protests from the local population, claiming that the Chinese replaced their local 
businesses that way (Kamwang/Koyi 2009, 23-24). CNMC is also operating an 
explosives manufacturing plant which is a major supplier of explosives to the Chambishi 
mine (Gu/Humphrey 2007, 7). A tragic occurrence, which for many has become a 
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symbol of the careless approach to safety regulations by the Chinese managers, has been 
an explosion in this factory in 2005, killing 46 Zambian workers (HRW 2011b, 22).  
 
Apart from these few examples, Chinese manufacturing activities in Zambia are on a 
relatively low level.  
 
There is a general lack of transparency in FDI related data that affects all sectors. A 
representative from the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction in Zambia claimed that very 
little information was provided by the government with regard to the real benefits of the 
FDI on poverty reduction and the improvement of life conditions. Another interviewee 
from the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection, a research center focusing on the 
research of social conditions, claims that the FDI impact is difficult to track, especially 
in the private sector. Information about rules and regulations should certainly be made 
transparent and better available to investors. Foreign investors interviewed also expect 
better support from the ZDA – including a translation of the rules and regulations into 
different languages and a regular update of the information (Van der Lugt et al. 2011, 
60).  Essential websites like that of the Bank of Zambia should also be kept up to date as 
many important financial data was simply not available, although highlighted, at the 
time of writing.  
 
Aside from the investments in manufacturing, agriculture and mining described above, 
Zambia is also target of Chinese loans and aid, however on a much lower level than in 
Angola’s case. These loans result in numerous projects in the communications, transport 
and manufacturing sector which will be highlighted in the following section.    
 
4.5 Chinese development loans to Zambia and associated projects in the 
communications, transport and construction sectors 
 
Aid cooperation with China dates back to the 1960s and has since been performed in 
various areas. In the medical and educational sectors, China has provided doctors and 
medical equipment to Zambia and is continuing its engagement until today, with projects 
like the construction of a National Malaria Centre or the provision of scholarships in 
China. The first Chinese loans to Zambia which were related construction and 
manufacturing projects, were granted in the 1970s. The loan-backed construction of the 
TAZARA railway project, road construction, new government buildings or the 
Mulungushi Textile factory are the main examples for that type of cooperation 
(Mwanawina 2008, 9-13; Kamwang/Koyi 2009, 27; Gov.cn 2007).  
 
The construction of the TAZARA railway, which linked Zambia with the port of Dar es 
Salaam in Tanzania, was completed in 1975 and financed by a Chinese government loan 
that was divided between the two recipient countries. It is remarkable that before the 
approval by China, the gigantic project has been rejected by the World Bank as 
92 
 
infeasible. From that time until recent years, China has provided loans for different 
purposes related to this project, including technical assistance in 1995 or cash assistance 
in 2004. These loans are special in their definition since they are mainly interest free or 
soft loans, hence credits below the market interest rate. The fact that the TAZARA 
railway is valued as inefficient and unprofitable leads to dependence and rising debt to 
China. It seems that it can only be kept alive by continuous loan agreements.  
 
Two other early construction projects financed by Chinese interest free loans were the 
Lusaka Kaoma road or the Serenje Samfya Mansa road. One of the first major 
infrastructure projects was the construction of the Zambian government complex in 
1985. Other key projects were the Kamwala market or a newly constructed stadium in 
the copperbelt region (Mwanawina 2008, 10-12; Bräutigam 2009, 40). 
 
However, as briefly mentioned above, Chinese loans to Zambia are much lower than to 
our first focus Angola and other SSA countries, with only around USD 410 million over 
the past 40 years (measured in 2006). The number of the loan destinations is relatively 
clear since more than 50% of the figure above are associated with the construction and 
maintenance of the TAZARA railway. I also didn’t find any evidence that the loans are 
resource-backed which may be the result of the privatized commodity industry in 
Zambia. China’s loans in the construction sector often require, similarly to loan-
prerequisites in other countries, the company contracted for the project to be Chinese. In 
addition, the loan agreements are kept in secret and Chinese partners are reported to be 
directly involved in the implementation of the development programs, which might be a 
consequence of the lacking planning units in the local governments and ministries with a 
rather weak project analysis capacity (Mwanawina 2008, 18-21).  
Representatives of various areas in the Zambian economy agreed during a workshop that 
a major characteristic of Chinese loan agreements in Zambia is their direct negotiation 
with the heads of state, which implies that there is often no involvement of an expert 
committee that can analyze the aid agreement. The development consultant Stephen 
Muyakwa stated that Western donors like the EU sent warnings to Zambia, and the 
World Bank and IMF also showed their concern about the Chinese aid policy. Chinese 
investors refused the critique by arguing that Western donors have had enough time to 
support Africa’s development and now it’s their turn, given that as a developing country, 
they claim to have a better understanding of Zambia’s problems (AFRODAD 2009, 11-
17).  
Although comparatively small in both volume and quantity, China’s aid related projects 
involve numerous challenges for Zambia. Local contractors can be definitely regarded as 
the losers of the preconditions that are imposed. Therefore, Mwanawina recommends 
that beneficial conditions for Chinese enterprises connected with loans should be 
removed and that the public benefit of incentives for Chinese enterprises should be 
reviewed (Mwanawina 2008, 18-25). All the same, China’s price level, for example in 
the road construction, sometimes offers discounts between 25% and 50% compared to 
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the proposals of other foreign investors. This is mainly the result of their easy access to 
capital, cheap materials, low wages of the working force and subsidies provided by the 
Chinese government (Kamwang/Koyi 2009, 27). Foreign, but also local contractors 
often simply cannot compete with these benefits. 
Chinese constructions are felt to meet Zambia’s quality standards, at least for the cases 
observed, since the Zambian control authorities suffer from a serious lack of personnel 
and know-how. At the same time, it was claimed that the cityscape of the capital Lusaka 
is being affected negatively by the constructions of foreign investors including Chinese. 
The reason for this is the permission to perform projects that are below Zambian 
standards, while it is also reported that foreign investors are using their own designs 
illegally, not controlled by Zambian councils or ministries. Again, a major part of the 
problem lies in the lack of know-how and manpower of Zambian official institutions, 
since controls are often limited or not performed properly. (Mwanawina 2008, 10-11).   
 
The experts participating in the workshop mentioned above also recommended that the 
Development Bank of Zambia must ensure coordination of these new initiatives. Also 
civil organizations must show a stronger engagement in the private sector and develop 
linkages with links to civil society organizations in China. The participants also 
underlined that Zambia should learn from China concerning the long-term planning of 
their investment policies, which can be achieved through strengthening the ZDA 
(AFRODAD 2009, 20-22). 
4.6 Sino-Zambian trade relations 
 
Chinese-Zambian bilateral trade has made a strong jump in the last years, with Zambian 
exports to China rising from USD 257 million in 2006 to USD 1.5 billion in 2011 and 
imports from China rising from USD 84 million in 2006 to USD 695 million in 2011. 
However, similarly to Angola, the trade balance between the two countries shows a clear 
misbalance in their composition and size. Zambia’s exports to China are by nearly 88% 
copper-related, followed by oars and other base metals, aircraft parts and cotton with 
minimal shares ranging from 1 to 3%. At the same time, Zambian imports from China 
are more than two times lower than its exports, but they are increasing faster than the 
exports in the last years. Again, imports are much more diversified (as shown in below 
Table 4.3) and mainly composed of machinery, electrical equipment and vehicles.This 
impressive growth over the last years made China Zambia’s second largest export 
partner and third largest import partner in 2011. 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All products 85.458 83.792 233.976 227.230 178.029 289.699 695.265
1 Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc 19,8% 34,1% 51,5% 29,8% 29,2% 30,5% 28,9%
2 Electrical, electronic equipment 38,1% 9,4% 7,8% 17,9% 16,6% 11,5% 18,5%
3 Vehicles other than railway, tramway 7,8% 20,2% 2,8% 6,2% 8,1% 5,6% 13,5%
4 Articles of iron or steel 3,8% 1,9% 16,2% 14,8% 11,1% 8,7% 7,1%
5 Plastics and articles thereof 1,8% 1,0% 0,5% 1,1% 1,1% 1,2% 4,1%
6 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 0,2% 0,4% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0% 0,1% 3,6%
7 Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings 1,2% 2,8% 1,3% 2,9% 2,5% 2,3% 3,5%
8 Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus 0,7% 0,5% 1,5% 1,6% 3,2% 13,9% 3,4%
9 Iron and steel 0,3% 4,3% 3,7% 2,7% 2,8% 3,3% 2,8%
10 Rubber and articles thereof 2,7% 4,2% 2,8% 2,9% 2,3% 3,4% 2,4%
Product category
Table 4.3: Composition of Chinese imports to Zambia, calculated by author (Trade Map) 
Similarly to Angola, Zambian exports to China also fall under the LDC preference 
scheme due to its status of a Least Developed County. This means that China is 
providing duty or quota free access to at least 97% (UNIDO 2011, 17) of the products 
originating from Zambia. 
 
Mwanawina presented an overview of the winners and losers of the increased trade 
relationship. Local producers appear in a mixed position. On the one hand, some can 
boost their businesses with cheap Chinese products available on the market, but at the 
same time, they are competing with cheaper Chinese imports. Since this situation is 
expected to intensify within the next years, the government can counteract the 
development by encouraging the establishment of further joint ventures. Consumers on 
the other side, benefit from the cheaper products and their access to new markets with 
the trade-off of sometimes lower product quality (Mwanawina 2008, 13-18). However, 
as mentioned in the sections above, the quality issue is not always valid since Zambian 
retail outlets are reported to offer at better quality than earlier at lower prices 
(Kamwang/Koyi 2009, 28).   
 
Another consequence of the, not only China-driven, increase in exports, is the dutch 
disease. Its results could be observed in Zambia after cheap imports increased due to the 
strong Zambian currency Kwacha that was boosted by the high exports and subsequently 
lead to higher export prices for Zambian products (Bräutigam 2009, 218).  
 
4.7 Chinese immigration to Zambia 
 
There is general consensus that the number of Chinese immigrants to Zambia has 
significantly increased over the last years. But also in Zambia’s case, the figures of 
Chinese migrants vary depending on the source. While around 3000 Chinese were 
estimated to live and work in Zambia in 1990, their number is reported to have increased 
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to 20.000 in 2010. Other sources name actual figures lying between 4.000 and 6.000 
Chinese in Zambia. More than 50.000 Chinese workers were reported to have 
participated in the construction of the TAZARA line, a figure that underlines the 
gigantic dimension of the project. Yet, most of them returned to China after the 
completion of the railway line. 
Most Chinese migrants are working as engineers and employees in mining, followed by 
construction and agricultural companies. Another major group are private Chinese 
business men, who see a positive investment outlook for Africa due to a comparatively 
limited presence of foreign businesses. With regard to the agriculture-related migration 
to Zambia, there have been reports of several thousand farmers who migrated to a few 
SSA countries including Zambia, but there is no detailed published empirical data on 
this topic available yet. 
Similarly to other African countries, Chinese communities in Zambia are reported to 
have the tendency to isolate themselves from the local population. Chinese workers in 
the NFCA Chambishi headquarters, for example, tend to live separately from the local 
community. An interviewed Zambian worker expressed his opinion about the Chinese 
immigrants as follows:  
 
“Western managers treat Zambian employees like their small brothers. For 
instance, the Western managers will use the same toilet as the Zambian 
workers, but in Chinese companies, the Chinese have their own toilet. It 
seems that the Chinese like to put up barriers. When guys from America and 
South Africa do business in Zambia, they will look for houses where we 
[Zambians] live, but the Chinese are not the same. […] They even have their 
own bus service running from where they live directly to the mining sites 
[…] If you Chinese want to stay in Zambia and want to do good business 
here, you should open up and overcome these barriers.”(Li 2010, 12) 
 
Some other workers stated that Chinese managers are not greeting Zambian employees 
and in general are not outgoing towards Zambians (Li 2010, 10-12; Park 2009, 3-8). 
 
During protests resulting from the low wage level in a Chinese mine, a Chinese manager 
was attacked by Zambians. These protests then turned into a riot and a worker was 
wounded by a Chinese manager. As rumors about his death spread, a Chinese compound 
was stormed by Zambians, where another Chinese manager had wounded five other 
Zambian workers (Bräutigam 2009, 5-6).  
 
Still it seems that incidents like these and the rather critical attitude towards Chinese is 
mainly resulting from their engagement in the copper mines: a recent study found that, 
with the exception of the Copperbelt region, a stable majority of the people interviewed 
had a positive opinion about the Chinese, mainly driven by the fact that low priced 
consumer goods are now affordable to them (Park 2009, 14). 
 
96 
 
Since these statements are all subjective views, it is difficult to draw a general 
conclusion on this matter. Moreover, policymakers like current President Michael Sata 
during his election campaign in 2006 spiced the already critical approach with 
aggressive anti-Chinese statements, as mentioned above. Therefore, it is essential to 
perform further research on this topic, especially with regard to various sectors of 
Chinese activities in Zambia. 
 
5. Conclusion and analysis of research questions  
 
In the following concluding part, I will provide answers to the research questions that 
guided the thesis, mostly based on the findings from Chapter 3 and 4. 
 
The analyses in this thesis demonstrate that Chinese activities in Africa are numerous 
and very well diversified. Still, the first research question – whether there are 
investments apart from commodity-related sectors that are relevant in size, despite the 
economies’ commodity-oriented nature – can only partly be affirmed. In Zambia’s case, 
China is indeed making investments aside from mining, investing in commercial farming 
by constructing and operating farms or establishing the Zambia-China Mulungushi 
Textiles Joint Venture.  
Today, Zambia offers a huge potential for further development and investment-
diversification, for example in the agricultural cooperation, as only 16% of the arable 
land is being used and cultivated by farmers using rather primitive equipment 
(Hairong/Sautmann 2010, 307-316). Therefore, the extension of the promotion of 
Chinese agricultural technologies as observed in other African countries is only a 
question of time. Moreover, the Chinese-Zambian agreement to perform biomass fuel-
related investments totaling USD 3 billion may change the current setting 
(Hairong/Sautmann 2010, 328). Momentarily however, relevant non commodity-related 
investments are very limited, as the primary focus is copper and coal mining, intensified 
by the establishment of the SEZ in Chambishi. 
 
In Angola’s case, the situation is slightly different: on the one hand, the Angolan market 
seems to be more attractive to Chinese investors as more investments in non-commodity 
industries can be observed in direct comparison with Zambia. On the other hand, due to 
numerous often nontransparent loan agreements, FDI often go hand in hand with loan-
related projects. It is also common that Chinese companies that have entered the market 
through aid projects financed by oil-backed loans, gain ground and therefore have a 
competitive advantage compared to other investors. In the agricultural sector, Chinese 
activities are dominated by projects resulting from loan and development agreements. 
Chinese companies also established manufacturing industries like, inter alia, a car 
manufacturing plant, an air conditioning facility, a motorcycle fabric or a granite factory, 
with more investments to follow, as announced by the Chinese Vice President in 2011 
(Xinhuanet 2010). In the communication sector, the Chinese company ZTE entered the 
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Angolan market in 2004 by taking partial control of the management in Angola’s second 
largest mobile operator Movicel. In addition, the Chinese company Huawei has 
performed major investments in the optimization of Angola’s wireless technology and 
the ICT sector (Kiala 2010, 28-46). Similarly to Zambia, Angola desperately needs 
further investment and local involvement in non-mineral sectors to make its economy 
less vulnerable to crises and fluctuations in commodity prices. 
Are there any differences between the approaches of Angolan and Zambian authorities 
in the management of foreign investments, Chinese in particular? 
First, the initial situation differs significantly among the two countries. Angola’s 
commodity industry and major companies in other sectors are entirely or partly state-
owned. This implies that the bulk of foreign investments have to be performed through 
joint ventures. Zambia, on the other hand, initiated a massive privatization programme in 
the 1990s, which resulted in the state being only a partial shareholder in the country’s 
commodity-related companies. Therefore, Angola has much more control over its 
commodities than Zambia, a fact that is reflected by resource-backed loans worth 
billions of dollars in Angola. We have learned that, at the end of the day, liberalization 
had a rather adverse impact on Zambia although one cannot say where Zambia would be 
today without the reforms promoted by the World Bank and IMF. Especially in the 
country’s main pillar, the mining industry, millions of taxes were withheld as a 
consequence of special development agreements with foreign investors, including China. 
Both Zambia and Angola have a very low transparency level and corruption is 
widespread in their main industries. Both countries started to improve the situation only 
very recently, so the current business environment aggravates a fair comparison of the 
different approaches. It is evident that both countries are lacking controlling bodies and 
official staff to enforce compliance with the laws and regulations imposed by the 
government. In numerous cases, this leads to construction projects of minor quality or 
violations of labour laws and quotas imposed by the government to involve local 
workforce, to name a few negative consequences. Especially in Angola’s case, it is 
difficult to track if the local population gets value for their money as a result of loan-
financed projects. The obligatory involvement of Angolan companies in major foreign 
investments seems to be a beneficial precondition for the country. However, the wide 
spread corruption and the difficult task of tracking funds transferred through obscure 
organizations like the CIF makes an objective evaluation of the impacts very 
problematic. Both governments do not seem to have any long-term oriented programs of 
how to deal with Chinese investments and, moreover, of how to involve more local 
businesses in the investments. 
What is the concrete measurable impact of recent Chinese activities on the economic 
development and local labour force of Zambia and Angola? 
This question also cannot be answered unambiguously for both countries. In Zambia, 
Chinese activities in the construction sector play a minor role compared to Angola. On 
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the one hand this is due to a long period of peace in the last decades and therefore less 
immediate need for a reconstruction of the infrastructure. On the other hand, China did 
not provide resource-backed loans to Zambia that are comparable in size to their 
engagement in Angola.  
An early positive impact of Chinese investments in Zambia has been the construction 
and continuous support of the presently unprofitable TAZARA railway line in the 1970s, 
a project that had been rejected by the World Bank at that time, but that is of high 
importance for Zambia. China also invested in the acquisition of copper mines, while 
other investors had fled due to low copper prices. These investments secured thousands 
of jobs for Zambians and contributed to the country’s tax revenues. In addition, China 
has cancelled parts of Zambia’s debt and provided several soft loans to optimize the 
country’s infrastructure. The low price level of Chinese goods made markets accessible 
to a large part of Zambians that simply could not afford these products before.  
Still, the Chinese engagement has also had numerous negative effects on Zambia: the 
investments in copper mining and the establishment of the SEZ in Chambishi were 
accompanied by a decrease in labour standards, an aggravation of the social 
infrastructure and lower involvement of local businesses. Moreover, Chinese 
investments in Zambia are still focused on commodities and, as a result, contribute little 
to the county’s diversification, perpetuating Zambia’s status of a resource enclave. The 
competition from Chinese imports and agriculture activities has a rather negative impact 
on local businesses.  
In Angola, Chinese imports have had a similar result: extended product availability for 
Angolans that could not participate in certain markets before, with the trade-off of strong 
competition for local businesses.The impact of China’s acquisition of stakes in Angolan 
oil blocks is rather difficult to assess. Moreover, they play a rather minor role in the 
acquisition of oil stakes compared to Western companies. Similarly, China’s activities in 
diamond mining are difficult to evaluate as the acquisition happened very recently. 
China’s establishment of various manufacturing companies in Angola certainly is a 
positive development, as these factories provide employment for the local workforce and 
produce goods ranked high on the value chain. Still, plans announced by the Angolan 
government to extend foreign investments in diamond mining, the recent construction of 
Chinese granite manufacturing company, or statements by Chevron to invest in new 
resource sectors such as natural gas are examples showing that Angola is still putting a 
strong focus on exploiting their natural resources rather than diversifying the economy.   
The most significant impacts of Chinese activities in Angola result from oil-backed 
loans. These loans have led to numerous enormous construction projects and the 
reconstruction of large parts of the destroyed infrastructure. These are measurable 
positive impacts for the Angolan population.  
Is China a better alternative to traditional actors with regard to aid and loans, or does 
their engagement lead to further unmanageable indebtedness of African economies?  
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In Angola’s case, the cooperation with traditional donors like the IMF or the World 
Bank has been on a comparably low level as, for instance, the total principal of loans 
received from the World Bank amounted to USD 949 million by May 2012 (World Bank 
reports, 2012), while Chinese loans from Exim Bank were totalling 10.5 billion just 
between 2004 and 2010 (Corkin 2011, 2). Angola rather tends to intensify the 
cooperation with traditional donors, when the commodity prices are at a low level, as 
recently with the IMF after the 2008/09 economic crises (HRW 2011a, 20-27). Chinese 
Angola mode loans brought major changes to the country. They offered the unique 
opportunity of receiving billions of loans, without being obliged to restructure the 
economy as it was the case for Zambia with IMF and World Bank loans. This makes the 
Angolan government more flexible in deciding how the money will be used and which 
projects will be performed, rather than being overruled by the donors. The loans are 
generally not granted in cash, but rather transferred directly to the contracted company 
for the performance of specific projects, which means that very often the money stays in 
China. This approach leads to a visible distribution of the oil revenues among the 
Angolan population by rebuilding the country’s destroyed infrastructure and avoiding 
the cash of passing the hands of local policymakers. However, one has to keep in mind 
that this is the optimal scenario which may not always work in practice, as shown by the 
involvement of dubious constructs like the CIF in the loan distribution or by funds that 
disappeared from Angolan accounts imply. Moreover, the fact that many details of the 
loan agreements have not been made public and the allegedly very low level of the 
pricing backing certain loans have certain clear disadvantages for the local population. 
Therefore, it is not objectively measurable, at least not at the moment, if Angolans 
indeed get value for their money. Moreover, common prerequisites of using Chinese 
materials, contracting Chinese companies and employing Chinese workforce are 
withholding labour and business opportunities for the locals. Still, despite all these 
negative aspects, Angola seems to prefer the Chinese as a partner as the loan-figures 
shown above indicate.   
 
On the contrary, in Zambia’s case, Chinese loans play a comparably minor role. While 
Chinese loans totalled only USD 410 million in the past 40 years measured in 2006 
(Mwanawina 2008, 19), World Bank loans amounted to more than USD 3.6 billion by 
2006 and USD 4 billion by May 2012 (World Bank reports, 2012). As a result, the 
handwriting of the Bretton-Woods donors can be clearly seen in the structure of 
Zambia’s economy.  
Apart from the positive impacts, ranging from the TAZARA railway that possibly would 
not exist without Chinese funding, soft loans and debt cancellations, Chinese-financed 
construction projects have a clear drawback for the local population as the common 
prerequisites of contracting Chinese companies with the construction are certainly not 
contributing to a strengthening of local businesses. 
With regard to the concern of rising indebtedness through Chinese loans, the danger is 
evident – especially in Angola’s case. Only by assuming that the oil price remains stable 
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may the repayment of the loans be guaranteed. Moreover, China’s hunger for Angola’s 
oil contributed significantly to the reduction of the country’s debt burden. 
 
 
Are there any lessons that traditional donors and investors can learn from Chinese 
investors and vice-versa? 
Western investors can learn numerous lessons from Chinese investment behaviour, and 
they probably should do so very soon in order not to lose further ground to emerging 
investors. First, Chinese investors, more than traditional investors, tend to have a more 
long-term oriented approach as is evident in their frequent investments under difficult 
circumstances, like the acquisitions of mines in Zambia during the financial crisis, or 
investments in Sierra Leone during the civil war. Chinese companies also often operate 
on low margins which may lead to little short-term profits, but to a crowding out of 
existing competitors, and therefore higher market shares in the long run. This long-term 
oriented approach can be accomplished largely only with the backing of Chinese (state) 
banks who support major overseas operations with export credits or loans, implementing 
the going global strategy. Although there is no evidence that the Chinese governmental 
institutions are involved in the coordination and planning of all overseas activities, 
institutions like Exim Bank or CDB are unique instruments in the support of Chinese 
overseas operations. Also, the concept of Special Economic Zones that is still in its 
initial stage in Africa, could serve as an example for well-coordinated overseas 
operations. Generally spoken, the Chinese approach of intercontinental business 
partnership, rather than a donor-beggar relationship that Western institutions and 
companies are often associated with, has been met with positive feedback in Africa.  
Chinese investors and officials, for their part, should keep in mind that providing 
infrastructure or jobs though investments is only half the battle, since the regularly 
observed disregard of labour laws and local regulations, lacking integration in the 
society and low involvement of locals in higher positions in Chinese projects could 
create serious obstacles on the road to their long-term goals. China’s labour and 
environmental regulations are still far from meeting international standards and it would 
be a negative development if these regulations were imported to Africa via China’s 
economic engagement. Despite the liberal environment for Chinese investors, they 
should keep in mind that by taking advantage of this situation they might undermine 
their basis for future investments. 
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7. Appendix  
 
Abstract German 
 
Die chinesisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen erlebten in dem vergangenen Jahrzehnt eine 
enorme Entwicklung auf unterschiedlichsten Ebenen. Aufgrund der deutlich 
intensivierten Handelsbeziehungen, einer rasanten Erhöhung der Direktinvestitionen und 
durch afrikanische Rohstoffe gesicherte Milliardenkredite, wurden die Karten auf der 
Investorenlandschaft in vielen Volkswirtschaften Afrikas neu gemischt. Zwei dieser 
Länder, die eine starke Entwicklung der bilateralen Beziehungen aufweisen, sind Angola 
und Sambia. 
In Angola riefen Chinas Aktivitäten besonders  im  Zusammenhang mit durch Öl 
gesicherten Milliardenkrediten die Aufmerksamkeit der traditionellen Geberländer und 
der Medien hervor. Chinas Kredite standen im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik, da China keinerlei 
strukturelle Änderungen in Angola als Bedingungen an die Löhne geknüpft hatte und 
somit in den Augen der traditionellen Geber, wie der Weltbank oder des IWF, deren 
bisherige Bemühungen untergraben hatte. Desweiteren verlaufen diese bilateralen 
Vereinbarungen und die anschließende Projektvergabe im Regelfall wenig transparent 
und machen somit eine Auswertung der tatsächlichen Vorteile und Konsequenzen für 
Angola sehr schwierig. Gleichzeitig setzten die meisten chinesischen Kredite an Angola 
voraus, dass die anschließenden Projekte zu einem großen Teil durch chinesische 
Unternehmen und von chinesischen Arbeitern durchgeführt werden, was in einer 
Benachteiligung der lokalen Bevölkerung resultiert. Andererseits konnte Angola mit 
Hilfe chinesischer Kredite in sehr kurzer Zeit ihre – zu einem wesentlichen Teil durch 
den Bürgerkrieg zerstöre Infrastruktur – aufbauen und gleichzeitig erstmals den 
Rohstoffreichtum durch die große Anzahl an Bauprojekten auf sichtbarem Wege mit der 
Bevölkerung teilen. Auch trugen chinesische Investitionen und Kredite maßgeblich zu 
Angolas Unabhängigkeit von traditionellen Gebern bei und ermöglichen dem Land 
dadurch eine bessere Position am Verhandlungstisch. Speziell in Angola bestehen 
Zweifel, ob die große Anzahl chinesischer Bauten auch tatsächlich den gängigen 
Qualitätsstandards entspricht und ob die Mittel die Angola in diesem Zusammenhang 
aufbringt, auch gerechtfertigt sind.  
Zum heutigen Zeitpunkt ist es jedoch zu früh, um diesbezügliche Rückschlüsse zu 
ziehen da, außer einigen wenigen negativen Beispielen für die schlechte Qualität 
chinesische Bauten, keine empirischen Daten vorliegen. 
 
Im Fall von Zamba spielen vor allem chinesische Investitionen im Kupfer-Sektor eine 
bedeutende Rolle. Nach der Privatisierung der vormals staatlichen Kupferindustrie 
Sambias akquirierten chinesische Stattunternehmen  nach und nach – gemeinsam mit 
anderen ausländischen Investoren – Kupfer-, Kohle- und Nickel-Minen in Sambia. Diese 
Investitionen waren in Sambia sehr willkommen, da viele Minen aufgrund der niedrigen 
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Rohstoffpreise zum Zeitpunkt der Akquisition aufgegeben wurden oder bereits seit 
längerer Zeit still standen. Jedoch folgen diesen Investitionen im Laufe der Jahre 
schwere Vorwürfe in Richtung der chinesischen Investoren betreffend der in den Minen 
vorherrschen Arbeitsbedingungen, der niedrigen Löhne und der Ausgrenzung lokaler 
Arbeitskräfte durch den Import chinesischer Arbeitskraft. Die erhobenen Vorwürfe an 
der Vorgehensweise Chinas haben sich in weiterer Folge zwar in vielen Aspekten 
bewahrheitet, wurden gleichzeitig aber auch durch die Feststellung relativiert, dass auch 
andere ausländische Investoren geltende Gesetzte missachten und es nun vor allem 
Aufgabe der sambischen Regulierungsbehörden ist, durch schärfere Kontrollen die 
Situationen in den Minen zu verbessern. 
Chinas Engagement in Afrika wird vorwiegend mit Rohstoffen in Verbindung gebracht 
wird, tatsächlich werden sowohl in Angola als auch in Sambia signifikante Investitionen 
in anderen Bereichen wie dem medizinischen Sektor, der Fertigungswirtschaft oder dem 
Landwirtschaftssektor getätigt.   
Im Allgemeinen sind die Resultate der chinesischen Aktivitäten zum derzeitigen 
Zeitpunkt sehr schwer messbar, da einerseits oft nur sehr wenig Zeit seit den 
Investitionen vergangenen ist, aber auch da ausführliche empirische Daten fehlen und 
die von den Regierungen veröffentlichen Zahlen oft lückenhaft sind und derzeit keine 
Regelmäßigkeit aufweisen. Jedoch lässt sich bereits jetzt sagen, dass sich das 
chinesische Engagement nicht gravierend von dem anderer ausländischer Akteure 
unterscheidet und wesentlich gemäßigter ausfällt als oft in den Medien dargestellt. China 
ist also zusammenfassend gesagt viel eher ein weiterer Akteur mit unterschiedlichsten 
Aktivitäten auf dem international stark umworbenen Kontinent, als eine Bedrohung für 
Afrika und den Westen, wie oftmals dargestellt. 
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Abstract English 
 
Sino-African relations developed enormously in various sectors in recent years. A 
massive increase in bilateral trade, millions of new investment flows, as well as large 
amounts of resource-backed loans from China have brought many changes to African 
economies and their business environments. Two sub-Saharan African countries that 
were targets to numerous capital flows from China in last recent years were Angola and 
Zambia.  
 
Chinas activities in connection with oil-backed loans in Angola have caused strong 
attention from traditional donors and media and became objects for criticism for several 
reasons: First, China didn’t require any preconditions in terms of structural changes for 
the provision of the loans, as it is the common in connection with credits from the World 
Bank or the IMF. Thus, these loans were regarded to undermine the efforts of traditional 
donors to improve governance and transparency in Angola. In addition, these bilateral 
agreements and the resulting projects lacked transparency which aggravated a proper 
evaluation of their effects on the country. In most cases, Chinese loans to Angola require 
a major part of the projects to be contracted to Chinese companies and subsequently, 
parts of the workforce to be Chinese which clearly is a drawback for the local population 
and businesses.  
Still, Angola managed to rebuild significant parts of its destroyed infrastructure through 
Chinese loans and thus share its wealth gained through natural resources with the 
population. The credit lines also led to more independence from traditional donors and, 
as a result, to a strengthening of Angola’s position on the bargaining table.  
Many doubts are issued whether the large number of Chinese constructions in Angola 
complies with international quality standards and gives Angola value for its money. At 
present, however, it is too early to draw general conclusions on this issue since very little 
empirical data is available and these assumptions rely on a small number of examples of 
minor quality constructions performed by Chinese companies. 
 
In Zambia’s case, especially Chinese investments in the copper industry had a 
significant impact on the country’s economy. After the privatization of Zambia’s 
formerly state-owned mining industry, Chinese companies acquired, along with other 
foreign investors, two copper mines, a coal mine and a nickel mine. These investments 
were highly appreciated at the time of acquisition, since the mines were inoperative or 
closed down, mostly because of low commodity prices. However, these investments 
were followed by serious complaints directed at the new Chinese investors, who were 
accused of disregarding labour laws, paying low wages and taking away local jobs by 
importing Chinese workforce. Although many of these claims are true, there are also 
other foreign investors who perform similar violations, which indicates that the weak 
Zambian regulatory institutions should put more efforts to enforce compliance to local 
laws.  
Although public perception of China’s engagement in Africa is mainly associated with 
projects related to raw materials, both Angola and Zambia attracted significant Chinese 
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direct investments and other capital flows in numerous other areas like manufacturing, 
agriculture or medical sectors.  
In general, the results of Chinese activities in Africa are difficult to measure at the 
moment, since on the one hand, too little time has passed since the initial investments 
have been made and on the other hand, empirical data and official figures are often 
scarcely available or incomplete. It can be concluded that China’s engagement in Africa 
does not differ significantly from that of other foreign investors and in reality is much 
less substantial than claimed by media and policymakers. China is rather another player 
on the African continent, involved in countless activities, than a new threat for African 
sovereignty and Western donors and investors. 
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